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INTRODUCTION: THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND POLITICS
We like to imagine that law operates in a world separate and apart
from that of politics. We expect thatjudges will decide cases based on
the facts and existing precedents, rather than on the preferences of
those in power. We understand that each judge may see a case dif-
ferently based on life experience, and we recognize that politics influ-
ences the selection of the judges.2 But that is where the influence of
politics on judicial decision making is supposed to end.3 We disdain
the notion of judges rendering decisions under the threat of political
retribution.4 Article III's tenure and salary guarantees for federal
judges are the constitutional embodiment of this value of judicial in-
dependence from political pressure." When we speak of the rule of
Vanderbilt, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Legal History Colloquium at New
York University, as well as from panel discussions at one or more Law and Society, and
American Political Science Association meetings. Generous and essential support was
provided by Vanderbilt Law School, New York University Law School, and the Vander-
bilt University Research Council, and the project itself benefited-as I have said be-
fore-from my time at the Rockefeller Foundation Study Center in Bellagio.
' Don Herzog tackles what we mean by the distinction between law and politics, in
the course of which he explains the fundamental conflict between positivist and liberal
views of law. See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT
THEORY 110-47 (1989). Herzog explains:
We could again cast the point as a matter of insulating law from the daily exi-
gencies of politics. Or we can think of the point in terms of selective blind-
ness. Judges should pay no attention to whether litigants are kingly or com-
mon; jurors should ignore the government's desires in deliberating and
ruling....
Id. at 129.
2 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS ix-xi (1994) (criticizing the
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices as overly politicized because they focus too
much on the nominee's views on controversial legal issues); see also Elena Kagan, Con-
firmation. Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CI-. L. REv. 919, 930 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L.
CARTER, supra) (criticizing recent Supreme Court confirmations as a rubber stamp of
approval applied without ascertaining a nominee's views).
3 Judges' political and extrajudicial activities are limited to reduce conflict with
their judicial office and to avoid the appearance of impropriety. See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT 5-7 (1998).
' See HERZOG, supra note 1, at 128 ("[L]egal interpretation may not be principled
ifjudges are haunted by the fear that they will lose theirjobs if they displease the pow-
erful.").
" See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office."); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (finding that the purpose ofjudges' tenure and salary protection
is to ensure independence of the judicial branch); Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers:
In. Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. LJ. 109, 113 (1997) ("The conventional wisdom is
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law-at home and abroad-this is in large part what we mean.6
Concern about the separation of law and politics has made a bat-
tleground of 1937.7 In that year, while Franklin Roosevelt's threat to
"pack" the membership of the Supreme Court was still pending, the
Court appears to have done an about-face. Prior to the "switch in
that Article IIIjudges have the greatest independence because of the assurance of life
tenure and the protection against decreased salary."). See generally Francis J. Larkin,
The Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats toJudicial IndependenceJUDGES' J., Winter
1997, at 4 ("Judicial independence [is] the ideal and lodestar that undergirds the
Americanjudicial system....").
6 As Christopher Larkins explains the matter:
The courts' enjoyment of judicial independence will be important to the
proper operation of any constitutional democracy, as it allows them to act as
an institutional mechanism to safeguard the rule of law. This is especially the
case for those countries undergoing processes of democratization, where insti-
tutionalizing respect for the rule of law is of utmost importance.
Christopher M. LarkinsJudicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Con-
ceptualAnalysis, 44AM.J. COMP. L. 605, 625-26 (1996). We also mean that compliance
with judicial decisions will not turn on agreement or disagreement with them. SeePaul
J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 968-69 n.70
(1978) ("Fulfillment of the duty [of the Executive to back up judicial orders] does not
depend upon agreementwith the court orders.").
7 Perhaps the single best exposition of the relationship among New Deal intellec-
tual thought, New Deal events, post-New Deal developments, and persistent concern
about the separation of law and politics is Michael Seidman and Mark Tushnet's book,
Remnants of Belief Seidman and Tushnet explain that although legal realism was a cen-
tral tool in removing judicial review as an obstacle to economic regulation, realists al-
ready experienced anxiety about the separation of law and politics. This anxiety only
increased when, in the wake of the New Deal, the Supreme Court engaged in active
judicial supervision in the area of individual rights, while eschewing it with regard to
economic regulation. Because no satisfactory answer to this problem has presented
itself, anxiety persists. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARKV. TUSHNET, REMNANTS
oFB T;IE 31-39 (1996) (discussing the concern of realists over law's slide into politics).
G. Edward White identifies the New Deal switch of the Court as the seminal point for
adopting the political "it depends on the judge" perspective. G. Edward White, The
Constitution and the New Deal 281-82 (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Thurman Arnold captured the anxiety about
the separation of law and politics present even on the eve of the Court-packing plan,
describing the central role of law as a symbol of stability. "It saves us from the mob,
and also from the dictator." THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 35
(1935) [hereinafter ARNOLD, SYMBOLS]. Then, in a prescient story, Arnold told of a
Latin American country in which a "lawless executive" ordered a court-martial of some
students implicated in a bombing. Id. at 43. The students' attorneys challenged the
jurisdiction of the court-martial and were told to withdraw the motion: "[T]he Gov-
ernment had no objection to allowing the fullest defense," but "consequences" to the
attorneys would follow if the motion were not abandoned. Id. Arnold observes of the
executive: "He controlled the courts, yet he could not help believing that he did not
control the law." Id
" See WILLAM E. LEUcHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 216 (1995) ("In
the spring of 1937, though, in the midst of the controversy over President Roosevelt's
Court-packing message, the Court began to execute an astonishing about-face."). A
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time that saved Nine,"9 the Court invalidated a number of New Deal
measures, one after another.'0 After the switch, the Court removed
itself as an obstacle to economic legislation," even as it gradually
found a new role scrutinizing legislative enactments that threatened
individual liberty. 2 Ever since the New Deal, commentators have de-
bated whether the change was a result of political pressure, '3 or
recent revisionist account of the New Deal argues that there was no dramatic doctrinal
shift. Rather, revisionist scholars argue, the seeming change in 1937 was the product
of gradual doctrinal changes. Moreover, early New Deal legislation was struck, accord-
ing to revisionists, because of poor draftsmanship. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT 36-39 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING]; Barry
Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Decisions from Swift to
Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 146 (1992) [hereinafter Cushman,
Stream]; Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Dea, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240
& n.16 (1996) (citing other sources for this argument); see also Barry Cushman, The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998J. SuP. Cr. HiST. 79, 80 ("[I]n ways
that Roosevelt apparently did not fully appreciate.., the court was in fact... seeking
to formulate solutions to the economic crisis of the 1930s."). For a view dubitante, see
LEUCHTENBURG, supra, at 231-32 (arguing that neither the New Deal's "draftsmanship"
nor the government's arguments before the Court can be said to have had a dispositive
effect).
9 Professor Philip Bobbitt and Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis credit Tho-
mas Reed Powell with this phrase. See PHILIP BOBBrTT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 39
(1982); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR. INTO THE STORM 1937-1940, at 81 (1993). At least
three other variations exist. Joseph Alsop takes credit for the phrase "a switch in time
saves nine." JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 135 (1938) [hereinaf-
ter ALsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS]. Leonard Baker credits Abe Fortas with the
expression "the switch in time that serves nine." LEONARD BAKER, BACKTO BACK: THE
DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT 174 (1967) (citing High Court Assailed at
Labor Institute, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1937, at 19). Laurence Tribe credits Fortas with
the more familiar, "the switch in time that saved the nine." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD
SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 66 (1985). Professor Gerald Gunther and The Oxford
Dictionary of American Legal Quotations also quote the phrase as "[tihe switch in time
that saved the Nine." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 478 (13th ed. 1997);
FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393
(1993). Neither identifies the originator of the expression.
'0 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 215 ("The Supreme Court during these
months frequently went out of its way to frustrate the Roosevelt administration."). See
infra Part IA for a discussion of these events.
" See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 220 ("Beginning in 1937, the Supreme
Court upheld every New Deal statute that came before it."); see also id. at 219 ("From
1937 on, the relationship among the branches of government shifted dramatically, as
an era of judicial supremacy' gave way to deference by the Supreme Court to Con-
gress. The New Court committed itself, at least in the realm of social welfare legisla-
tion, to the doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint... .").
1 Writing in 1941, constitutional scholar Thomas Reed Powell explained: "Our
new Supreme Court has, however, pointed to a distinction between judicial protection
of economic interests and judicial protection of civil and political liberties." Thomas
Reed Powell, Conscience and the Constitution, in DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL UNITY 19
(William T. Hutchinson ed., 1941).
Is An alternative account of political pressure is provided in Drew D. Hansen, Tie
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whether the doctrinal change was unrelated to the threat of retribu-
tion that preceded.
1 4
Among legal academics, New Deal historiography is again the
rage 5-and with good reason. New Deal commitments that have
shaped the structure of American law and politics for the last sixty
years show signs of crumbling. 16 Recent federalism and economic lib-
erty decisions suggest greater supervision by the Supreme Court in ar-
eas long seen to be taboo.'7 Signs of this shift occur amidst renewed
concern about the legitimacy of constitutional change that the New
Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming June 2000).
Hansen argues that the Court switched direction in response to the widespread sit-
down strikes in the early months of 1937.
" As David Pepper recently explained, "much has hinged on the historical debate
over the New Deal's 'switch' in time," including the "Court's status vis-b.-vis popular
politics" and "deeper questions of constitutional and democratic theory." David A.
Pepper, Against Legalisv Rebutting an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 aRQ. L. REV.
63, 64 (1998); see also 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 290-92
(1998) ("For legal realists, the political character of the centrists' 'switch in time' in
1937 is painfully apparent. For shocked legalists... [t]he so-called switch in time was
not the product of politics, but the result of the law working itself pure."); G. Edward
White, The "Constitutional Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASrINGS L.J. 867, 907
(1997) ("Thus the challenge is to advance an explanation for the constitutional 'revo-
lution' that abandons the Court-packing crisis as a causative element."). A catalogue of
the many works adopting the political view of the switch appears in Barry Cushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201, 202 n.1 (1994). Discussions of, and
citation to, the literature offering a legalist explanation for the apparent switch appear
in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, orFelix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994), and
Pepper, supra, at 65-67 & nn.9, 10 & 15. For further discussion of the question whether
the Court switched, see infra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
"' There is a flood of recent New Deal scholarship, some of it in response to recent
events (or acknowledging the possible significance of them) and some longer in the
making. For examples of New Deal scholarship with an eye on current events, see 2
AcmRMAN, supra note 14, at 258 ("With the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994,
New Deal premises are an object of sharp legislative critique."); Devins, supra note 8, at
237 (observing that recent Supreme Court decisions "may soon give New Deal nay-
sayers another nail to hammer into the coffin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's increas-
ingly beleaguered legacy").
'6 In addition to legal decisions, see infra note 17, there are political events that
suggest this shift as well. For discussions of these events, see, for example, Larry
Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the
New Dea4 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 931-33 (1996) (arguing that current political
activity appears to be a movement to devolve power from the federal government back
to the states). But see Richard B. Stewart, Evaluating the New Dea 22 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 239, 240 (1998) ("[Ihe likelihood of the courts drastically altering the regula-
tory landscape is slim.").
1 See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (relying on the Tak-
ings Clause to strike down congressional economic regulation for the first time since
the New Deal); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (striking down a con-
gressional enactment as exceeding power under the Commerce Clause for the first
time in sixty years).
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Deal represents, 8 even though long acquiescence perhaps ought to
have put such concerns to rest.'9
The thesis of this Article is that if one is concerned about judicial
independence from politics it may be more profitable to examine
popular reaction to Supreme Court decisions, rather than the com-
mon approach in New Deal scholarship of investigating the Supreme
Court's reaction to popular politics. Most accounts of the events of
1937 center on the question whether the Supreme Court shifted
ground in response to the direct threat to its independence embodied
in the Court-packing proposal, or whether there is another less politi-
cal explanation for the Court's doctrinal change.? This question is
probably unanswerable." More important, it is of dubious value in re-
18 See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 280 ("Should the Roosevelt revolution be
viewed as a constitutive act of popular sovereignty that legitimately changed the preced-
ing Republican Constitution?"); id. at 344 ("I mean to raise a question of legitimacy.");
Pepper, supra note 14, at 65 ("Put simply, every theory of constitutional law must con-
tend with and account for 1937.").
19 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 912 ("One might have thought the legitimacy of the
New Deal settled, by acquiescence if by nothing else .... ").
20 For example, Barry Cushman's project is to provide a legalist or doctrinal expla-
nation for the shift while raising questions about the political account. See CUSHMAN,
RETHINmNG, supra note 8, at ch. 1. Richard Friedman attributes the transformation in
constitutional law to political appointments; the events of 1937 in particular are the
result, he argues, of the appointments of ChiefJustice Hughes andJustice Roberts. See
Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court
and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1891, 1895-96 (1994). William
Leuchtenburg's account is a political one. See LEUCHnTENBURG, supra note 8, at 236.
Michael Ariens takes aim at one part of the legalist account, Justice Roberts's explana-
tion of the switch, as explained byJustice Frankfurter. SeeAriens, supra note 14, at 623-
24 (focusing on Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history ofJustice Roberts's 1937 shift).
For a very recent response to the legalists, see Pepper, supra note 14, at 66.
21 See, e.g., ATSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 140-41 (discussing
speculation as to justice Roberts's motives and concluding that "[t]hese are questions
which cannot be answered"); CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 32 ("All of these
theories have at least some facial plausibility .... [T]hese conjectures cannot be con-
clusively disproved on the evidence available."). Alsop and Catedge go on to provide
a "political" guess as to what motivated the Court, see ALsOP & CATLEDGE, TIE 168
DAYS, supra note 9, at 141 ("It seems probable, in the first place, that all the justices
realized that their only chance to save the Court lay in more self-reversals."), while
Barry Cushman provides a legalist one, see, e.g., CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8,
at 32 ("The opinions themselves offer legal reasons for the results reached.. . ."). "Po-
litical" or "external" accounts attribute changes in law to the pressure of outside
events. "Legal" or "internal" accounts focus on the doctrine, debating whether a shift
occurred in 1937, or whether those decisions were imminent in pre-existing doctrine.
See id. at 4 ("This conceptualization of the decisions of 1937 in externalist terms, as a
political response to political pressures, has deflected scholars from inquiry into the
plausibility of an internal-legal and intellectual-component to a more comprehen-
sive explanation of the New Deal Court."). Both sets of stories contain much that is
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vealing much about the future of judicial independence or the rule of
law. After all, examinations of this question inevitably focus on
whether one or two Justices switched their votes on critical issues in
light of the specific events of the day.22 It would be very difficult to
generalize from this account to different times and differentjudges.
But what if we reversed the question, and instead tried to under-
stand the public's response to the Supreme Court.r The premise here is
that ultimately the separation of legal decision making from political
action depends not only on what courts do in response to the meas-
ures that threaten them, but more importantly on what degree of
freedom and independence the public generally is willing to extend
to courts.24 This, in turn, depends at least in part upon deeper strains
persuasive, but also many holes that simply cannot be plugged conclusively. Thus,
there are critics of each approach. See, e.g., id. at 33-34 (explaining why "a purely po-
litical model, particularly a class politics model, can adequately account neither for the
behavior of the New Deal Court as an institution, nor for the behavior of individual
justices"); Kramer, supra note 16, at 928 n.120 (commending Cushman's work, but stat-
ing- "It is, nonetheless, implausible to explain these developments entirely as a prod-
uct of internal legal debate. Competing arguments and conflicting lines of authority
were always available, and.., choices among these can only be made by looking out-
side the legal briefs.").
2 See, eg., Friedman, supra note 18, at 1935-74 (examining in detail the votes of
Hughes and Roberts in the 1936 and 1937 cases which gave rise to the claim that a
"switch" had occurred).
2s To some extent Bruce Ackerman takes on a similar assignment. His account of
the New Deal transformation focuses at least as much attention on popular reaction to
judicial decisions as it does on the Court's reaction to the Court-packing plan:
To put my thesis in terms of a single (if much abused) word, the reigning
myth is insufficiently dialectical. It focuses on each No handed down by the
Supreme Court without trying to understand how these rejections helped
shape the subsequent Yeses by the New Dealers in Washington and the
American people at large.
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 313. The difference is that Ackerman still is developing
a normative theory of why constitutional law was transformed in 1937 and thereafter.
See id. at 280 (arguing that the Court was in all sincerity attempting to merely interpret
the Constitution). This search for a normative theory to legitimize the transformation
of constitutional law is common to much recent scholarship. See, e.g., Kramer, supra
note 16, at 921-30 (explaining the transformation as purposefully incremental, except
for the Court's panic in 1935); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidel-
ity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 443-72 (1995) (explaining the transformation as a
faithful "translation" of prior doctrines in light of changing background understand-
ings); White, supra note 14, at 870-71 (explaining the transformation as an interpretive
shift to living constitutionalism, followed by an epistemic shift to the notion ofjudging
as will and not law).
As explained infra at notes 395-403 and accompanying text, the account given here
is descriptive, not normative, although it does have some implications for the norma-
tive inquiry.
24 This approach, less common in legal scholarship, finds some affinity with politi-
cal science scholarship. For a sample of political science literature focusing on public
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of cultural thought regarding democracy and constitutionalism.2
This Article thus is a historical examination of the strains of thought
present in American society that operated separate and apart from di-
rect political retribution, but appear to have influenced both Roose-
velt's choice of the Court-packing remedy and its ultimate demise.
The story told here zooms the camera out from the specific events of
early 1937, to provide a more panoramic view of the culture in which
those heated politics occurred. The focus is on broad social, cultural,
and political understandings in the 1930s regarding the operation of
democracy, the role of courts in that democracy, and the determinacy
of constitutional meaning. These imbedded understandings provide
a way to understand the events of 1937 as something more than either
a threat of political retribution or simple doctrinal change. They also
provide insight into how we have come to understand the rule of law
the way we do.
As this Article explains, the battle in 1937 over the Court-packing
plan was a collision between embedded notions of judicial supremacy
and equally strong feelings that contrary to judicial rulings-and to
prior conceptions about American democracy-the national govern-
ment must have the power to deal with the Depression. These views
were reconciled by recognizing that the Constitution was "living" or
"elastic" enough to permit government the necessary power. The in-
stitution ofjudicial review was not perceived to be the problem (as it
had been at other times in history); rather, it was the Justices them-
selves who were seen as out of touch with present needs. Thus, Court-
packing made some sense as a remedy, because it involved a change in
personnel without tampering with the institution ofjudicial review it-
support for the Supreme Court, and identifying factors that go into that support, see
WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., PUBLIc EvALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COuRTS (1973);
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM.J. POL. Sci. 635, 636 (1992); and Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki,
Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the Supreme Cour, in CONTEMPLATING
COuRTS 356-57, 370 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995). GERALD ROSENBERG, T1-E HOLLOW
HOPE (1991) goes beyond simply assessing public reaction to courts, to examine the
extent to which court decisions actually are implemented. For an extremely helpful
piece examining the impact of Supreme Court actions on public willingness to support
the Court-packing plan, see Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme
Court: FDR's Court Packing Plan, 81 AM. POL So. REV. 1139, 1139-40 (1987) ("The ar-
gument is disarmingly simple: the justices themselves helped to shape events and
build up institutional support with a series of well-timed decisions.").
25A recent study of public reaction to the Supreme Court supports this proposi-
tion. See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 24, at 652 (arguing that support for the Su-
preme Court as an institution can be predicted by examining broader public values
such as commitment to liberty or democratic norms).
[Vol. 148:971
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self.2
6
The plan failed, however, because Roosevelt mistook the strength
of two dominant ideas. First, he grossly underestimated public accep-
tance of judicial independence and supremacy. More important, he
failed to understand that while the public was willing to cede power to
the national government-and particularly to the Executive-to ad-
dress the crisis, many also worried about the threat to civil liberty this
might represent, a problem made apparent in the growth of totalitar-
ian governments abroad. Thus, as the national government and Ex-
ecutive authority grew, the people resisted a fundamental change in
the one institution they charged with protecting individual liberty-
the courts.
2 7
This examination of popular attitudes toward judicial review dur-
ing the crisis of 1937 also provides insight into the central concern of
the academy regarding the doctrinal change that occurred in the
wake of the defeat of the Court-packing plan. Since 1937, the legal
academy has struggled to resolve the apparent double standard re-
flected in the contrast between the Court's post-New Deal abdication
of supervision of economic legislation and the more aggressive protec-
tion of individual liberty reflected in the famous footnote four of the
Carolene Products decision. The standard account suggests judges
erred in the pre-Court-packing period by imposing their own values
on the Constitution.2 But if imposing judicial values was inappropri-
ate with regard to economic liberties, what possibly justified intrusive
judicial decision making with regard to noneconomic, or "individual"
liberties?
Although no single answer can resolve this difficult problem, it is
worth observing that the Court's shift in doctrinal direction bears re-
markable resemblance to a similar shift in the strains of political
thought present at the time of the switch. In other words, the post-
1937 constitutional regime mirrored deep social understandings
about constitutional liberty and the role of the Supreme Court.
This Article thus is a comment on the legitimacy of constitutional
2 See infra Parts I-IA for a detailed account along these lines.
27 See infra Parts I.F.1-.F.2 for a detailed account of this point.
This problem is explained simply and with force in SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra
note 7, at 35-39. The book discusses some of the possible theories offered to resolve
the problem, finding none of them to be successful. The genesis of concern with the
"double standard" is described in Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of an Academic Obsession 2-3 (Feb. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Friedman, Academic Obsession] (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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change. As used here, however, "legitimacy" takes on a special and
specific meaning. There is already an enormous body of constitu-
tional scholarship given over to the question of the legitimacy of con-
stitutional change,2 most of it theoretical and normative in nature. In
contrast, this Article suggests legitimacy may be "empirical" as well s
The claim here is that in order to survive, a constitutional regime
must tap into, and bear some consistency with, deeper public or social
understandings of how that regime should be. This consistency with
social understandings may not be a sufficient condition for legitimacy;
the suggestion here is that it is a necessary one.s'
There is a central lesson to this study, one that weaves together
concerns about the separation of law and politics, and the legitimacy
of constitutional change. This lesson is that law and politics are inter-
twined, but at a remove. In the rough and tumble of American poli-
tics, courts inevitably will be subjected to political pressure when judi-
cial decisions are unpopular. Yet, what may matter most to judicial
independence are deeper public sentiments about the role ofjudicial
review itself.8 2 It is not the specific retributive proposals that matter,
but their likelihood of success. This depends in part, but only in part,
on what the Court actually is doing at any moment. Equally important
are broader social attitudes toward democracy and constitutionalism.
SSee, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 4 (examining the validity of constitutional
change through "an extra-ordinary process of definition, debate, and decorum"); Les-
sig, supra note 23, at 395 (proposing a theory to elucidate "how new readings of the
constitution may maintain fidelity with past understandings of the document's mean-
ing and purpose"); see also Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitu-
tion, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1998) (offering, as an alternative to "anachronistic
originalism" and "non-historical living constitutionalism," a theory that "takes all of our
constitutional history into account").
"0 See Eric W. Orts, Positive Law and Systemic Legitimacy: A Comment on Hart and
Habermas, 6 RATIojuLws 245 (1993) (exploring the notion oflegitimacyas an empiri-
cal issue).
3' The Article argues in conclusion that these two understandings of legitimacy
necessarily are related, but one need not have any sympathy for a normative account of
popular legitimation of constitutional change to accept the descriptive account offered
here.
12 There is some disagreement in the political science literature on this point. For
some time the view had been that general (or "diffuse") support for the Supreme
Court as an institution varied in response to the reaction to specific decisions. See, e.g.,
MURPHY, supra note 24, at 45-47. Even here, however, the relationship was not over-
whelming. See id. at 46-47. Caldeira and Gibson recently concluded, however, that the
connection between the general public's views of specific decisions and their general
support for the Court was thin indeed. See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 24, at 636,
642. Nonetheless, Caldeira and Gibson find a closer relationship between specific de-
cisions and general support among "opinion leaders." Id. at 656.
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Of course, there will be some symbiotic relationship between what the
Court is doing and social attitudes about judicial review. But even
here what matters most may be the Court's work over the long term,
not any specific decision or body of decisions.
3
A word is in order at the outset about the constant refrain here
regarding "the public." Historians in particular are wary of broad as-
sertions about "public" thought.m Is the "public" discussed here really
the general public, or is it some subset of political elites, intellectual
elites, or the "thinking public"? It may seem entirely plausible, for ex-
ample, that elite views shifted in the 1920s and 1930s from an under-
standing of a static to a living Constitution, but can it be said that the
general public even was paying attention, let alone that it held such a
"sophisticated" perspective?
These questions need not necessarily be answered, because the
story told here works whether it is understood as reflecting only elite
views or those of the broader public. In other words if a reader be-
lieves this historiography captures only some set of elite views, then
the causal story still ought to stand: all that one concludes, at that
point, is that it is elite views that matter, that drive and protect judicial
independence and the rule of law.
Nonetheless, this story is the people's story. Much of the com-
mentary and actions discussed here are those of the general public.
The New Deal fight provoked tremendous popular engagement.s5
Congress and the President were swamped with mall, much of it from
ordinary citizens.36 These citizens may have been swayed to write by
'" This is not to suggest what the Court does in individual cases is irrelevant, a
proposition that would border on the ludicrous. For elaboration of the view that the
Court does not have an inexhaustible reserve of "institutional capital," see JESSE
CHOPEI,JJUDICIAL REvMV AND THE NATIONAL POLrnCAL PROCESS 129-70 (1980).
' Kramer, supra note 16, at 895-96 (observing that Ackerman's discussion of a "col-
lective understanding" actually privileges the "professional narrative ... of lawyers and
judges" over that of the "general population").
35 Ackerman's and Leuchtenburg's accounts make this plain. Leuchtenburg's
book, in particular, contains a flood of quotations from citizens writing letters to poli-
ticians and the media. LEUC-TENBURG, supra note 8, at 136.
6 See, e.g., ALSOP & CATLEDGE, TiE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 72 ("[L]etters and
telegrams, nine to one against the plan, began to pour in on a frightened Con-
gress... [and] the shrieks of the editorial pages deepened to a roar of protest from all
over the country."); LEUC-TENBURG, supra note 8, at 98-99 (quoting Secretary of the
Interior Harold Ickes as saying: "[t]he President said that word is coming to him from
widely separated parts of the country that people are beginning to show a great deal of
interest in the constitutional questions that have been raised by recent Supreme Court
decisions"); id. at 134-35 ("Constituents inundated members of Congress with commu-
nications on the Court bill .... [and one Senator said, 'it has been impossible to
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elite-driven interest groups, 7 but write they did. Elites did not burn
Supreme CourtJustices in effigy, ordinary citizens did.s' Elites did not
write all the angry letters to the President about the Court, many or-
dinary citizens did. Ordinary citizens also lambasted the Court-
packing plan and expressed serious concern about tampering with an
independent judiciary. Media coverage of the events was fierce.
Popular opinion shifted in response to political events, and political
tides shifted quickly with popular opinion-perhaps the first demon-
stration of a phenomenon of politicians driven by polls and public
opinion that has become so prominent today.s9
Even the "elite" views quoted here might well have reflected popu-
lar sentiment. Politicians and those in the media are both opinion
leaders and opinion followers. There are obvious mechanisms that tie
together "elite" and "public" views, making any such division-espe-
cially during the highly politicized times discussed here-quite impos-
sible. The rich literature on policy entrepreneurs and the develop-
ment of public opinion give every reason to believe that many of the
"elites" quoted here were mediating forces between popular opinion
and political action.
Part I is the heart of the Article. Part IA introduces this study of
the New Deal by asserting that criticism of courts during the New Deal
differed in an important way from criticism during the Lochner era.
The traditional story of the events that culminated in 1937 errs in con-
flating these two periods. Differing criticisms of courts during these
periods reflected changing notions of democratic governance, judicial
supremacy, the role of courts, and the determinacy of the Constitu-
even read one-third, much less answer them.'"); Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 24, at
1143 (discussing the correlation between the number of stories in the New York Times
and Reader's Digest on the Court in 1937 as indicating that elites and non-elites were
following the story).
3717thinlecSee LEUC-TENBURG, supra note 8, at 137 (describing the influence of Frank
Gannett's National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government in motivating
letter-writing campaigns).
"' See infra note 89 and accompanying text (describing the public reaction to the
Supreme Court's actions).
39 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL:
TRE GROWrH OF THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN CONGRESS, 1933-1939, at 99 n.76
(1967) (citing a study indicating that Senators' votes reflected state polling data); Cal-
deira, supra note 24, at 1142-50 (examining shifting public opinion in response to the
events of 1937).
'0 One study of New Deal voting indicated that Senators' votes almost invariably
reflected "home state sentiment." PATERSON, supra note 39, at 99 n.76; see also
LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 135 (relating how one Senator overwhelmed by the
mail pleaded for "some relief" and stated, "I feel fully informed of the wishes of my
constituents").
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tion between the time of Lochnerand 1937.
Parts I.B through I.F then turn to history. After Part I.B provides a
brief review of the tumultuous events of the New Deal crisis, Part .C
elaborates upon the claim that criticism of courts during the New Deal
was not the same as criticism leveled during the Lochner era. Part I.D
explains changing social views regarding democracy and constitu-
tional determinacy. Part I.E demonstrates that together, these shifting
views explain why criticism of courts in the 1930s differed during the
two eras, and why Court-packing seemed the logical way to eliminate
the Supreme Court's challenge to the New Deal. Despite logic, the
plan failed, of course. Part I.F discusses two further sets of social and
cultural understandings, those relating to judicial supremacy and
those relating to the independent role of courts in society, which pro-
vide some reason why. Taken together, these social understandings
can account for much of what happened in 1937. They also point to
the direction of the Supreme Court's doctrinal shift, both in the short
and the long term.
Part II identifies the lessons we can learn from this history. There
are two in particular: one relating to the separation of law and poli-
tics, and the other to the legitimacy of constitutional change following
the Court-packing plan.
As to the separation of law and politics, this history suggests that
although politics (loosely defined) inevitably has some impact on the
Court, that occurs at a remove. Looking at the events of 1937, this
Part concludes that if the Court had continued its recalcitrant stance,
action might have been taken against it. On the other hand, deeper
social and cultural values complemented immediate political passions
in determining whether retribution would be taken against the Court.
Thus, the Court's independence is guarded on one side by deeper
cultural and social strains that might protect the Court, but bounded
on the other side by popular dissatisfaction with the Court that might
threaten it. •
This conclusion, in turn, offers some insight into the legitimacy of
the constitutional change that followed the fight over the Court-
packing plan. Scholars seek to explain the legal legitimacy of that
change, as well as the present deference of the Court in the economic
realm and its active protection of individual liberties. This history
suggests that the post-New Deal Court took a course consistent with
prevailing public views regarding the meaning of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's post-1937 jurisprudence mirrored the prefer-
ences of the body politic, and thus was in some sense "legitimated"
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empirically by public opinion.
I. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
Modem constitutional theorists have struggled to reconcile the
practice ofjudicial review with democratic governance. That dilemma
generally is referred to as the "countermajoritarian difficulty," a term
coined by Alexander Bickel in The Least Dangerous Branch4 ' At least
since the early 1960s, when Bickel wrote, and actually much earlier
than that,4 academics have tried to justify what they see as a practice
in which unaccountable judges interfere with the will of the people
and their representatives.4
As the traditional story is told, from the end of the nineteenth
century until the New Deal, judges regularly flouted the will of the
people, striking down legislation intended to ameliorate the economic
hardships inflicted by an industrializing society. The judges' actions
infuriated the people, who attacked courts in both word and deed.
The culmination of this period, so the story goes, was the New Deal
Court-packing plan.4
As other scholars have observed, it is a mistake to treat the deci-
sions of courts (and especially the Supreme Court) throughout this
period as of one piece. Commentators point to rapid changes in the
economy and the rise of administrative government as forces that
caused judges to abandon laissez-faire notions prevalent at the turn of
the century.4 In terms of the legal legitimacy of legal change, the
"' ALEXANDER M. BICKEI, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLrICS 16 (1962).
42 See Friedman, Academic Obsession, supra note 28, at 64. The debate began in
the 1940s shortly after the Court's doctrinal shift became clear.
0 Numerous citations are provided in Barry Friedman, The Histoy of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334-
39 & nn.1 & 4 (1998).
4 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 42-43 (1991) (describing the modem
lawyers' story of the "fall from grace" that began after Reconstruction, "climax[ed]"
with the New Deal Court-packing plan, and was finally defeated with Justice Roberts's
"switch"); Lessig, supra note 23, at 446 & n.220 (explaining that in the "dominant
view," post Court-packing plan jurisprudence "restored the original Constitution, after
a period of constitutional usurpation by an activist conservative Court").
Examples of reliance on such accounts to explain changing doctrine include
CUSHMAN, RETHINING, supra note 8, at 41-42; Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Consti-
tutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of
American State-Building 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191-247 (1997); Kramer, supra note 16,
at 919-30; and Lessig, supra note 23, at 453-72. A related account, relying on changed
notions of constitutional interpretation, is found in White, supra note 14.
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only question seems to be how sudden or gradual the shift in doctrine
was. Gradual doctrinal change is considered legitimate, but if the
doctrinal shift in 1937 was precipitous, then it requires (and engen-
46ders) a more complicated response.
Just as it is a mistake to conflate the work of courts over this forty
year period, it also is an error to believe that judicial review provoked
uniform responses from the public throughout the period. From the
Populist/Progressive era at the turn of the century, until the New Deal
fight was resolved, courts regularly were subject to harsh attack for
striking economic legislation.47 The period at the turn of the century
commonly is called the Lochner era, after one of the most reviled deci-
sions of all time. The conventional story treats criticism of courts as
one straight arrow from the time of Lochner through the New Deal,
when the courts finally recanted.
Although courts were attacked during both the Lochner era and
the New Deal, the nature of the criticisms differed, reflecting chang-
ing notions ofjudicial review.8 To an ear tuned only to modern-day
insistence that judicial review is problematic because it interferes with
democratic governance, these criticisms may all seem to have a similar
thrust. Careful attention to the specific words of the criticisms, and to
change over time, would suggest otherwise.
During the Populist/Progressive, or Lochner, era, the criticism of
constitutional courts was akin to that described by Bickel's "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" (and thus will be called, for want of a better
term, "countermajoritarian criticism"). Courts regularly were attacked
as interfering with, or frustrating, popular will.49 Commenting on the
" See ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
795 (3d ed. 1963) ("The 'revolution' of 1937 did not break the continuity of American
constitutional development in any decisive respect. In that sense it was not a revolu-
tion at all."). The view that there is nothing revolutionary in gradual constitutional
change is implicit in Barry Cushman's explanation of the doctrinal shift that resulted
in the New Deal transformation, see generally CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, as
well as Larry Kramer's discussion of the incremental shifts in doctrine mirroring the
growth of the national administrative government, seeKramer, supra note 16, at 323.
4 The criticism of the Lochner era is described at length in Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lodiner (Dec.
10, 1999) [hereinafter Friedman, Lochne,] (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Any strict epochal approach will, of course, overstate matters. The "New Deal
era" discussed here was all of roughly five years, but the "Lodinerera" may have covered
thirty-five years. It is unquestionably correct that at the beginning of the Lochner era,
criticism of courts sounded more like that during the Reconstruction era, and at the
end of the Lochnerera, criticism began to take on a New Deal gloss.
4 SeeFriedman, Lochner, supra note 47, at 14-30.
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anti-Granger decisions, James Weaver wrote in 1892: "What responsi-
bility could this judge assume? Both he and the Court for which he
was speaking were beyond the reach of the ballot box .... ,5' In re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision invalidating the income tax,
the Evening Star ran a column "BY THE PEOPLE" in which it ex-
plained: "The argument is that the Supreme Court as at present con-
stituted does not spring from the people, and therefore does not
properly represent the people."51 Theodore Roosevelt, running for
President as the Progressive party standard-bearer in 1912, wrote:
"Here the courts decide whether or not ... the people are to have
their will." 2 Robert LaFollette, playing the same role in 1924, re-
ceived cheers from a huge crowd in Madison Square Garden when he
argued: "If the court is the final and conclusive authority to deter-
mine what laws Congress may pass, then, obviously, the court is the
great ruler of the country, exactly the same as the most absolute king
would be."
3
By the time of the New Deal, however, the dominant criticism was
quite different. Although there assuredly was some countermajori-
tarian criticism during the New Deal, much more commonly judges
(not courts) were attacked as being old, behind the times, and unwill-
ing to see how the Constitution should be interpreted.5 Thus, one
correspondent wrote Roosevelt that "Nine OLD MEN, whose total age
amounts to about 650 years, should have additional help. '55 Another
wrote: "Business does not accept an applicant with twelve gray hairs
on his head." 6
Although attacks on judicial review as frustrating popular will, and
criticism ofjudges as being behind the times, both suggest that judges
were interfering with democratic politics, the criticisms are in fact
quite different. One criticism sees the Constitution and judicial re-
view itself as problematic for democracy. The other sees the Constitu-
tion as malleable, and the judges as unable to perceive its necessary
present-day interpretation.
'0 JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO ACTION 122 (1892).
By the People, EVENING STAR (Wash., D.C.), May 21, 1895, at 1.
52 Theodore Roosevelt,Judges and Progress, 100 OUTLOOK 40, 41 (1912).
53 Full Text ofLaFollette's Speech Attacking Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1924, at
2; see 14,000 Pack Garden, Cheer LaFollette in Attack on Cour N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1924,
at 1.
' See infra Part I.D (discussing critiques of the judges as too old that appeared in
books and articles).
55 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 97.
56 Id.
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Understandings reflected in differing criticisms of courts also ex-
plain a change in the strategy in dealing with unpopular constitu-
tional decisions. Throughout the Lochner era there were countless at-
tacks on the institution of judicial review itself. Proposals were made
to subjectjudicial decisions to legislative override and permit review of
decisions by popular referendum. 7 Under these proposals majori-
tarian politics could control constitutional meaning. Some of these
same proposals were floated during the New Deal crisis, but Roose-
velt's plan aimed not at the institution of judicial review, but at the
judges themselves.Ye Roosevelt stole a page from the Reconstruction
book, whenjudicial supremacy had some currency but the judges also
were seen (for partisan reasons) to be the problem.59 The solution
was to profess respect for constitutional rulings but to get new judges
who would presumably hand down new decisions.
This story of the changing popular response to judicial review ad-
dresses a central paradox of the traditional New Deal story.6° As al-
most universal agreement would have it, significant segments of the
public during the New Deal supported both the rejection of the
Court-packing plan and the sweeping constitutional change that fol-
lowed the Court's "switch." The public's opposition to the Court
could be taken as support for the existing constitutional order, yet
that was hardly the case. But if the people demanded constitutional
change, why reject the Court-packing plan? After all, Court-packing
had some pedigree in American politics. Wholesale transformation of
the Constitution by judicial flat did not.
The answer is that shifting economic conditions had swept the
foundation out from under the old legal regime, something the
judges themselves were late to acknowledge. Thus, society already ac-
knowledged greater power in the national government. At the same
time, the potential of judicial review as a protection against govern-
57 The very best account of this is WLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY (1994).
m See infra notes 235-48 and accompanying text (explaining Roosevel's opposition
to a constitutional amendment as a result of his belief thatjudicial review played a cen-
tral role in adapting the Constitution to changing times).
" SeeBarry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two:
Reconstruction's Political Court (Feb. 11, 2000) 20-32 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (describing the political tensions that
led to a popular view of the Court as being opposed to the Reconstructionist agenda
advocated by the Republican-dominated Congress).
60 SeeJEFFREYD. HOcKMr, NEwDEALJUSTIcE 164 (1996) (contrasting responses to
the Court-packing proposal with responses to "Roosevelt's efforts to restructure the
Court through the regular process of appointment[s] [which] were, of course, much
less controversial").
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mental excess also struck many observers as essential. Thus, when
judges left the bench through legitimate attrition, the public was quite
comfortable with a constitutional transformation consistent with
broader public opinion. But the attempt to hasten that transforma-
tion by attacking the judiciary was seen-despite Roosevelt's attempt
to portray it otherwise-as threatening judicial review itself. It is pos-
sible that continued recalcitrance might have provided support for
some action against the judges. Once the Court apparently had
shifted, however-and that is assuredly how the public saw things6'
support for the Court-packing plan evaporated.
This is the story of the changed societal views between the Lochner
era and the New Deal, about their impact on Roosevelt's proposal of
the Court-packing plan, and on its demise.
A. A Capsule History of New Deal Events
As FDR's regulatory program emerged following his election as
62President in 1932, commentators expected a collision with the Su-preme Court.0 Surely it was coincidence that as the conflict loomed,
61 See infra Part I.F.2 and accompanying text. At least, that is what newspapers and
politicians told the public had happened.
62 Roosevelt had promised a "New Deal" to lift the country out of the Great De-
pression.
On the farms, in the large metropolitan areas, in the smaller cities and in
the villages, millions of our citizens cherish the hope that their old standards
of living and of thought have not gone forever. Those millions cannot and
shall not hope in vain.
I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Governor Accepts the Nomination for the Presidency (July
2, 1932), in 1 T11E PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 647, 659
(1938-1950) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS]. There was considerable doubt, however,
about what Roosevelt's program would look like. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at
283-84 ("It would be a mistake... to suppose that Americans knew what they were
bargaining for when they swept the Democrats into the White House and Congress in
1932.");JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 171 (1956)
("Roosevelt was following no master program-no 'economic panaceas or fancy plans,'
as he later called them derisively. He not only admitted to, he boasted of, playing by
ear."). Some claim that the contours of his program were evident in campaign
speeches, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL, 1932-1940, at 12 (1963) (discussing this view), but the dominant view is that
most of the program emerged after the election, see id. at 3a-39. Indeed, according to
Leuchtenburg and Bums, popularization of the phrase "New Deal" was not intended
by Roosevelt, but resulted from a cartoonist focusing on the phrase following Roose-
velt's acceptance address at the Convention. See BURNS, supra, at 139-40 (discussing
how a cartoonist picked up on the phrase even though Roosevelt had not intended it
to have any significance); LEUCHTENBURG, supra, at 8.
63 See Biggest News Rose in Supreme Cour N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1935, at 19 (reporting
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the Supreme Court moved into grander quarters, but the irony did
not escape contemporary observers." "It may be symbolic," wrote
Drew Pearson and Robert Allen in their classic book The Nine Old Men,
"that the Supreme Court of the United States took its most intransi-
gent position athwart the path of progress at the very moment it
moved into its first permanent abode and surrounded itself with the
trappings of Oriental grandeur."6s Harpers Magazine played up the iso-
lation of the Court's new marble palace: "Withdrawn from all the
noise and tumult sit the nine old men; they are waiting, waiting for
the time when the question of this government control [to lead the
country out of the Depression] must be brought before them.
"66
Come the question did, and when it did the Supreme Court encoun-
tered both the greatest threat to its independence and the most sur-
prising statement of public support in its history.
The Supreme Court's early New Deal decisions suggested that the
Court was prepared to interpret the Constitution to reflect changing
economic and social circumstances.! For instance in 1934, confront-
Supreme Court rulings affecting New Deal policies topped a poll of newspaper editors
for leading story of the year); Ralph F. Fuchs, The Constitutionality of the Recovery Pro-
gram, 19 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 1, 22 (1933) (commenting that while judicial acceptance
of the Recovery Program would be a "tribute to the adequacy of the process of select-
ing the judiciary and to the effect of public office upon social attitudes," the current
judges come from an "intellectual milieu" that "is outrageously hostile to economic
and social change"); Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE
L.J. 668, 671-72 (1933) (analyzing the impact of capitalism on the Court and the con-
flicts betweenjudicial review and social and economic legislation).
64 Actually, this "coincidence" occurred twice: the other instance was following the
Dred Scott decision. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HIsTORY 361-62 (rev. ed. 1926).
DREW PEARSON & ROBERTS. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 2 (1974).
Mitchell Dawson, The Supreme Court and the New Dea4 167 HARPERS 641 (1933).
6 The decisions in these cases are central to "legalist" stories told about the Court's
"switch" in 1937. See CUSHMAN, RETHINKiNG, supra note 8, at 3-7 (arguing that a plau-
sible account can be constructed of a single trajectory of legal reasoning linking both
the pre- and post-"switch" decisions); Friedman, supra note 20, at 1915-27 (arguing that
the Court's decisions between 1933 and 1936 were designed to give relief to the na-
tion's economic straits). For example, Barry Cushman believes much of the transfor-
mation occurred with the Nebbia decision. See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at
7. Others, such as Bruce Ackerman, accept that the Court shifted ground on substan-
tive due process at the time of Nebbia, but question whether that shift does much to
explain the Commerce Clause change of direction in 1937 and thereafter. See 2
AcKERMAN, supra note 14, at 366 (asserting that although the Court did "shift," such
shifts are fairly common as "mid-course corrections"). Larry Kramer believes the de-
velopments of 1934 were consistent with the Court's doctrinal evolution, but that the
Court "panicked" in the 1935 Term due to the breadth of the "innovative social legisla-
tion" before it. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 927-29. A recent article by David Pepper
argues vigorously that it was these few decisions of 1934 that were aberrational. See
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ing issues of the states' power to enact economic provisions parallel to
the federal-level New Deal legislation, the Court upheld Minnesota's
Mortgagee Moratorium Law' and validated a New York law fixing
milk prices in Nebbia v. New York.6 Then, in 1935, to the great relief of
Roosevelt and his advisers, the Court ruled for the government in the
Gold Standard cases.70
When the Court began to strike down New Deal legislation in
1935, it attracted great attention but mixed reactions. First, the Court
struck the Railroad Retirement Act, by a 5-4 vote.7 ' Although this cast
doubt on pending Social Security legislation, and some observers fret-
ted over the fate of the New Deal,7 Roosevelt had actually been reluc-
tant to sign the railroad pension legislation in the first place.73 Next,
the Supreme Court invalidated the National Recovery Act ("NRA") in
Schechter Poultry.74 Roosevelt responded with a lengthy press confer-
Pepper, supra note 14, at 104-27.
63 See Home Bldg & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium law); see, e.g., Clarence Manion, The Constitutionality
of New Deal Measures, 9 NOTRE DAME LAw. 381, 384, 386 (1934) (praising the Blaisdell
decision for recognizing the practical need of regulation to protect "individual oppor-
tunity" and defending regulation "as the only means for individual protection"); Elderly
Men Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1934, at 22 (expressing relief over the Blaisdell deci-
sion).
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
70 See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (sustaining the governments at-
tempt to avoid payment under gold clauses in public obligations); Norman v. Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (sustaining a 1933 joint resolution declar-
ing gold clauses in private contracts to be against public policy).
7 See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
7 The Atlanta Constitution began its reporting of the decision by proclaiming, "The
word of one man in a black robe halted the New Deal's first venture into the realm of
social legislation today," and went on to observe:
It is not so much the loss of this one case that discourages the New Dealers as
it is Roberts' enlistment with the conservative faction of the court. ... This
former Philadelphia lawyer-prosecutor of the Teapot Dome oil cases-holds
the balance of power in the court now and has it within his power to write and
rewrite the law of the land for the next two years.
Verdict of 5 to 4 Against Measure Given by Jurists, ATLANTA CONST., May 7, 1935, at 1; see
also LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 42 ("The Rail Pension decision, then, loomed as
far more important than the particular legislation at issue."); id. at 51 (arguing that the
decision caused Roosevelt to begin to look for a solution to the Court).
7* See LEUCHrENBURG, supra note 8, at 27 ("Roosevelt could barely bring himself to
sign it into law."); Rail Pensions Act Voided by Supreme Court, 5 to 4; Social Program in Peril
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1935, at 1 (pointing out that at the time of its enactment, Roose-
velt's endorsement of the Retirement Act had been regarded as "rather luke-warm,"
and that Roosevelt had asserted that while the Act was "in line with sound social pol-
icy," it was "crudely drawn" and would "require many changes and amendments at the
next session of Congress").
74 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The judgment
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ence critical of the "horse-and-buggy" Court.75 Congress temporarily
76stopped work on New Deal legislation, and organized labor was
highly critical.77 Nonetheless, the impact of the decision was blunted
by the unanimity of the Court, the imminent demise of the NRA, and
great public hostility to many aspects of the program.s Press reports
was one of three 9-to-0 decisions that day curtailing government power. The other two
were LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating the
Frazier-Lemke Act on mortgage moratoria), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935) (circumscribing the President's power to remove members of in-
dependent regulatory commissions).
Humphrey's Executor is especially significant because Roosevelt (and others) took
that decision as a sign that the Court was personally hostile to the President. See Dev-
ins, supra note 8, at 245 ("At one level, Humphrey s Executor seems anything but monu-
mental.... Within the White House, however, Humphrey's Executor was considered a
major blow to the President and his reform agenda."). The story of the case is related
in LEUCHTENBuRG, supra note 8, at 52-81.
See LEUCf-TENBURG, supra note 8, at 90. According to Leuchtenburg's charac-
terization, Roosevelt argued through this press conference that "the Court had
stripped the national government of its power to cope with critical problems." Id.
Bruce Ackerman views this press conference as a vital move in the constitutional mo-
ment that he believes solidified New Deal commitments. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note
14, at 297-99. Ackerman presents the press conference as "informally presented but
carefully weighed in advance," id. at 297, while Alsop and Catledge describe it as more
impromptu and angry, seeAISOP & CATLEDGE, TM 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 17.
6 See All NRA Enforcement Is Ended by President as Supreme Court Rules Act and Codes
Void Wole of New Deal Program in Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1 (reporting
on the deserted feeling in the Capitol as legislators awaited Roosevelt's response to the
Court's actions). "At NRA headquarters officials and employees sat in gloom, wonder-
ing what is to become of them." NRA Held Invalid, Enforcement Ends, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 1935, at 21. At a total loss, Congress waited for orders from the President. See Con-
gress Confused by NRA Decision, Halts All Work on New Deal Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
1935, at 20; Congress at Standstill Waiting for Word on White House Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 1935, at 1.
Louis Stark, LaborLeaders Much Disturbed, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1935, at 17 ("Organ-
ized labor was dazed by the Schechter case decision today."); Rail Labor Sees Blow at Se-
curity, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1935, at 18 (quoting George M. Harrison, a railroad workers'
labor representative, as saying, "The decision... shows a total disregard of the social
obligations of industry to its workers.... [I]t is a serious obstacle to the consummation
of the whole New Deal program."); see also Fight for the NRA on in New England, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 8 (expressing view of Robert J. Watt, Secretary of the State
Federation of Labor, that "Es] omething must be done at once," and of Margaret Wi-
esman, Secretary of the Consumers League of Massachusetts, predicting a return to
sweatshops unless immediate remedial steps were taken).
78 See PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 65, at 272 ("With the press and a good part of
the public, the NRA was anything but popular. And the general exclamation escaping
from a General-Johnson-wearied public was: 'Whoopeel Good for the Supreme
Courtl'"); A Deplorable Decsion, 27 COMMONmEAL 199, 199 (1936) (commenting on the
NRA, "No one was amazed by the good it had accomplished; many were irritated by
the flaws in its operation."). One commentator noted that
By no means all the new dealers are blue, even assuming the worst possible
fate for NRA. One group always did oppose the NRA and is now glad that it is
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throughout the nation were generally positive." Even in industry
opinions differed." Many businesses quickly stated that they would
adhere to NRA codes. 81
These 1935 decisions triggered a vigorous debate about the prac-
tice of judicial review.82 There was, however, no clear opinion as to
out. Another group feel [sic] that the Blue Eagle has served its emergency
purpose and should be permitted to die.
George B. Bryant, Jr., Washington Letter, WALL ST.J., May 28, 1935, at 2. Roosevelt him-
self admitted some faults with the program. See George Creel, Roosevelt's Plans and Pur-
poses, COLLIER'S, Dec. 26, 1936, at 7 (commenting that "[n]ever at any time has the
President shut his eyes to the defects of the NRA as developed after a noble begin-
ning").
7' A New York Times article summarized editorial comments from newspapers
around the country. See Press Generally Sees Ruling as a Victory for Fundamental Law, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 28, 1935, at 12. The article included scathing headlines from several pa-
pers such as the Philadelphia Inquirer, "Wrecking Crew Attempts Futile," the Boston Her-
ad "End of Slovenly Legislation," the Charleston News and Courier, "Brain Trust Only a
Relic," and the Dallas News, "End of Stricken Law." Id. The Wall Street Journal com-
mented that:
It must be expected that a flood of ill-considered gabble about how the Su-
preme Court defeats the will of the people for the sake of preserving an out-
moded document will follow this week's decisions-indeed, it has already be-
gun. But it should not take us long to realize that the will of the people is the
Constitution. It remains the will of the people to hold Congress and Presi-
dent under specific restraints which the Constitution sets forth. The Supreme
Court's respect for the Constitution is its respect for the will of the people.
Review and Outlook. Realists on the Bench, WALL ST.J., May 29, 1935, at 4.
80 While many in industry welcomed the ruling as an end to close government su-
pervision of business, some feared the effects of the resulting confusion and turmoil.
See Code Industries Under Pressure in Active Market, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1935, at 1; Decision
Has Immediate Effect on Local Business, N.Y. TIMS, May 28, 1935, at 18; Effect of Ruling on
Capital Labor Widely Debated, ATLANTA CONST., May 28, 1935, at 1; Fight for the NRA on in
New England, supra note 77, at 8; Industry Cheered by NIRA Ruling WALL ST. J., May 28,
1935, at 1 ("Industrial leaders were generally agreed that Supreme Court's ruling in-
validating important sections of the [NIRA] will have many stimulating and few ad-
verse effects....").
8' See Perkins Is Hopeful Green Is Optimistic on Future Outlook, ATLANTA CONST., May
29, 1935, at 1 (reporting the decisions of large firms like R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany, General Foods Corporation, Chrysler, du Pont, and Eastman Kodak to continue
the NRA practices); Some Stores Cut Prices at Once: Employees Are Reassured, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1935, at 1 (reporting announcement from R.H. Macy & Co. that "the sched-
ules of wages and hours it had adopted under the NRA would continue pending de-
velopments which we hope will insure the permanence of these important social bene-
fits"); Wall Street Hails New Deal Defeats, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1 (quoting Eugene
G. Grace, president of the American Iron and Steel Institute, as stating that with or
without the NRA, the steel industry "should have the common sense to realize the ne-
cessity of exerting every possible effort to prevent a recurrence of the evils, abuses and
unfair business methods of the past").
" Letters to the editor of the New York Times, for example, expressed the full
range of views on the Court. Compare, e.g., Albert Stevens Crockett, Letter to the Edi-
tor, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1935, § 4, at 9 (stating that "apparently nobody knows what the
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the appropriate outcome of the struggle. At the end of that year,
newspaper editors voted the debate about judicial review and the
Court's encounter with the New Deal the year's "biggest" news story.
The real clash came in 1935 and 1936. The Supreme Court struck
down the Guffey Act in Carter v. Carter Coal8 and the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act ("AAA") in United States v. Butler."' Butler was a turning
point of sorts. Although Roosevelt's reputed reaction was simply to
smile,s and public opinion may have been opposed to the law the
Court invalidated, 7 the decision met with vehement negative public
reaction and the beginning of serious calls to do something about the
Court or the Constitution.88 In Iowa, six members of the Court were
laws of the United States are except the Supreme Court," including the House and
Senate who are mostly "lawyers by profession"), with Frank H. Blumenthal, Letter to
the Editor, Function of Supreme Court Defined, N.Y. TIMzs, Feb. 3, 1935, § 4, at 9 (reject-
ing the notion that the Court's political views influence its decisions, saying that "it
knows its duty to interpret and uphold the Constitution and to protect the country
against rash legislation"), and Emanuel Redfield, Letter to the Editor, Several Handicaps
Seen, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1935, at 20 ("So long as there is a written Constitution, ex-
pressing the ideals of the community[,] ... there must be an umpire to judge whether
the Constitution is being followed."). Wondering whether a private citizen had the
right to criticize a Supreme Court decision, the New York Times wrote:
It all depends, really, on what you think about the New Deal. Say you are for
the New Deal. Then it is perfectly right, of course, after the Supreme Court
has handed down a decision declaring a New Deal law to be unconstitutional,
to deplore the decision, to say that it throws us back into the horse-and-buggy
age, and that it makes any really advanced legislation impossible. If, however,
any group of men say prior to a decision of the Supreme Court that they be-
lieve a New Deal act to be unconstitutional, then they are to be denounced for
trying to "anticipate" the Supreme Court, for showing "disrespect" for the
court, and for "gross impertinence and flagrant impropriety." If, however,
you are against the New Deal, then you deplore the statements of people who
deplore the decisions of the court deploring acts of Congress, though you un-
dertake to say in advance what the court ought to decide. The question is al-
together too complicated to explain to a mere layman.
Subtleties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1935 at 20.
m Biggest News Rose in Supreme Cour N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1935, at 19 (reporting that
Supreme Court rulings affecting New Deal policies topped a poll of newspaper editors
for leading story of the year).
'4 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
See Roosevelt Receives Decision with a Smile; Starts Conference on Steps To Be Taken, N.Y.
TiamS,Jan. 7, 1936 at 1.
"7 Scholars are of two minds on this point. Compare WHLLAM LASSER, TEM LMI
oFJuDIc:.AL POWER: THE SUPRENE COURT IN AMERICAN POLrncs 139 (1988) (arguing
that the Butler decision was generally unpopular and "supported only by the anti-
Roosevelt right"), with LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 98 (citing a Gallup poll show-
ing that a majority of the country disapproved of the AAA).
See Garment Workers Back Roosevelt N.Y. TIES, May 30, 1936, at 3 (describing a
union convention's resolution demanding "a Constitutional amendment to permit
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hanged in effigy.9 Perhaps the most controversial decision of the pe-
riod was the one in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,90 striking down
New York's minimum wage law.9' If reaction to Butlerwas mixed, reac-
tion to Tipaldo was almost uniformly negative. Even conservative de-
fenders of the Supreme Court were taken aback.12 Roosevelt-observ-
ing that under the Court's decisions neither the national nor state
governments had the power to address the situation-commented
that the Court had created a "No-Man's Land."
9 3
These 1936 decisions, frequently decided by closely divided courts
(Pearson and Allen observed that the 1935-1936 Term had a record-
Congress to pass laws to safeguard the economic welfare of workers"); Miners Demand
Basic Law Change N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1936, at 6 (reporting resolution by Mine Work-
ers demanding "a constitutional amendment, if necessary, to protect social and eco-
nomic progress"); Socialists Assail Judicial Tyranny,'N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1936, § 1, at 23
(reporting support of the Socialist party "for a new Declaration of Independence
against judicial tyranny and industrial autocracy'"). But see Review and Outlook-Farmer
and Constitution, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1936, at 4 (questioning the effectiveness of farmer
price support legislation even if it was validated by a Constitutional amendment); Re-
view and Outlook-Unconstitutional, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 7, 1936, at 4 (criticizing attempts by
Congress to "interpret" the Constitution into "new and otherwise impossible legisla-
tion").
89 See Six SupremeJustices Hanged in Effigy in Iowa, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1936, at 15.
'0 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
9' See LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 105 ("Tipaldo produced a national outcry
against the Court.... [I] t was not only the New Dealers who objected. The Court em-
barrassed Administration opponents who had been arguing that protection of the
rights of labor should be left to the states."); Friedman, supra note 20, at 1947 ("Tipaldo
prompted a furious reaction.... The firestorm spread far beyond the liberal camp.").
The Court was criticized for depriving all governments of the power to deal with labor
problems. State attempts at social legislation were held to violate the constitutional
right of freedom of contract, while Congress's efforts were held precluded as in-
fringements on state sovereignty. See Wage Law Decision As Virewed by Press, U.S. NEWS,
June 8, 1936, at 12 (stating that 79% of newspapers found the Tipaldo decision "regret-
table"); Week by Week, 24 COMMONWEAL 199 (1936) (comparing the decision overruling
New York's minimum wage law "to a few activities by Louis XVI" and predicting that
"lilt will do more to undermine the prestige of the Court than everything else said or
done during the past four years").
92
At [the Tipaldo decision] even the reactionaries held up their hands in horror.
The very stupidest among them realized that the Court could not tell the
country, "These may be serious problems, but we're sorry; the Constitution
simply does not let either the federal or the state governments handle them."
Aisop & CATLEDGE, 'hE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 9; see also LASSER, supra note 87, at
9 (reporting that the Tipaldo decision caused consternation among Republicans draft-
ing the 1936 election platform, which, until Tipaldo, was going to take a strong line de-
fending the Court).
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 106. Asked by a reporter to elaborate, the
President merely replied, "I think that is about all there is to say on it." Id.
[Vol. 148:971
LAW'S POLITICS
setting number of dissenting opinions)," aroused not only a storm of
indignation, but also numerous proposals to curb the Court. Indeed,
"[the years 1935-37... saw more Court-curbing bills introduced in
Congress than in any other three-year (or thirty-five year) period in
history.""- Proposals included requiring a supermajority vote for the
96Court to strike down acts of Congress, using the "exceptions and
regulations" clause to curtail the Court's jurisdiction,9 7 and amending
the Constitution to enumerate in explicit terms the powers supporting
New Deal legislation."8
The election of 1936 could have become a plebiscite on the
Court, but Roosevelt chose to avoid the issue entirely, seeking the
broadest support he could for his program." Popular accounts sug-
gest the President's prior comments on the Supreme Court had been
poorly received."* Changing his strategy, Roosevelt sat back and let
See PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 65, at 42.
LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 102 (quoting Michael Nelson, The President and
the Court- Reinterpretingthe Court-PackingEpisode of 1937, 103 Poi- Sci. Q. 27 3 (1988)).
' See Louis Friedman, Letter to the Editor, The Court: Curb Suggested, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1936, § 4, at 9 ("[T]he court would not be abolished and its right to declare
acts of Congress unconstitutional would not be destroyed. It would only mean that the
voice of the people would become again the ultimate power of government.").
See, e.g., Ashley Miller, Letter to the Editor, Source of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1935, § 4, at 9 (pointing out that under Article I, Section 2, the Supreme Court has
the power to invalidate acts of Congress "only if Congress chooses to give it"); W.C.
Rose, Letter to the Editor, Selecting Phrases, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1935, § 4, at 9 ("Con-
gress is not, as is commonly assumed, helpless before the courts. Under this article it
clearly has the right to establish a court with both original and final jurisdiction over
all cases arising under this or that law."). See generally ISIDOR FEINSTEI, THE COURT
DISPOSES 114 (1937) (discussing four ways to limit the Supreme Court's power, includ-
ing limiting the Court's jurisdiction, increasing its membership, amending the Consti-
tution to prohibitjudicial review, and amending the Constitution to facilitate constitu-
tional change).
9s For a discussion of the various bills, see Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965), and LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at
102. See also AAA and the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 26, 1936, § 4, at 8 (urging consti-
tutional amendment to deal with death knell dealt the AAA legislation because "[a]fter
all, the Constitution must serve the changing needs of the people. Their welfare, in
the last analysis, is more sacred than any written document."); Arthur Krock, Barriers in
Path of Constitutional Amendment, N.Y. TrdEs, Jan. 5, 1937, at 22 (explaining that the
outcome of the pending Supreme Court decisions regarding the Wagner and Social
Security Acts would determine "whether this Congress will prepare ... a constitutional
amendment relating to social and industrial conditions in the United States").
99 See Basic Law Change Gains in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1937, at 4 (divulging
"some privately expressed theories" that Roosevelt "hoped for enlargement of the
court or restriction of its powers if the justices did not show warmer hearts" but that he
"proposed to play a waiting game before determining any future course of action").
1 The New York Times explained:
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the Court tie its own noose.' Not until his stunning victory in 1937
did Roosevelt move against the Court.
B. The Relative Paucity of Countermajoritarian Criticism
Given the frequency with which the Court struck legislation, one
might have expected charges that the Court was interfering with
popular will. As discussed above, this "countermajoritarian criticism"
had been prominent during the Lochner era.112 The measures struck
down by the New Deal Court seemed to have even greater popular
support than those struck down during the Populist/Progressive era.'
Nonetheless, countermajoritarian criticism took a back seat to
other criticism ofjudges during the New Deal crisis. The claim here is
not that the Supreme Court was without fierce critics, but that the na-
ture of the criticism differed significantly from the predominantly
countermajoritarian criticism of the Populist/Progressive era.
Even when countermajoritarian criticism is found during this pe-
riod, the usage reveals its more marginal status. The statements often
were quite weak or made in passing.14 Typically, the countermajori-
The way in which his [horse and buggy] comments were received convinced
the President that the occasion and tone of his remarks constituted a blunder,
and he contented himself with a single public reference to the court-the one
about 'no man's land,' which followed the decision on the NewYork Woman's
Wage Law.
Arthur Krock, Roosevelt Charged with Court Design in 1932, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at
22. In addition to the "horse and buggy" and "no man's land" comments, during the
election campaign in 1932 Roosevelt made a comment about the whole government,
including the Court, being in Republican hands, which was interpreted as accusing the
Court of partisanship. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 83 ("'After March 4, 1929,
the Republican party was in complete control of all branches of the government-the
Legislature, with the Senate and Congress; and the executive departments; and I may
add, for full measure, to make it complete, the United States Supreme Court as well.'"
(quoting Roosevelt)).
101 See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DA"YS, supra note 9, at 17-20 (describing how
popular and editorial indignation toward Roosevelt's comments led him to delay any
direct assault on the Court).
'02 See Friedman, Lochner, supra note 47, at 10 (referring to criticism of the courts
on the ground that that they were interfering with popular will). This was also the case
during the Depression era attacks on the Supreme Court. SeeFriedman, supra note 43,
at 356-81.
'0" The Democratic Congress and President responsible for the initiatives of the
First Hundred Days received the greatest electoral support in history. See 2 ACKERMPAN,
supra note 14, at 310.
'04 See, e.g., Lloyd K. Garrison, The Constitution and Social Progress, 10 TUL. L. REV.
333, 349 (1936) (giving a complicated analysis of the economics of federalism, sur-
pluses, and natural resource allocation; providing only a one-line criticism in the mid-
dle stating that the Court exercises "a veto of the legislative and popular judgment in
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tarian criticism was a throwaway argument following a criticism the
author apparently thought was much stronger.0 5  Many of the
stronger statements about judicial review interfering with popular will
came from old-time, Progressive era politicians who could be ex-
pected to continue to echo familiar themes. 6 The most "counterma-
economic affairs"); Thomas F. Konop, Reorganization of the FederalJudiciay, 12 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 347, 351 (1937) (haranguing the court in a several page blustering
speech that simply throws away the line "What about the power of ONE MAN, the
FIFTH JUSTICE, to thwart the will of the people as expressed through their represen-
tatives?"); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Politics and the Supreme Court: President Roosevell's
Proposa!, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 666 (1937) (dropping the phrase that "the Court in-
creasingly substitutes its own views for those of Congress and the electorate" in a S0-
page attack on the Court).
Anticipating the struggles ahead, Ralph Fuchs wrote an article in the St. Louis Law
Review largely discussing the merits of the constitutionality of the New Deal. He began
with the extended observation that the proverbial Man from Mars would have a diffi-
cult time understanding a court striking down New Deal measures:
Upon asking who it is that could deny the authority of the responsible heads
of a democratic government to carry out policies which they have evolved with
popular approval, the Gentleman from Mars would be told that it is a hierar-
chy ofjudges, the most important of whom are elderly gentlemen holding of-
fice for life.
Fuchs, supra note 63, at 2 (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, after introducing the
problem he dropped the countermajoritarian theme altogether. Yet, this is one of the
most countermajoritarian references. Notably, it came two years before the New Deal
struggle began.
"5 See, e.g., Osmond K Fraenkel, What Can Be Done About the Constitution and the Su-
preme Court?, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 212, 226 (1937) (ending a sustained, 15 page criticism
of the Court for rendering unpopular decisions with the countermajoritarian criticism
not leveled earlier that "the people ... could rewrite the Constitution step by step so
that their will rather than that of the justices might prevail"); D.O. McGovney, Reor-
ganization of the Supreme Cour4 25 CAL. L. REv. 389, 406 (1937) (commenting that the
Court is "an undemocratic feature of our system" after 18 pages of case-by-case, sub-
stantive criticism of the Court's reasoning); Mitchell Dawson, The Supreme Court and the
New Deal, 167 HARPERS 641, 642-43 (1933) (arguing that the Court "stands as the great
defender of private property against the attempts of popular legislatures to encroach
upon the privileges of that property," despite commenting that the Court is "far re-
moved from the will and behest of the people").
'(" For example, despite the government's success with the Gold Clause cases,
Senator George Norris still protested: "These five to four Supreme Court decisions on
the constitutionality of congressional acts it seems to me are illogical and should not
occur in a country like ours." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 88. Norris also advo-
cated requiring at least a 7-to-2 vote by the Supreme Court to invalidate legislation fol-
lowing the three Court decisions handed down on "Black Monday." Id. at 91. Norris
was a Progressive, and his proposal mirrored Progressive-era ideas. See Ross, supra
note 57, at 297, 307-08. In explicit countermajoritarian language, Fiorello H. La
Guardia criticized conservatives who seemed "to believe that the Constitution was writ-
ten for no other purpose than to guarantee exploitation of the many by the chosen
few." Fiorello H. La Guardia, For 2/3 High Court Vote to Make Laws Invalid, N.Y. TMES,
May 18, 1935, at 1. LaGuardia, too, was a Progressive. See Ross, supra note 57, at 231-
32. Moreover, "Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., [the son of a famous Progressive,] was the
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joritarian" of books attacking the Court followed the meandering, po-
lemic style of Populist/Progressive literature.
0 7
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the relative absence of coun-
termajoritarian criticism is that it was barely mentioned in places
where one would most expect to find it. This, after all, had been a
slogan for a long time, coming easily and quickly to the lips of many
that fought Progressive-era battles. Yet, when strident attacks were
leveled at the Court in the New Deal period, critics really did neglect
this early criticism, shifting to a new and different one. For example,
it is almost completely missing from Pearson and Allen's famous book,
The Nine Old Men.01 This book captured the tone of the period, and
its theme was-as the title suggests-age, not countermajoritarianism.
Literally hundreds of articles were written in bar journals and law re-
views both before and after the Court-packing plan was announced.
For the most part these authors supported judicial independence,
thus countermajoritarian criticism would not have been expected.
But such articles defending the Court did not feel the need to rebut
the countermajoritarian claim. Even in those articles criticizing the
Court, countermajoritarian criticism was not prominent.' 9
only senator who consistently and unequivocally supported the Court-packing plan."
Id. at 303. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan ultimately proved too extreme even for
some Progressive-era politicians. For example, Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Mon-
tana, who in 1924 had been "the vice-presidential nominee on the Progressive ticket
headed by Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., who charged the federaIjudiciary with usurpation
and wanted to authorize Congress to override Supreme Court rulings," denounced
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 137.
107 See, e.g., MORRIS L. ERNST, THE ULTIMATE POWER 321 (1937) ("Words of neces-
sity have changing contents. Whose content do we wish applied? Appointedjudges or
elected representatives?"); FEINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 11, 20 (tiding chapters "Judges
Rule Us" and "The Roll of theJudicia Dice").
103 The closest possible reference is PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 65, at 322, which
explores the relation ofjustice to popular will when unpopular presidents have the
opportunity to appoint numerous Justices and well-liked presidents do not.
'09 There were at least 177journal articles written between 1932 and 1938 involving
the controversy over the Court. Of that number, 41 clearly defended the Court, and
34 clearly attacked or criticized it. Only in the 34 articles clearly attacking the Court
was countermajoritarian criticism made, and even there the primary basis of criticism
in these articles was not countermajoritarian. Of the 34 articles, 21 made the coun-
termajoritarian criticism, but many of them only in passing. A small number of articles
were, however, strongly countermajoritarian in tone. See, e.g., Theodore Francis
Green, Proposed Supreme Court Changes, reprinted in 7 LAW SOc. J. OF MASS. 806, 806-
14 (1937) (describing the courts as possessing "an attitude which has thwarted the ef-
forts and the will of the people, and has raised problems so serious that 'crisis' is the
only word adequate to describe the situation"); Charles Grove HainesJudicial Review of
Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitutional Reform, 45 YALE L.J. 816 (1936) (criticizing
judical review); Konop, supra note 104, at 347 (arguing that the Supreme Court was
usurping the power of Congress and the President). A number of these authors had
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The claim is not that countermajoritarian criticism was entirely
absent. It was not. The exercise of judicial review was discussed in
countermajoritarian terms in many letters to the editor.1 The Nation
suggested Court-packing did not go far enough, as "[ i] t clearly does
not meet the issue of the judicial power as an obstruction to demo-
cratic action.""' A speech given by Senator Logan also had a coun-
termajoritarian flavor.12  Collections of comments on the Court-
packing plan included a number that clearly talked of thwarting popu-
lar will or the will of the people.13 Some authors did not agree with
cut their critical teeth during the Populist/Progressive era, so it is less of a surprise that
their criticisms were in countermajoritarian terms. For example, a prominent Popu-
list/Progressive critic, Louis Boudin, published a two-volume, highly countermajori-
tarian history attacking the Court. See 1 Louis B. BOUDIN, GOvERNMENT BYJUDICIARY
viii (1932). He leveled the same countermajoritarian criticism in his 1932 work as in
his 1911 essay of the same name. See Louis B. Boudin, Government byJudiciay, 26 POL.
Sci Q. 238-70 (1911).
110 See, e.g., Francisj. Bassett, Letter to the EditorJudicialAutocracy, N.Y. TIMESJan.
25, 1936, at 14 (decrying 5-4judicial decisions because "[i]n a true democracy taken
from the Greek ideal the people must be given final authority");James E. Heath, Let-
ter to the Editor, Judicial Review of Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1936, at 20 (opining that
judicial review should only be used when an act is clearly unconstitutional and that
"when... a measure has passed the scrutiny of the judiciary committees of the two
houses... [and] has met with the approval of three members of the court, it certainly
cannot be said that its unconstitutionality is plain beyond any question"); Richard A.
Lindblad, Letter to the Editor, Supreme Court Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1934, at 16
(ruing the possibility of "one man overruling the will of the people" if [the New Deal]
laws are made void by a five to four vote).
". Purging the Supreme Court, NATION, Feb. 13, 1937, at 173-74, reprinted in FRANKLiN
D. ROOSEvELT AND THE SUPREmE COURT 34 (Alfred Haines Cope & Fred Krinsky eds.,
1969).
112
Any body having supreme and absolute power in a republic, uncontrolled by
the people or their representatives, is something that cannot be imagined by
anyone unless he believes that for the protection of property and property
rights it is necessary to have such a tribunal with supreme power over the life,
liberties, and property of all the people.
81 CoNG. REC. 7376, 7380 (1937) (speech of Sen. Logan).
ns See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT ISSUE AND THE CONSTITUTION 50 (William R.
Barnes & A.W. Littiefield eds., 1937) ("The proposal of the President is nothing more
nor less than a call to Congress to exercise its power under the Constitution to prevent
the majority of the Supreme Court from thwarting the popular will." (comment of
Robert M. LaFollette, United States Senator from Wisconsin)); id. at 65 ("[T]hejudi-
ciary should be as representative of the people as are the executive and legislative
branches of our government." (comment ofRobertR. Reynolds, United States Senator
from North Carolina)).
That an act may be passed by the Congress, representing the sovereign will of
a sovereign people, approved by the Executive, also representing all of the
people.., only to have it stricken down years later by the assumed unconstitu-
tional exercise of power by an appointive judiciary, is, I say, an anomalous and
unbearable state of affairs and one wherein we fall short of the ability to exer-
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the argument but felt the need to answer it. For example, Dean Al-
fange wrote a book in which he addressed the tension he felt between
democracy and judicial review.14 Merlo Pusey responded to the ar-
gument, perhaps "the most persuasive argument" leveled in favor of
Court-packing."' But one has to go looking for such references, in
contrast to the Lochner era when it was difficult to avoid stumbling
over them.
Skeptical readers may temporarily withhold judgment on whether
there was a shift in attitudes toward judicial review from the Popu-
list/Progressive era to the New Deal era. As the following story es-
tablishes, there was a good reason for the shift in criticism. Indeed,
Robert Jackson's own odyssey is further evidence of this point. On
October 12, 1937, after the court battle was over, Jackson, then FDR's
Assistant Attorney General and one of the Court's fiercest critics, gave
a speech at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In it he
set out the countermajoritarian difficulty quite plainly, stating that
"[e]ither democracy must surrender to the judges or the judges must
yield to democracy."' 7 This was to become a theme of Jackson's in
cise the sovereign powers of a nation.
Id. at 71 (comment of FredJ. Sisson, former Representative from NewYork).
... See DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL (1937) (ex-
ploring the relationship between the changing national will and the Supreme Court
crisis).
1 MERLOJ. PUSEY, THM SUPREME COURT CRISIS 63-74 (1937) (acknowledging the
strength of the argument that remodeling the Supreme Court would be necessary to
make "democracy effective," but arguing against the President's Court-packing plan by
stating that "we ... cannot afford to compromise with fascistic methods to gain imme-
diate objectives").
16 There is an irony prominent at the time but often overlooked: countermajori-
tarian concern about courts often appeared in articles that ignored the same concern
with regard to administrative agencies. For a critique along these lines, see Barry
Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 629-43 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review]. The most prominent dismissal of the no-
tion that the countermajoritarian criticism applies equally to administrative agencies
may be BICKEL, supra note 41, at 19-20 (dismissing the argument).
At the time of the New Deal, those who attacked the courts undoubtedly supported
the work of agencies, yet there were those who actually attacked agencies as counter-
majoritarian while approving of the role of courts. See THURMOND W. ARNOLD, THE
FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 73-74 (1937) [hereinafter ARNOLD, FOLKLORE] (describing
this criticism of agencies); see also SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 37 (describing
the problem with the "policy science" approach to law: "Law as policy science, how-
ever, was equally undemocratic. .. ").
11 Jackson Calls Court Curb on Democracy; Says Law Reviews Block United Functioning,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1937, at 6. Jackson's opinion on how the conflict should be re-
solved was clear: "Why should democracy discipline itself to accept decisions at the
polls, if its enemies reject election and appeal to another forum where the decisions of
the polls are reversed?" Jackson Hits Court in Celebration Talk, DAILYTARHEEL, Oct. 13,
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later years, and was the focus of a book he published while on the Su-
preme Court entitled The Struggle forJudicial Supremacy.
s18
During the battle over the Court-packing plan, however, Jackson's
tone was quite different, with countermajoritarian criticism com-
pletely absent.1 9 Jackson developed his countermajoritarian attack on
the Court only after Court-packing had been defeated and it became
clear to him the Court could not be controlled by the political
branches. Prior to that time, Jackson shared many popular percep-
tions regarding judicial review, perceptions which differed signifi-
cantly from those held at the height of the Populist/Progressive era.
C. What Changed?: External Influences on Perceptions
ofJudicial Review
1. From "Popular Democracy" to
"National Government"
The first fundamental shift was in popular perceptions about the
relationship between government and the people, about the way de-
1937, at 2.
When Jackson first made the countermajoritarian argument in 1937, there was
protest of'Jackson's understanding of the Court's role. SeeJohn F. Curran, Letter to
the Editor, Mr. Jackson on Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1937, at 16 ("Either [Jackson]
does not understand the Constitution, which he has taken an oath to defend, or he
wishes to overthrow it by substituting a centralized consolidated government for our
Federal Republic of limited powers."); Sef-Checking Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1937, at 24 (doubting that popular majorities will always be as "reasonable and self-
restrained" asJackson claims). Frank Gannett even tried to arrange forJackson to de-
bate Albert Levitt on this point. See Jackson Declines to Debate Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1937, at 11. Jackson responded with a challenge to debate Gannett over whether Roo-
sevelt had been justified in sending his court proposal to Congress. See Jackson Offers
Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1937, at 10. Gannett declined the challenge as well. See
Gannett Declines Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1937, at 24; Mr. Gannett to Mr. Jackson, N.Y.
TImES, Oct. 28, 1937, at 24.
118 ROBERTJACKSON, TBE STRUGGLE FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1949).
"9 For example, Jackson said to Congress:
"A majority of the justices have made it apparent that the great objectives of
this Administration and this Congress offend their deep convictions.... Pre-
diction of 'impending moral chaos,' grief over the fear that 'the Constitution
is gone,' characterization of the Securities & Exchange Commission as a 'star
chamber,' accusation that the Congress and the Executive have coerced farm-
ers, taken freedom of contract away from working women and despoiled the
states, indicate an implacable, although unquestionably sincere, opposition to
the use of national power to accomplish the policies so overwhelmingly en-
dorsed by the voters."
Quiet Cisis, TIME, Mar. 22, 1937, at 14, 16.
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mocracy should operate.2 At the height of the Populist/Progressive
era, the sine qua non of democracy was responsiveness to popular pref-121
erence. Majoritarian rhetoric supported reforms to foster direct
democracy, such as the initiative and referendum, the direct primary,
and the popular election of United States Senators. By the mid-1930s,
however, there was grave doubt about the capacity of the popular
democratic experiment to deal with modem problems. Even fascism
held a certain appeal in some quarters.122 But most people simply
looked to "government" to resolve what they could not. As Robert
Wiebe has explained, "[t]he modem individual's growing reliance on
government marked a shift with momentous consequences: the state
replaced the People as democracy's last resort."'23 "[Tihe meaning of
democracy shifted from process to results.... Now the crucial ques-
1 As Henry Monaghan has made clear, the democratic nature of American consti-
tutionalism was subject to change (and has changed) since the founding. See Henry P.
Monaghan, We the Peoplels], Original Understanding and Constitutional Amendmen 96
COLUM. L. REv. 121, 165-77 (1996) (critiquing the notion that populist understand-
ings had any place in the original Constitution and describing some of the early shifts
in thought).
1 William Nelson explains the rise of post-Reconstruction majoritarianism in light
of a failure to reach agreement on pre-political moral principles for governing. See
Wnn.Am E. NELSON, THE RooTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 62-72
(1982). Admittedly, the highly populist imagery of the time was a bit of a fiction.
Many Progressives were elitists and had far greater faith in expertise than popular will
as the means of governance. See infra text accompanying notes 128-33 (discussing the
Progressive preference for policy experts). Moreover, any broad categorization is
likely to have exceptions. On the differing views of Progressives about democracy and
free expression, see MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEE H 82-87 (1991), and see
generally the excellent work on democratic thought throughout this period by
EDWARD A. PURCEI.LJR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973). Eldon Eisen-
ach's work provides a good description of the complexity of Progressive era thought.
ELDON EisENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM (1994). Despite this complex-
ity, Eisenach notes the powerful majoritarian strains present in progressive thought:
"Distrustful of governing institutions dominated by political parties and disdainful of
the stilted and artificial language of the courts, they pursued two related options: to
appeal directly to a broad public and to dominate institutions that had or could
achieve popular acceptance and autonomous political influence." Id. at 74; see also id.
at 115 ("Butjust as courts are giving way to legislative majorities, and legislative majori-
ties, in turn, to direct democracy, so parties must now yield to democratic will, ex-
pressed as a coherent national program of socialjustice.").
'22 See, e.g., Les K Adler & Thomas G. Paterson, Red Fascis.m The Merger of Nazi Ger-
many and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's, 75 AM.
HIST. REV. 1046, 1047 (1970) ("[M]any Americans, until the Italian attack on Ethiopia
and the rise of Hitler 'gave Fascism a demonic image,' saw Fascist Italy as an attractive
political and social experiment." (quoting John P. Diggins, Flirtation with Fascism:
American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini's Italy, 71 AM. HIST. REV. 499 (1966))).
'23 ROBERTH. WIEBE, SELF-RULE 202 (1995).
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don was what came out of the state rather than what went into it."
1 24
And, importantly, the "state" to which the people looked for help in-
creasingly was the national government.
The seeds of this new statism assuredly were sown during the
Populist/Progressive era. Volunteerism and individualism, even
among those who decried laissez-faire, limited confidence in govern-
ment action.12 In this environment courts dominated, in part be-
cause they often appeared to have the last word.12 Over time, how-
ever, Progressives in particular came to see courts as lacking the
knowledge to address novel social problems.'2 Instead, Progressives
turned to policy experts, often in the guise of commissions and execu-
tive agencies.' As James Landis explained, this "sprang from a dis-
trust of the ability of the judicial process to make the necessary ad-
124 Id. at 215.
12' See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 167-68 (1991) (noting that the AFL embraced an anti-statist outlook, as-
sailed protective legislation, and turned to politics only for voluntarist ends).
'2 See FORBATH, supra note 125, at 26 (describing the emergence of the "court-
centered American state"); MORTONJ. HoRWIZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870-1960, at 170 (1992) (noting that "pre-war reformist legal thought tended to
be court-centered-with the dramatic exception of the movement for workers' com-
pensation").
127 See id at 32 (stating that nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Amer-
ica lacked an administrative state elite to counterpoise the courts' primacy and noting
that "[n]owhere else among industrializing nations did the judiciary and judge-made
law so fully define state policy toward industrial relations throughout the nineteenth
century").
'2 See HoRwrrZ, supra note 126, at 225 ("As the Progressive disenchantment with
the competence of courts to perform social engineering tasks combined with a loss of
faith in the sensitivity of judges to questions of social justice, the effort to replace
courts with administrative experts became more pronounced."). Stephen Skowronek
has commented:
[Alt the turning point in American state development, when the nature of the
demands on government began to change, courts and parties came under di-
rect attack as the pillars of the old order.... National administrative capaci-
ties expanded through cracks in an edifice of rules of action and internal gov-
ernmental controls articulated by courts and parties.
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONALADMINIsTRATIvE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 287 (1982).
125 See ARTHUR S. I.NK& RICHARD L. McCoRMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 60 (1983) (de-
scribing Progressives' distrust of legislatures and efforts to entrust new functions of
government to executive agencies perceived to have greater administrative sophistica-
tion and less interest in patronage); see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM 265 (1955) (describing the Progressive notion that centralized authority is
more open to public view, less corrupt, and therefore preferable to courts and legisla-
tures); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 184-85 (1967) (not-
ing that those in search of political favors began soliciting administrators rather than
legislators).
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justments in the development of both law and regulatory methods as
they related to particular industrial problems."'
s°
The gradual change in thinking engendered a shift to executive
control that was well underway in Theodore Roosevelt's administra-
tion, 131 and reached a height in the 1920s in the wake of the first
World War.1 Felix Frankfurter, writing two years before Franklin
Roosevelt's first election, said:
There is something touching about the Congressman who only the other
day introduced a joint resolution for a Commission on Centralization
which is to report "whether in its opinion the Government has departed
from the concept of the founding fathers" and "what steps, if any, should
be taken to restore the government to its original purposes and sphere
of activity."
33
Despite this trend, it would nonetheless be a mistake to emphasize
similarity over discontinuity.14  The World War I boom of national
l0JAus M. LANDIS, T'M ADMN TA E PROCESS 30(1938).
,' For brief descriptions of Theodore Roosevelt's administrative philosophy, see
HoRwrrz, supra note 126 at 170; LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 36; and
WIEBE, supra note 123, at 202-03.
132 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 930 ("No more than the world was the welfare state
created in seven days, or even 100. It evolved over at least a half century of political
and judicial turmoil."); Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifrvorld; Substantive Due Process in
the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (1998) (noting that during World War I,
"[n]othing like this explosion of federal regulatory power had ever happened be-
fore"); id. at 1491 (quoting George Sutherland as stating that "Congress is passing ex-
traordinary legislation and the Administration is doing many extraordinary things").
For an excellent discussion of the change engendered by the World War-as well as
the reactive element of post-War America-see DAVID KENNEDY, OVER HERE (1980).
"3 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PuBuC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 28 (1930) (quoting
H.R.J. Res. 185, 71st Cong. (1930). As political power shifted, there was also a subtle
but important shift underway in the mechanism of democratic action, as individualism
gave way to group activity. SeeWIEBE, supra note 123, at 115 ("The unorganized fell to
the bottom of these hierarchies: no group, no voice. At best, atomized citizens be-
came the political cartoonist's beleaguered, befuddled John Q. Public, honest enough
but utterly lost in the intricacies of modern government.").
,34 Perhaps the best source on this discontinuity is Otis Graham's study, in which
he endeavors to explain the reaction of Progressives to the New Deal. See OTIS
GRAHAM, AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE NEw DEAL
(1967). As Graham astutely points out, it was quite natural for New Dealers to attempt
to claim the Progressive mantle. Far more interesting is the question of how Progres-
sives regarded the New Deal: some of them were supportive, but many were oppo-
nents. Robert Post also quotes Charles Evan Hughes conceding in 1924 that "it was
doubtless impossible to cope with the evils incident to the complexities of our modern
life.., by the means which were adapted to the simpler practices of an earlier day,"
but nonetheless saying "there is no panacea for modem ills in bureaucracy." Post, supra note
132, at 1538 (quoting President Hughes Responds for the Association, 10 A.B.A. J. 567, 569
(1924)) (emphasis added).
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administration collapsed to some extent after the war.13 Herbert
Hoover was no stranger to active government, but his idea of govern-
ment primarily was a federalist reliance on the states. He never ac-
commodated himself to the necessity for national action to address
the ravages of the Great Depression.ss Richard Hofstadter, granting
"that absolute discontinuities do not occur in history," nonetheless
observed that "what seems outstanding about [the New Deal] is the
drastic new departure that it marks in the history of American reform-
ism. The New Deal was different from anything that had yet hap-
pened in the United States. 7
This fairly dramatic shift in views about government power was the
result in part of the cataclysmic economic turmoil of the Depres-
sion. It would be difficult to overstate the impact of the Depression,
both in its magnitude as an economic catastrophe, and in its influence
on ways of thinking about the role of the government, particularly the
national government. 9 Attacking the Supreme Court, Robert Carr
's' See KENNEDY, supra note 132, at 231-95 (discussing the uphill battle of Progres-
sives to maintain their agenda in the years after the First World War); Post, supra note
132, at 1490 n.9 ("Wilson... 'allowed his administration to close in a riot of reaction.'"
(quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN
WHO MADE IT 274 (1948))); id. at 1496 (describing the Court's concern "to limit the
abnormal reach of wartime power"); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual
Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberal, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKE J.
Emp. & LAB. L. 1, 9 (1999) ("[F]rom the end of World War I to the beginning of the
Great Depression, a laissez-faire ideology that focused on the sanctity of the individ-
ual's right to contractwas in its ascendancy.").
's' See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 281 ("Hoover was a social engineer who be-
lieved in the affirmative uses of government power. His response to the Great Crash of
1929 was quite activist. ... At the same time, Hoover was clear that the Constitution
did not give the federal government plenary powers to manage the national econ-
omy."); RONALD L. FENMAN, TIVIGHT OF PROGRESSISM xi (1981) (calling Hoover
an "opponent of intervention by the national government in the economy");
HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 306 (noting that as an "old Bull Mooser" Hoover was
equipped with a Progressive mind, but was unprepared for the Depression nonethe-
less);JAMEs T. PATTERSON, THE NEw DEAL AND THE STATES, 29-32 (1969) (discussing
the grudging efforts of the national government to aid states during the Hoover ad-
ministration).
IS HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 303. Hofstadter contends that the New Deal
was different from Progressivism in its ideas, spirits, techniques, and most strikingly in
its principal difficulty: The Great Depression. See id. at 303-04.
. See Lessig, supra note 23, at 468 ("By the mid-1930s, these structures of thought
were to collapse, failing victim to an obvious shock, the Depression.... 'With amazing
speed,' the dominance of the ideals of nonintervention disappeared.'" (quoting
ARNOLD, SYMBOLs, supra note 7, at 265)).
'5 See PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 11-12 (explaining the impact of the Depression
on the willingness to extend great authority to Roosevelt); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitu-
tional Theory Transfonne 108 Yale L.J. 2115, 2130 (1999) ("[The New Deal] was a re-
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detailed the miseries facing Americans and asked: "Why not use gov-
ernment to solve such problems?"'40 Karl Llewelyn and Max Lerner,
speaking to the League of Women Voters in 1936, both spoke of the
need and inevitability of government aid to people in distress.'4'
The failure of government to alleviate the impact of the Depres-
sion coincided with widespread global skepticism about democracy.'42
Referring to Congress's ineffectual lame-duck session in 1932-1933,
James Patterson reports that Alf Landon (Roosevelt's opponent in
1936) said, "[e]ven the iron hand of a national dictator is in prefer-
sponse to a crisis. The Great Depression was one of the most serious political and eco-
nomic crises in American history. Such crises create unique opportunities for state
building.... " (footnotes omitted)); Lessig, supra note 23, at 468 (explaining how ex-
isting structures of thought fell victim to the Depression); Post, supra note 132, at 1542
(ascribing the collapse of Lochnerism to the fact that "dominant opinion in the coun-
try" no longer saw economic transactions as "significant sites for the enactment of in-
dependence from state control"). The magnitude of the Depression and its influence
on thinking about government somewhat undermine Larry Kramer's incrementalist
explanation of the constitutional transformation in one respect, though it strongly
supports it in another. Kramer argues the transformation only looked dramatic be-
cause of the "panicked" decisions of 1935-1936, and that otherwise the doctrine was
moving apace with the growth of administrative government from the turn of the cen-
tury. Kramer, supra note 16, at 916-30. But Kramer's own numbers establish that al-
though there was gradual growth (and doctrinal change), the growth during the De-
pression years still was quite dramatic. See id. at 924 (detailing that during the 1930s
"the federal bureaucracy increased by another 60%"). Given the depth of the Depres-
sion, however, the "panic" in the Court's jurisprudence that Kramer describes is all the
more dramatic.
140 ROBERT CARP, DEMOcRACY AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1936). Carr's discus-
sion of the role of government differs markedly from the populist discussions of the
prior era:
In other words, it is government that brings order out of chaos, it is the
government that makes the robber baron, the captain of industry, the would-
be tyrant, the potential destroyer of liberty, toe the mark and respect the
rights of others. The abolition of child labor, the fixing of minimum wages
for women and children, and maximum hours of labor for men, the creation
of machinery for collective bargaining between employers and workers, the
establishment of a system of social security providing insurance against unem-
ployment, accident, disease, and old age, the regulation of money lenders,
brokers, and stock markets; these are the necessary policies of government if
the position of the common man in the midst of the welter and confusion of
modern society is to be made secure.
Id. at 128-29.
"'1 See Winifred Mallon, Urge Women Back Federal Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1936,
at 8.
142 For a collection of views turning the fascism card against the Supreme Court
during the Court-packing battle, see infra note 308. Edward Purcell, in describing the
changing character of democracy, discussed the fear (or appeal) of dictatorship
spreading to the United States. See PuRCELL, supra note 121, at 126. "Had democracy
failed and was dictatorship alone capable of meeting the problems of advanced indus-
trial society?" Id. at 117.
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ence to a paralytic stroke."14 Corwin even explained the New Deal
concept of delegation as "an effort to attain some of the results of dictator-
ship by a mergence of legislative power with Presidential leadership. "144 Con-
temporary scholars of the time such as Felix Frankfurter, and subse-
quent commentators such as Hofstadter and Wiebe, all have noticed
the loss of faith in democratic rule as totalitarian regimes were spring-
ing up around the globe.1 5 "A growing sense that only the state stood
between its citizens and impending disaster lent new urgency to the
need for decisive leadership."
Into this breach strode Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt offered to
utilize the massive power of centralized government to address the
needs of a nation calling for help, signaling a significant shift from the
attitudes of the Populist/Progressive era. Roosevelt proclaimed that
the "accustomed order of our formerly established lives does not suf-
fice to meet the perils and problems which today we are compelled to
face."147 Instead, "[n] ere survival calls for a new pioneering."148 In the
1936 elections, the people offered Roosevelt a stunning mandate for
149his vision.
SPATTRSON, supra note 39, at 2.
,44 EDwARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 140 (1934).
1 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 133, at 123 ("Epitaphs for democracy are the fash-
ion of the day."); WIEBE, supra note 123, at 215 (noting historian Carl Becker's con-
cern about the survival of a democracy that betrayed the industrial poor); see also
PURCELL, supra note 121, at 126 (quoting The Nation as saying, "[ulnless we can find
through democracy a way to efficiency, justice, and liberty, we shall get dictatorship-
and we shall deserve it"); id. at 126-27 (discussing this problem in depth).
116 WIEBE, supra note 123, at 217.
'47 3 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 457. Cf HOCKETr, supra note 60, at 161 ("'By
the pressure of experience.... legislative regulation of economic and social activities
turned to administrative instruments.'" (quoting Felix Frankfurter)). As G. Edward
White observes, "Frankfurter had concluded that the onset of modernity required an
expanded conception of government. Earlier generations of American legal and social
theorists had reacted to perceptions of economic, social, and scientific transformations
without concluding that government should be the primary mechanism to respond to
those changes." White, supra note 7, at 351.
'4 3 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 457. For examples of that New Deal innova-
tion, see JOHN MORTON BLUM, ROOSEVELT AND MORGENTHAU chs. II, V (1970), and
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEvELT: THE COMING OF THE NEv
DEAL 85-176 (1959).
"9 See ALAN BRINKLE, THE END OF REFORM 15 (1995) (identifying Roosevelt's vic-
tory as unprecedented-60.8 % of the popular vote, 523 of 531 electoral votes, and
decisive Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress); see also Joseph Alsop &
Turner Catiedge, The 168 Days: The Story Behind the Story of the Supreme Court Fight,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 18, 1937, at 9 [hereinafter Alsop & Catledge, Behind the
Story] ("[Roosevelt] took the 27,000,000 votes cast for him as an endorsement as per-
sonal as an appointment to be trustee and guardian of a friend's children. He be-
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The most dramatic "departure" was the turn to the national gov-
emnment. As Richard Stewart has said:
[T]he New Deal firmly established the proposition that the federal gov-
ernment ought to take responsibility for the overall productivity and
health of the economy at the macro-economic level .... [T]he New
Deal established the proposition that the federal government has a basic
responsibility for protecting individuals and families against the eco-
nomic risks of an industrial market economy through various means of
social insurance and assistance .... [T]he New Deal experimented with
an economy-wide approach to central planning and economic regula-
tion .... [and] the New Deal greatly intensified and extended national
regulation of particular industries .... 1S
The federal government assumed an unprecedented fiscal role,'
one that grew by leaps and bounds,'5 2 as federal agencies sprang up to
address social and economic problems5 Passage of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act signaled a turn from the trust-busting of the
Progressive era to cooperation with big business, although business
was to be under the yoke of governmental control.' 54 As Corwin ex-
plained, "Business, being capable of affecting the lot in life of most of
us fully as much as Government itself, is no longer to be considered a
purely private enterprise."""'
In his classic work, The Age of Refom, Hofstadter summarized this
change in attitude. He explained that while Progressives often looked
to enterpreneurial freedoms for solutions to problems, the New Deal
lieved ... that the people had given him carte blanche to go forward... .").
"m See Stewart, supra note 16, at 240-42. Stewart's analysis is part of broader re-
marks evaluating the lasting impact of each of these elements of New Deal policy, some
of which-Stewart points out-we have since abandoned as unwise.
,51 See COLIN GORDON, NEW DEAlS 1 (1994) (describing the New Deal as the "'big
bang' of institutional innovation" and the central landmark of the modern U.S. politi-
cal economy); HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 308-09 (noting the imposing new fiscal
role of the federal government as an addition to the traditional progressive social base
of reformism).
152 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 924 (describing the number of administrative
agencies as "nearly doubling" during the New Deal).
"3 See BRINKLEY, supra note 149, at 63 ("A modern state, [New Deal liberals] be-
lieved, required the proliferation of independent executive agencies and expert ad-
ministrators, insulated as f-ar as possible from political pressures.").
114 See HOCKETT, supra note 60, at 228 (discussing the conflict after the death of the
NRA between Robert Jackson and those "within the administration [who] were still
devoted to the proposition that industry cooperation under the eye of a government
regulator was the appropriate strategy for dealing with concentrated economic power"
(internal quotation omitted)).
' CORWIN, supra note 144, at xxvii; see also FRANKFURTER, supra note 133, at 4 (dis-
cussing the collapse of the public/private distinction); HORWITZ, supra note 126, at
223 (noting that "regulation increased massively at the state level as well").
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focused on government intervention: "[The Progressives'] concep-
tions of the role of the national government were at first largely nega-
tive and then largely preventative."1 6 However,
[e]ven before F.D.R. took office a silent revolution had taken place in
public opinion, the essential character of which can be seen when we re-
call how little opposition there was in the country, at the beginning, to
the assumption of the New Dealers that henceforth, for the purposes of
recovery, the federal government was to be responsible for the condition of
the labor market as a part of its concern with the industrial problem as a
whole. 57
Emphasis needs to be placed on both of the italicized words in the
Hofstadter analysis. When Americans looked to government, they
looked to the national government 5 s
As the focus shifted toward government, it moved avay from no-
tions of popular democratic control.'-" Reforms critical to Progres-
sives, such as toppling political machines, simply fell off the political
radar screen.16 Commentators emphasized "representative" (rather
than popular) democracy.16' Robert Wiebe observed that Thurman
6 HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 305.
117 Id. at 307 (emphasis supplied); see alsoBlINKLEY, supra note 149, at 9.
"s This was an important reason for the split from the New Deal by Progressives
whom one might have expected to be supportive. See GRAHAM, supra note 134, at 29,
45, 66. These Progressives felt the "New Deal was unforgivably coercive," id. at 66, and
deplored "New Deal spending, labor policy, bureaucracy," id. at 29. "The fight [during
Progressive days] was for individualism then and is for individualism now [during the
New Deal]. The enemy was regimentation attempted by big business; the enemy now
is regimentation attempted by the government." I. at 45 (quoting Mark Sullivan).
On the other hand, Progressives supportive of the New Deal liked the effort of gov-
ernment in the areas of "relief, public works, public housing, social security-which
meant that the federal government was now committed to intercession against want."
I&d. at 103. These Progressives favored policy change over moral reform, see id., and
welcomed the experimentation of the NewDeal. Seeid. at 110, 113.
"9 See Kevin Baker, TWy Americans Loved FDR, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. EDITION,
Apr. 17, 1995, at 23 ("More shocking than the conditions in which Americans of 1933
lived was how little say they had in anything that mattered .... Politics in every large
city was usually controlled by corrupt political machines.").
'0 Indeed, Roosevelt relied on the machines when it suited his purposes. See
HOFSTADTER, supra note 129, at 310 (noting that FDR not only ignored the democratic
"problem" of machines, but worked with the bosses "[ i] n the interest of larger national
goals and more urgent needs"); see aIsoBRINKLEY, supra note 149, at 9 (explaining New
Dealers' indifference to the moral aspects of earlier progressive reform attempts, and
the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to assault political machines as earlier
generations of reformers had done); AISOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9,
at 90 (noting help of political machines in the Court-packing plan).
'6' CARR, supra note 140, at 7 (pointing out that representatives of the people can
make more informed decisions, especially on technical matters); see also B.F. Affleck,
Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1935, at E9 (explaining that the founding
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Arnold's Folklore of American Capitalism, "often cited as the New Deal's
most significant commentary on government, derisively dismissed the
very thought of popular rule. Despite the image of an approachable
President and his open government, New Deal decisions occurred
even more commonly than ever behind Washington's closed doors."
1 62
Perhaps it is Roosevelt's classic words in defense of the Court-
packing plan that best sum up this shift in attitude. In his fireside
chat of March 9, 1937, Roosevelt spoke aggressively on the necessity of
his plan. But it is the vivid image he used to describe the Court's fail-
ure that best captures the change in attitude toward the state:
Last Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three
horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that
their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course, the three
branches of government-the Congress, the Executive and the Courts.
Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not.163
In a world in which embrace of federal control prevailed over
popular determination, the nature of criticism leveled at courts took a
different tone. When the Coal Act that bore his name was invalidated
in Carter Coal, Senator Guffey did not say that the Court's decision was
thwarting popular will, as he almost certainly would have some twenty
years earlier. Rather, he accused the Court "of blocking the social-
reform program of the Roosevelt administration."16 A significant shift
in rhetoric and temperament had occurred. Rather than insisting on
fathers "intended to found a republic-a representative not a democratic form of gov-
ernment").
162 WIEBE, supra note 123, at 207.
'63 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 1937 PUBuC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 123-24. In the
course of his talk, Roosevelt discussed the "mandate" the people had given him and
Congress, and he joined the relatively rare countermajoritarian critic who actually said
the Court was "thwart[ing] the will of the people." Id. at 126.
164 FRANHIN D. ROOSEVELT AND Tm SUPREME COURT, supra note 111, at 91
(statement of Sen.Joseph F. Guffey). Similarly, Robert Carr spoke of the Court block-
ing not the people, but Congress and the states:
And it is here that the Court and not Congress becomes the enemy of liberty,
for it is the Court and not Congress that has said many of these things may not
be done. Congress, confronted by the insistent demands of a determined
public opinion has from time to time been willing to provide the necessary
legislation, and so have some of the states. But the Court has used first one
device and then another to thwart the hand of progress. When Congress has
acted, the Court has said "This is a matter for the states." When the states
have tried, the Court has said, "This is a matter for Congress." And when both
have tried, the Court has still said, "No, the Constitution won't permit either
of you to do this."
CARM, supra note 140, at 129.
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popular control of government, the people saw the federal govern-
ment as an entity charged on its own with addressing pressing prob-
lems.
2. The Malleable Constitution: The Triumph
of Anti-Formalism
Criticism of judges was also influenced by two critical shifts in
thinking with regard to constitutional determinacy and the under-
standing of what judges did when interpreting the Constitution.'6
First, at the time of Lochner it was thought that judges were adopting
interpretations that reflected their own biases.1 Milder critics would
simply say, "To the courts the Constitution is a peg on which to hang
predilections in politics and sociology and call them law."167 Harsher
ones would accuse the Court of out-and-out class bias. Thus, Corwin
complained that the Court used the Constitution as a vehicle "to sink
whatever legislative craft may appear to them to be, from the stand-
point of vested interests, of a piratical tendency."16 And William
Trickett, Dean of the Dickinson Law School, decried judges with "nar-
row, sectarian, professionally biased or class-biased views of the Consti-
'6 In his work on the New Deal transformation, G. Edward White identifies the
shift in interpretive methodology from formalism to living constitutionalism as the sin-
gle most important factor explaining the "revolution" of 1937 and thereafter. See
White, supra note 14, at 871 ("The 'constitutional revolution' of the 1930's was not
only a doctrinal revolution but an interpretive revolution."). White develops this
theme in his book-length historical treatment of the period. SeeWhite, supra note 7, at
289-97. As White says:
An important function ofjudges in constitutional cases affecting government
and the economy has been to implement a conception of the Constitution as
an adaptive document, one whose meaning could change to reflect the con-
text and mores of its times. This conception . .. [was] embodied in the
phrase "the living Constitution," which began to appear in constitutional dis-
course just prior to the New Deal period.
Id. at 289-90. Accompanying this shift, according to White, "came a potentially radical
constriction in the role ofjudges as constitutional interpreters, at least in the realm of
political economy." White, supra note 14, at 873. White's story mirrors to some extent
the one told here, and lends support to the thesis that criticism ofjudges during the
New Deal differed from that of the Lochner era because the complaint about judging
invariably would change as visions of the Constitution and the role ofjudges changed.
' This view has been challenged by recent revisionist scholarship. For a discus-
sion of this Lodner era criticism, and a response to revisionist difficulties with it, see
generally Friedman, Lochner, supra note 47.
'6 Jackson Harvey Ralson, Shal We Curb the Supreme Court?, 71 FORUM 561, 564
(1924).
'6' Edward S. Corwin, Book Review, 6AM. POL. Sci. REv. 270, 271 (1912).
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tution."'69
Second, the culprit that permitted the judges to impose their own
views was the perceived malleability of the constitutional text. The
anti-formalist critique that later blossomed into the Realist movement
was a result of this belief.'70 Thus the "rights" found to trump legisla-
tion during the Lochner era were attacked as "new" or "novel": as
Learned Hand said, "There can be little doubt that so to construe the
term 'liberty' is entirely to disregard the whole juristic history of the
word.""' Louis Greeley would call the right to contract "theo-
retic.., which has no existence in fact.""' The problem was the Con-
stitution left judges too free to adopt these interpretations. As early as
1890, Eaton Drone would say about the Fourteenth Amendment:
"Time has shown that the operation of the amendment is capable of
restriction to a narrow sphere, or extension to a scope well-nigh illim-
itable. "173 By the 1920s journalists would join academics in wondering
about constitutional indeterminacy. For example, The Nation com-
mented negatively on the Court's decision striking child labor legisla-
tion as outside the commerce power: "It found no such vacuum when
Congress forbade the transit across State lines of lottery tickets, alco-
6 W. Trickett,Judicial Nullification of Acts of Congress, 186 N. A.MR. REv. 848, 856
(1907).
171 Formalism is the notion that legal tests and texts provide fixed answers to ques-
tions, a practice that reached its height at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of
the twentieth century. See NELSON, supra note 121, at 133; see also Friedman, Lochner,
supra note 47 (describing challenge to this method ofjudging during the Lochner era).
Those who attacked formalism were "anti-formalists." From today's perspective we also
tend to see realism as a more narrow movement than formalism, focusing on the soci-
ology ofjudging, and then turn to other disciplines to answer the formalist challenge.
Nonetheless, it is also common to speak of the New Deal anti-formalists as "realists"
(some of whom were part of the realist movement and some of whom were not). See,
e.g., PURCELL, supra note 121, at 79 (referring to those who attacked the "inconsisten-
cies between the practices of a rapidly changing industrial nation and the claims of a
mechanicaljuristic system" as "realists"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the
Development ofAdministrative Law, 72 CHM.-KENTL. REV. 1119, 1119-37 (1997) (question-
ing whether practicing lawyers ever adhered to law as "formalism" and referring to the
alternative as "realism"). More important, at the time of the New Deal "realism" was
used to describe the broader movement we might today call "anti-formalism." See
ARNoLD, SymBOLS, supra note 7, at 37 ("So far as the public is concerned, the struggle
of the so-called school of realism [is] against the tenets of an older group of devoted
priests .... Realists prove incontrovertibly that there can be no objective reality be-
hind the law as a brooding omnipresence in the skies....").
'' Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495,
495 (1908).
'7 Louis M. Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation, 5
ILL. L. REV. 222, 223 (1910).
'73 Eaton S. Drone, The Power of the Supreme Court, 8 FORUM 653, 663 (1890).
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holic drink, and impure foods, and restrained men and women on in-
terstate errands of vice." 74
By the time of the New Deal, thinking on both of these points had
changed. The Constitution's malleability was now seen as a virtue.
The power ofjudges to interpret the Constitution was accepted, but it
was felt that use should be made of the malleability of constitutional
meaning to keep the Constitution current with the times." 5
Two common words used to describe the Constitution during the
New Deal were "flexible" and "living."17 According to Roosevelt,
"[o]ur Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always
to meet the extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and ar-
rangement without loss of essential form.1 7 Felix Frankfurter ex-
174 Thomas Reed Powell, The Child-LaborDecision, NATiON, June 22, 1918, at 730.
175 See Constitution Held Ample in New Dea4 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, § 1, at 34 ("Ex-
isting Federal powers under the Constitution [will] be sufficient to solve the new social
and economic problems of the country without the necessity of constitutional amend-
ment[] ... the Constitution has proved to be adequate in every test of peace and
war."). Another NewYork Times article noted FDR's belief that:
[T]he Constitution is a living document; that its authors were fully aware that
changing conditions would raise for a new Federal Government problems
which they themselves could not foresee; that they intended and expected
that a liberal interpretation of it in the years to come would give Congress the
same relative powers over new national problems as they themselves gave
Congress over the national questions of their day.
Te Ways of Democray, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1937, at 18. High school civics books follow-
ing the New Deal reflect the view that the Constitution is a fluid, and not static docu-
ment:
Do the courts ... 'change' the constitution of any government, national, state,
or local? There are those who assert that they do not. To them the law is an
inexorable thing that follows perfect laws of logic to incontrovertible conclu-
sions. The courts, they say, merely 'declare what the law is,' as when the
arithmetic teacher assures the pupil that two and two make four. This view is
really too naive to merit serious consideration .... Courts are made up of
judges, and judges are human beings, fallible like all the rest of mankind ....
They declare what they think the law is, but where no signs point a clear path
they naturally say the law 'is' what they think it 'should be.'... [C]ourts un-
doubtedly make changes in the framework of laws controlling government in
the United States.
WILLIAM ANDERSON, AMERIcAN GOVERNMENT 80 (1946). This viewpoint was in con-
trast to the language of civic books from the early part of the 1930s. One book urges
that the Supreme Court must "preserve our fundamental law in its integrity," indicat-
ing a static view of the Constitution. S.E. FORMAN, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 167
(1930).
176 For a discussion of the "move" to living constitutionalism during the New Deal,
see Gillman, supra note 45, at 230-46.
7 LASSER, supra note 87, at 150 (quoting 2 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 14-15).
Roosevelt's message to Congress in early 1937 revealed his strong conviction that the
interpretation of the Constitution must change with the times: "'Means must be found
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plained that "[t]he framers of the Constitution intentionally bounded
it with outlines not sharp and contemporary, but flexible and pro-
phetic."178 Charles Beard argued that the vague phrases of the Consti-
tution left room for "indefinit[e]" disagreement; "[fif such words are
'law,' then moonshine is law." 9 Both at home,"' and abroad,"1 com-
mentators claimed that the Constitution afforded ample room to deal
with the pressing problems that the country faced.
Advocates of "living constitutionalism" argued that their method
of interpretation was grounded in sentiments of the framing era.182
... to adapt our legal forms and our judicial interpretation to the actual present na-
tional needs of the largest progressive democracy in the modern world.'" Turner Cat-
ledge, Basic Law Upheld N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1937, at 1 (quoting Roosevelt). Roosevelt
added that the "vital need is not an alteration of our fundamental law, but an increas-
ingly enlightened view with reference to it. Difficulties have grown out of its interpre-
tation; but rightly considered, it can be used as an instrument of progress, and not as a
device for prevention of action." Text of President Roosevelt's Message Read in Person Before
Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1937, at 2.
"s FRANKFtJRTER, supra note 133, at 75. Others believed in the malleable nature of
the Constitution. Joseph O'Meara, Jr. remarked that, "The Constitution does not
speak with mathematical exactitude. Its provisions are couched in broad and general
terms capable of being read in different ways.... [T]he fact is that the Supreme Court
is constantly making and remaking the Constitution." Joseph O'Meara, Jr., The Court
and Democracy, 26 COMMONWEAL 10, 10 (1937); see also Raymond Moley, Today in Amer-
ica, NEWsWEEK, Mar. 20, 1937, at 5 ("[Olur Constitution was not intended to impose
rigid limitations upon progressive legislation in the public interest...."). Others, dis-
agreeing, believed that change should only come through an amendment to the Con-
stitution. SeeAndrew F. Burke, The Court and thePeople, 26CommoNwEAL 5, 7-8 (1937);
Michael Collins, To theRoots of Court Reform, 26 COMMONWEAL 122, 122 (1937).
179 Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 2 VrrAL SPEECHES 631 (1936). Beard
argued forthrightly that constitutional phrases should be interpreted by "good con-
science in the light of expediency." I& The title of Beard's article indicates the view of
the Constitution common at the time. See also WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION 43 (1937) (discussing how common law interpretation of the Con-
stitution permits adoption to "changing conditions").
" See, e.g., Lewis Wood, 'Pessimists of '39' Chided by Byrnes, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1939,
at 42 (quoting Senator Byrnes's assertion that "ft]he Constitution must always be flexi-
ble enough to meet the needs of changing years").
"' The New York Times quoted a London Times editorial response to the Butler deci-
sion striking down the AAA.
Can the United States afford to allow the national government to be stopped
from exercising any direct control over matters of vital national concern?...
The Constitution was written in 1787. Since then modern methods of pro-
duction, trade, transport and communications have largely obliterated State
boundaries in matters of business and economic development.
Is it possible to continue to regard the questions raised by this change of
conditions as the exclusive affair of the States?
Ruling Poses Issue, Says London Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1936, at 12.
112 See Gillman, supra note 45, at 222 ("By separating the more abstract goals of the
framers from their specific intents and purposes it became possible to make the case
for a style of constitutional interpretation that floated free from original meaning.").
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John Marshall, vilified at other times of Court controversy for creating
judicial review out of whole cloth, was praised for a statesman's per-
spective the current Court seemed to lack. Critics of the Court re-
peatedly invoked Marshall as authority for interpreting the document
to take account of national growth and national problems.183 For ex-ample, Senator Logan declared:
If the Supreme Court had consistently adhered to the theories of Mar-
shall, ... we would be in no difficulties today, but trouble came in each
instance when the Court departed from the principles of Marshall, who
was looking toward the future and believing that the Constitution was an
elastic instrument.
8
4
Even the New York Times, a constant critic of the push for new con-
stitutional interpretations, used the language of "living constitutional-
ism" by the end of the Court-packing battle. Commenting on Frank-
furter's appointment to the Supreme Court, the Times reconciled itself
to changing times, commenting that "he will reveal the organic con-
servatism through which the hard-won victories won for liberty in the
past can yield a new birth to freedom."16 "Organic conservatism" was
symbolic of the old coming to grips with the revolution that had oc-
curred.
This shift in views about a living Constitution, and the New Deal struggle over this in-
terpretation on the Supreme Court itself, is documented in Barry Friedman & Scott B.
Smith, The Sedimentay Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-21 (1998).
1s See FRANKFURTER, supra note 133, at 75-76 ("As a mere lawyer, Marshall had his
superiors among his colleagues. His supremacy lay in his recognition of the practical
needs of government. ... The great judges are those to whom the Constitution is not
primarily a text for interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a progressive
people."). For a discussion of New Dealers' efforts to claim Chief Justice Marshall's
legacy in the first AAA cases, see PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 137-38
(1982). Story was also praised. SeeRONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 74
(1995) ("'What is needed today is ... to recognize and apply canons of interpretation
based on Story's conception of the Constitution as permitting a continuous evolution-
ary growth within its own provisions.'" (quotingJohn Dickinson, TheProfessor, the Practi-
tioner, and the Constitution, HANDBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 63 (1935))).
184 81 CONG. REc. 7377-78 (1937) (speech of Sen. Logan); see also George Creel,
RooseveWs Plans and Purposes, COLI.ER'S, Dec. 26, 1936, at 9 (describing the "stupid
failure or stubborn unwillingness to recognize the vast changes that have taken place
in American life" as an obstacle to progress).
'8 Commenting on the Reed appointment to the Court in 1938, the Times seemed
relieved that "there has been no evidence of intolerance in his advocacy of the law as a
living instrument designed to meet the changing needs of changing times." The Presi-
dent's Choice, N.Y. TIME, Jan. 16, 1938, § 4, at 8.
6 Felix Frankfurter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1939, at 20; see also Justice Frankfurter, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1939, at 18 ("No real doubt was expressed that the living Constitution,
and the liberties of the citizen under the Constitution, will be safe in his hands.").
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The second significant change in belief was that in the face of tex-
tual malleability, the meaning of the Constitution was what the judges
said it was. 18 Thus, the Court had leeway to read the Constitution
with a favorable eye toward New Deal legislation. Ronen Shamir re-
ports an American Bar Association Executive Committee member as
saying: "[T]he truth of the business is we don't know what is constitu-
tional or unconstitutional until the Supreme Court says it is or it
isn't. ' 8' According to Larry Lessig, "the act ofjudging came to appear
more like will and less like judgment."'s9
There were resisters. Justice Roberts may be most famous for his
"switch in time," but his second claim to fame was insisting in Butler
that "the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty-to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former."1 9 His colleague Justice Sutherland, dissenting in West Coast
Hotel after the switch was complete, continued to resist: "[I]t is urged
that the question involved should now receive fresh consideration,
among other reasons, because of 'the economic conditions which
have supervened'; but the meaning of the Constitution does not
change with the ebb and flow of economic events."19'
This was the minority view, however. Scholars and citizens favored
judicial activism to interpret the Constitution consistent with the
needs of the times. Commenting on Roberts just a few years later,
Charles Curtis said "[c] onstitutional law is not much like poetry, but it
is far more like poetry than like geometry. Roberts's figure of speech
must be left behind.' 92 Writing in the New York Times Magazine, How-
ard McBain, a constitutional law professor at Columbia, wondered
187 As Stephen Presser recently observed, "the view that the Constitution is a malle-
able document... permits justices to change course the way the Court did in 1937."
Stephen B. Presser, What Would Burke Think ofLaw and Economics? , 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoLY 147, 149 (1997) (approving neither of realism nor its impact on constitutional
interpretation.).
"s SHAMIR, supra note 183, at 74, (citation omitted).
189 Lessig, supra note 23, at 463. Lessig goes on to say, "Thus, for the same reason
that the possibility of a general federal common law collapsed, so too did the possibil-
ity of a general judicial policing of legislative action collapse as well." Id. That, of
course, did not hold true of the jurisprudence of rights that was to blossom after the
New Deal transformation, and particularly during the Warren Court.
190 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935);see also CARR, supra note 140, at 32
(criticizing the Court for straying from a strict interpretation of the Constitution).
191 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1936) (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting).
"2 CHARLES P. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 19 (1947).
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"how the result could be otherwise" given the "vague phrases of the
Constitution".19 Charles Fairman suggested "we do not flinch from
the fact that the justices do make constitutional law and that in exer-
cising their prerogative of choice between possible constructions they
are performing what is, in the highest sense, a political function."94
In accord was Max Lerner, who said "[t] he prevailing view of the func-
tion of the Court is thoroughly realistic. It sees the Court as a definite
participant in the formation of public policy, often on matters of far-
reaching economic and social importance."9 Thus, the Court's con-
cern is "more significantly with power politics than with judicial tech-
nology.""'6 Indeed, Dean Acheson, addressing the Maryland Bar Asso-
ciation in 1936 and complaining aboutjudges imposing their personal
values on the vague clauses of the Constitution such as "due process"
seemed quite out of step. 7
The notion of a flexible Constitution became official administra-
tion policy during the New Deal and strongly influenced popular un-
derstandings."' Realists trained many of the young lawyers of the New
113 Howard Lee McBain, The Issue: Court or Congress?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1936
(Magazine), at 2. As Charles Curtis explained, "[wiords are living things, and ilfaut
vivre entre les vivants, as Montaigne well knew." CURTIS, supra note 192, at 19.
14 Charles Fairman, The Retirement of Federal judges, 51 HARV. L. REV. 397, 399
(1938).
195 Lerner, supra note 63, at 696.
19 Id. at 669.
197
In the field of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments there is equal need for judicial self-restraint. In cases of this sort the
Court is asked to set aside national and State laws for reasons which in most
instances defy statement convincing to the man in the street. The Court has
shown a tendency to make this vague phrase-due process of law-a conge-
ries of specific concepts drawn from the beliefs and ideology of some of the
judges. Such a limitation upon a democracy, as militant as it was in Taney's
day, cannot be reasonably expected to endure. And little is gained by the in-
terpretation that the clause prohibits what a majority ofjudges find to be arbi-
trary or unreasonable. Anything with which we strongly disagree seems un-
reasonable and arbitrary.
Dean G. Acheson, Roger Brooke Taney: Notes upon Judicial Self-Restraint, Address
Before the Maryland Bar Association, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE BARASsoCIATION 147 (1936).
13 Although the division was by no means strict, many of those attacking Realism
also were opponents of the New Deal, which is indicative of some correlation between
the two philosophies. SeePURCELL, supra note 121, at 159-72 (describing anti-realists as
opponents of New Deal, but indicating the division was not strict). These anti-
formalist-if not realist-understandings of the Constitution and constitutional inter-
pretation also help explain a famous document often taken to indicate Roosevelt's re-
luctance to acceptjudicial supremacy. In 1935, as Congress was considering the Bitu-
minous Coal Conservation Act, Roosevelt wrote Congress, urging it to enact the bill
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Deal,' " and then themselves took up important roles in government,
abandoning the intellectual movement for law in action.2 "0  Laura
Kalman reports that "[a]fterJerome Frank agreed to write a brief for
the government in the Nebbia case, ... 'for a month the [Yale Law]
School seemed to know of nothing but the Nebbia case--Charlie
[Clark] writing in his office, Thurman [Arnold] bellowing wherever
he happened to be, seminars writing briefs and papers.'" 20' "It was in
the New Deal," writes Ronen Shamir, "that legal realism, heretofore
confined to academic circles, became the active program of the ad-
ministration's legal-policy agenda."20 2 Stephen Presser explains that
the "immediate result" of the realist movement "was the New Deal and
the great judicial 'revolution' of 1937 in Jones & Laughlin and West
Coast HoteL"113
This change in views regarding constitutional determinacy was
even reflected in high school civics textbooks.2 " A book published be-
fore the start of the New Deal insisted that the Supreme Court must
"preserve our fundamental law in its integrity."25 Yet, a text from the
1940s called "naive" the view that courts do not "change" constitu-
tional meaning, given that where "no signs point a clear path" judges
despite "doubts as to [its] constitutionality, however reasonable." He went on to say
that "[a] decision by the Supreme Court relative to this measure would be helpful as
indicating with increasing clarity the constitutional limits within which this govern-
ment must operate." CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 935 (1943). As will be evident shortly, Roosevelt indeed was reluctant
to concede judicial supremacy. This excerpt, however, seems to suggestjust the oppo-
site, that Roosevelt was inviting a decision precisely to clarify the meaning of the Con-
stitution. In addition, what it emphasizes is that the Constitution's meaning was felt to
be both flexible, and was in flux, and the decisions of the Justices were necessary to
provide coherence.
'9 See IRONS, supra note 183, at 7 ("Courses at Columbia such as Llewellyn's in Law
and Society, Handler's in Trade Regulation, and Berle's in Corporation Finance pre-
pared budding New Deal lawyers to look on judges as manipulators of law and on regu-
lation as a modern necessity.").
200 See LAURAKALMAN, LEGALREAISM ATYALE, 1927-1960, at 130 (1986). Kalman
contends that so many legal professors at Yale were involved with the New Deal, teach-
ing and writing inevitably suffered. See id. at 130 ("In such an atmosphere, theoretical
discussion of legal realism was bound to wane."); see also PURCELL, supra note 121, at 93
("Frank, Oliphant, Clark, Arnold, Douglas, and Felix Cohen all became ardent New
Dealers....").
20 KALMAN, supra note 200, at 130-31 (quoting a letter from Harry Shulman to
Felix Frankfurter).
'2 SHAMIR, supra note 183, at ix.
20 Presser, supra note 187, at 148.
20' Thanks are due to Don Langevoort for suggesting a look at such civics books.
20- FORMAN, supra note 175, at 137.
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naturally "say the law 'is' what they think it 'should be."'"06 "There is a
wide range of choice for the judges in many cases. In exercising this
choice they fill gaps in the clauses of the Constitution and help turn
the course of government this way or that."
2 7
D. Nine Old Men: Criticizing the New Deal Court
Changed notions regarding the nature of democratic government
and the malleability of the Constitution were reflected in criticism of
the courts. These changes drove both the public's criticism of the Su-
preme Court and the action Roosevelt took to discipline the Court.
Countermajoritarian criticism was replaced largely with a flood of
criticism aimed at the Justices for failing to interpret the Constitution
in a manner consistent with the needs of the times. As William Lasser
explains, "To these men, the Constitution as written was not inher-
ently anti-democratic; it was simply in need of updating to cope with
economic realities. 
2 °s
Roosevelt's response to the Schechter Poultry decision was typical,
and frequently repeated. "We have been relegated to the horse-and-
buggy definition of interstate commerce," he said in a phrase picked
up by many newspapers .2  Roosevelt evidently told an associate that
when he took the oath of office and swore to uphold the Constitution,
"I felt like saying, 'Yes, but it's the Constitution as I understand it,
flexible enough to meet any new problems of democracy-not the
kind of Constitution your Court has raised up as a barrier to progress
and democracy.'" 21° This would become a Roosevelt theme. In his in-
augural State of the Union address, for example, he insisted that
"means must be found to adapt our legal forms and our judicial inter-
pretation to the actual present national needs of the largest progres-
sive democracy in the modem world."1
20 ANDERSON, supra note 175, at 80.
207 a'd
m LASSER, supra note 87, at 149.
Roosevelt "argued that the Court had stripped the national government of its
power to cope with critical problems," saying, "We have got to decide one way or the
other... whether in some way we are going to... restore to the Federal Government
the powers which exist in the national Governments of every other Nation in the
world.'" LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 90.
2'0 BAKER, supra note 9, at 33.
2u1 Catedge, supra note 177, at 1 (quoting Roosevelt). Roosevelt continued,
"'[t]he vital need is not an alteration of our fundamental law, but an increasingly en-
lightened view with reference to it.'" Id. at 4; see, e.g., id. at 1 ("'Means must be found
to adapt our legal forms and our judicial interpretation to the actual present national
2000] 1019
1020 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW
Advancing the notion that the Court was failing to keep step with
the times, Roosevelt tapped into public sentiment about the Supreme
Court.2 1 2 After Butler, Roosevelt received a huge volume of mail. Most
writers focused on the age of the Justices and their failure to grasp the
213
present situation. Similarly, in response to Tipaldo one member of
the regional NLRB and state minimum wage board said, "all we want
is a fair court-not a court remote and detached from the conditions
in the world today, a world in which the majority of the court have not
even lived for the past twenty years. 21 4 On the Senate floor sentiments
were often similar to those expressed by Senator Norris: "Our Consti-
tution ought to be construed in the light of the present-day civilization
instead of being put in a straijacket made more than a century ago.
215
RobertJackson, suggesting with only a thin veil of irony that Supreme
Court Justices need not and perhaps should not be lawyers, told the
needs of the largest progressive democracy in the modem world.'" (quoting Roose-
velt)); Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 1937 PuBuc PAPFas, supra note 62, at 128 (expound-
ing the need "to bring to the decision of social and economic problems younger men
who have had personal experience and contact with modem facts and circum-
stances"); Franklin D. Roosevelt, "If We Would Make Democracy Succeed, I Say We
Must Act-NOW!" The President Continues the Court Fight. Address at the Demo-
cratic Victory Dinner (Mar. 4, 1937), in 1937 PUBLIc PAPERS, supra note 62, at 115
("[T]he most striking feature of the life of this generation-the feature which men
who live mentally in another generation can least understand-[is] the ever-
accelerating speed with which social forces now gather headway.").
2 This apparently was true despite disapproval of Roosevelt actually criticizing the
Court. See infra note 218 (noting the many letters Roosevelt was receiving that were
critical of the Court). There is no contradiction here: as polls showed, people dis-
agreed with the Court but were unwilling to challenge the institution ofjudicial review.
See infra note 249 (noting that while Roosevelt was extremely popular, a majority of
Americans opposed his Court-packing plan).
2,s Roosevelt was flooded with letters from citizens concerned about the "age prob-
lem." One writer reasoned, "'Business does not accept an applicant with twelve gray
hairs on his head.'" From Virginia came a demand for Roosevelt to increase the Court
to "'at least twenty or more members. Nine OLD MEN, whose total age amounts to
about 650 years, should have additional help.'" LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 97.
214 RulingDisappoints Leaders Here, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1936, at 19.
215 81 CONG. REc. 2144 (1937) (statement of Sen. Norris); see also 81 CONG. REC.
7379 (1937) (statement of Sen. Logan) ("We cannot stand still. Society must move
forward. National power must be expanded to meet the exigencies of all occasions,
and if the Nation has a Supreme Court that will not allow this, then the Nation must
begin to wither and die."). Some time later, Senator Byrnes commented:
The real danger to our constitutional system has not been the readiness of
courts to amend their decisions. The real danger has been the tendency of
courts to disregard the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing, and thus to produce hardening of the constitutional arteries. That dis-
ease might be fatal to the body politic.
James F. Byrnes, The Constitution and the Will of the People, 25 A.B.A.J. 667, 668 (1939).
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New York Bar, "In dealing with a nation, whose genius is invention, we
cannot outlaw every action that can not show a precedent.2 16 Com-
menting on the architecture of the Supreme Court's newly-
constructed quarters, Pearson and Allen wrote:
[What could be more appropriate than that a Court which fails to take
cognizance of the speed of modem civilization in industrial and eco-
nomic development, and which denies posterity the right to express it-
self in regard to social and economic reform in its own way, should be
housed in a building symbolic of the court's intransigence?
So central was this complaint that it resulted in sustained criticism
of the ages of the Justices of the Supreme Court. William Leuchten-
burg reports a wealth of such complaints, many of them mailed to
218Roosevelt by ordinary citizens. Instead of being nine men who in-
terfered with the present program, it was invariably nine old men,219 a
phrase popularized by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen in their book
by that name. The ages of the Justices were the subject of ridicule.
One man wrote Roosevelt questioning the "fitness of 'that body of
nine old hasbeens, half-deaf, half-blind, full-of-palsy men .... That
they are behind the times is very plain-all you have to do is look at
Charles Hughes' whiskers. ' 2'n Indeed, a Gallup Poll showed that a
majority of Americans thought that "advanced age is a drawback on
the Supreme Court in most cases and that justices should be required
216 Robert H. Jackson, Address Before the New York Bar Association (Jan. 29,
1937), in 81 CoNG. REC. 124 (1937); see also Quiet Cisis, supra note 119, at 16 ("Judges
who resort to a tortured construction of the constitution may torture an amendment.
You cannot amend a state of mind.").
217 PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 65, at 2-3.
218 See, ag., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 97 ("From different parts of the na-
tion, Roosevelt heard calls for additional justices 'with younger minds.'"); id. at 104-05
(reporting letters to Roosevelt after Carter Coal that commented frequently on the Jus-
tices and their age); id. at 136 (quoting press reports and letters concerning the ages of
theJustices).
219 Many focused on the age problem. For example, the New York Times quoted
Senator Green as supporting Roosevel's Court-packing plan by claiming:
We must, however, legislate for the average man, and the average older man is
more apt than a younger one to have a closed mind. He is apt to become
fixed in his habits of action and of thought. Certain of his principles have be-
come settled beyond the reach of argument. Old precedents with him out-
weigh new conditions.
Held Gain for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1937, at 10; see also Too Early Start?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1939, at 22 (noting that conservatives and liberals alike agree that ap-
pointment of ajudge under 40 is "too much, if the Supreme Court is to keep step with
changes in the nation.... He will be around too long.").
LEUcHTEN URG, supra note 8, at 96-97.
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to retire after reaching a certain age."21
More restrained critics also focused on age. Many academics ex-
pressed approval of the Court-packing plan on the ground that it
would bring "new blood" to the Court. One witness at the Court-
packing hearings provided a graph to show how overrulings increased
dramatically the older the Justices were.2 Charles Fairman also wrote
a piece favoring early retirement of federal judges and addressing the
problems of age on the Court.
2 2
1
In short, the primary problem as people saw it in 1937 was the Jus-
tices themselves, not the inherently countermajoritarian nature of the
institution of judicial review. The Supreme Court was part of gov-
ernment, and government's job was to solve problems facing the peo-
ple. The Constitution was capacious enough to permit the Court to
join hands with the rest of government and to cast a more open eye
upon New Deal legislation. As the reaction to Schechter Poultry sug-
gests, no one expected the Justices to approve all the legislation, but
the popular perception was that the current occupants of the highest
bench were particularly hostile to the needs of changing times, in no
small part because of their age.
E. The Contemporary Logic of the Court-PackingPlan
This criticism of the Justices and their age was reflected in the so-
lution Roosevelt and his advisors settled upon to discipline the Court.
Although Roosevelt's Court-packing plan took many people by sur-
prise, in fact it had been the subject of tremendous study and atten-
tion. Long before the events of 1936, Roosevelt anticipated the need
2 Dr. George Gallup, Bench Retirement at 70 Is Favored, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1938, at
8N. Obviously, not all commentators agreed. See Age Limit forJudges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1939, at 22 ("There should be no hard and fast rule in the matter of age. The Su-
preme Court should not be deprived by an arbitrary prohibition of men who might be
numbered among its brightest ornaments.").
See, e.g., Law Teachers Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1937, at 9 ("The President is
acting fully within his constitutional rights and prerogatives. It seems to me a good
idea to get some new blood into the Supreme Court." (quoting John V. McCormick,
Dean of Loyola University Law School)); id. ("The President's plan affords an oppor-
tunity for injecting a little much-needed new blood into the Supreme Court without in
any way detracting from its power or independence." (quoting William W. Crosskey,
Associate Law Professor at the University of Chicago)).
W Reorganization of the FederalJudiciaiy: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciay, 75th Cong. 2429 (1937) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement ofJustin Miller,
member of the United States Board of Tax Appeals), reprinted in 2 CONGRESS AND THE
COURTS 129 (Bernard D. ReamsJr. & Charles R. Haworth eds., 1978).
224 See Fairman, supra note 194, at 398.
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to do something about the Court. Precisely what that would be re-
mained an open question, and Roosevelt's thinking on the question
shifted over time. Ultimately he settled on the popular, in both senses
of the word, criticism of the Justices themselves.
FDR saw his huge electoral victory in 1 9 3 6e as a mandate for his
policies and views, including the removal of obstacles-such as the
Supreme Court-from his path. In his State of the Union address to
Congress in 1937, Roosevelt focused on the Supreme Court, seeking
226
its cooperation. Every word in the speech that could be construed
as an attack on the Court was cheered heartily.2 Following the
speech, members of Congress advanced numerous plans to curb the
Court or amend the Constitution.ms
On February 5, Roosevelt sprang his Court-packing plan on the
nation. He argued that the entire federal judiciary was behind in its
work,2 due primarily to the age of thejudges.u Hejustified the plan
2 Roosevelt's 1936 win "rolled up the greatest victory in the history of two-party
competition by capturing the electoral votes of all but two of the forty-eight states."
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 108.
226
Roosevelt transformed the usually dull occasion of the State of the Union
message into a national spectacle. He appeared in person before Congress to
deliver it in the evening. What is standard in the television age seemed sensa-
tional then .... Only once before had a president addressed Congress at
night, and that had been when Wilson called for a declaration of war against
Germany. No previous president has so utilized radio as did Roosevelt....
FRANKFREIDEL, FRANLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESnTNY 195 (1990).
227 See, e.g., Catledge, supra note 177, at I (discussing Congress's very favorable re-
action to the speech).
See, e.g., Basic Law Change Gains in Congress, N.Y. TIM:ES, Jan. 8, 1937, at 1 (noting
the growing sentiment to put Roosevelt's social policies into a constitutional amend-
ment).
229 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 133 (discussing the "overcrowded Federal
court dockets"). In the press conference announcing the plan, Roosevelt stated,
"[d]elay in any court results in injustice. It makes lawsuits a luxury available only to the
few who can afford them or who have property interests to protect which are suffi-
ciently large to repay the cost.... The Supreme Court is laboring under a heavy bur-
den." Judiciai: De Senectute, TIME, Feb. 15, 1937, at 17. But see Charles P. Taft, More
Than This Would Be a Revolution, SATURDAY EVENING POsT, Apr. 10, 1937, at 19 ("It is
difficult to understand where the President secured the evidence upon which he bases
this statement [that the Supreme Court is overburdened].").
m See Judiciary, supra note 229, at 17 (discussing Roosevelt's concerns over the ad-
vanced age of federal judges). Roosevelt proposed to solve the problem of an over-
burdened court with the infusion of youngerJustices:
"Modem complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the
courts, just as it is needed in executive functions of the Government and in
private business. A lowered mental or physical vigor leads men to avoid an
examination of complicated and changed conditions. Little by little, new facts
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in terms of workload and judicial efficiency,31 rather than confronting
directly the question of Supreme Court interference with the New
Deal agenda. 2 The plan would have permitted the President to add a
Justice to the Supreme Court for any Justice over the age of seventy
who failed to retire.3 According to Alsop and Catledge, this decision
"horrified" FDR's many advisors who had been kept in the dark, as
they believed "no one, in Congress or out, would be deceived by the
fantastically disingenuous cloak of argument in which the President
and [Attorney General] Cummings had wrapped their bill."2
Despite the "disingenuous cloak," it is useful to recognize how
closely the remedy on which Roosevelt finally settled tracked the very
changes in public sentiment that framed popular criticism of the Su-
preme Court, how much "the plan seemed to have an inherent logic
and even inevitability." 2 Many in Congress and around the country
advocated amending the Constitution to grant the federal govern-
ment the powers withheld by the Supreme Court.23 Roosevelt re-
become blurred through old glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of another
generation; older men, assuming that the scene is the same as it was in the
past, cease to explore or inquire into the present or the future...."
Id. (quoting Roosevelt).
231 See id, (noting that additional judges were required to make certain "that the
affairs of the court... be properly and adequately discharged").
22' It is very difficult to assess how much the original presentation of the plan con-
tributed to its defeat. Surely Roosevelt's approach was attacked widely, and he may
have done better by using candor. Yet, it could be that the "taboo" against court pack-
ing, see infra note 235, was so ingrained that a more direct approach would also have
failed.
2" S. 1392, 75th Cong. § a (1937). The President took special glee in the fact that
the most recalcitrant of Justices, Justice McReynolds, had made just such a suggestion
when he was Attorney General in 1913. See BURNS, supra note 62, at 297. ("And Roose-
velt, with his penchant for personalizing the political opposition, must have delighted
in the thought of hoisting McReynolds by his own petard.").
"ALSOP & CATLUEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 58.
2' LEUCHNBURG, supra note 8, at 131. The Court-packing plan was well-
considered by Roosevelt. See 2 AcKERMAN, supra note 14, at 319 (stating that the plan
"came after years of reflection"). He had considered it early in his first term. See
LEUGHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 85-86 (tracing Roosevelt's discussions with Cabinet
members regarding the Court). Even the disingenuous cloak made some sense.
There was a certain "taboo" against Court-packing, AISOP & CAT=EDGE, THE 168 DAYS,
supra note 9, at 29; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 118, and the thought was that the
judicial reform idea might erase the taboo. See id. at 124.
2m See LEUCHTENBuRG, supra note 8, at 91 (noting that members of FDR's "Brain
Trust," including Senators James F. Byrnes Jr., and Robert M. LaFollette Jr., favored a
constitutional amendment following the three 9-0 decisions of "Black Monday," May
27, 1935); see also President and Court, BUS. WIL, Jan. 9, 1937, at 56 (asserting that if the
Supreme Court did not validate New Deal legislation, Roosevelt might try to amend
the Constitution to restrain the Court's power). After the announcement of the Court-
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jected the amendment route in part because of its many hazards, the
time that would be required, and doubt that any one amendment
could be framed to address the specific problems posed by the New
Deal program and the Court's decisions!a 7
Yet, for Roosevelt, the problem with the amendment process went
beyond drafting and enactment to deeper beliefs about the necessity
or efficacy of such an approach in light of the Constitution's flexibility
and the fact that the Justices retained the last word as to its mean-
ing.2' Even if an amendment were feasible, it still would be subject to
judicial interpretation. Roosevelt explained this to his listeners:
Even if an amendment were passed, and even if in the years to come it
were to be ratified, its meaning would depend upon the kind ofJustices
who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench. An amendment, like
the rest of the Constitution, is what the Justices say it is rather than what
its framers or you might hope it is.29
Similarly, Robert Jackson told Congress: 'Judges who resort to a tor-
tured construction of the Constitution may torture an amendment."4o
As several commentators have observed, advocacy of an amend-
ment was fundamentally inconsistent with the Realist belief that the
Constitution was adaptable to changing times.24' If the Constitution
was truly flexible, why was an amendment even necessary? Jackson
packing plan by Roosevelt, two of the five proposals that liberals presented as com-
promises included amending the Constitution. See The Big Debate, TIME, Mar. 1, 1937,
at 11 (detailing five proposals: to keep the Court young; to keep the Court up-to-date;
to limit the Supreme Court's power; to amend the Constitution; and to make it easier
to amend the Constitution).
2'7 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKoNG, supra note 8, at 23 (discussing the "framing difficul-
ties of a constitutional amendment); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 109 (noting that
"[tlwo years of study in the Justice Department had not yielded a satisfactory draft"
amendment); see also Alsop & Catledge, Behind the Stoiy, supra note 149, at 9 (stating
that the President thought the amendment process was "too slow and too uncertain").
m See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 111 (noting that not only would legislation
enacted under authorization of an amendment still be subject to judicial review, but
"an amendment enlarging federal powers" might also "seem tantamount to conceding
that [Roosevelt] had been wrong" in his disputes with the Supreme Court over New
Deal legislation).
29 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of theJudiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 1937 PUBUC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 132.
240 See 2 CONGRESS AND THE COURTS, supra note 223, at 2343.
' See, e.g., SHAMIR, supra note 183, at 72 ("The calls for constitutional amend-
ments, however, were somewhat at odds with the frequent emphasis of many of the
New Deal's legal minds on the 'uncertainty' of the law and the 'flexibility' of the Con-
stitution."); see also id. at 74 ("'[T]he talk about amending the Constitution is on par
with the talk about liberal judges. It assumes that there is something in the present
Constitution which says that the NIRA is unconstitutional.'" (quoting Louis Boudin)).
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made precisely this point to Congress, explaining: "Experience has
shown that it is difficult to amend a constitution to make it say what it
already says.
'2 42
For this reason, Roosevelt's plan was consistent with his own and
many advisors' conclusion that the problem rested with those who
held seats on the Court, not with the institution of judicial review.4
As Homer Cummings wrote to the President, "The real difficulty is not
with the Constitution, but with the Judges who interpret it."244 Cum-
mings's conclusion echoed that reached by Felix Frankfurter seven
years earlier 24 (although Frankfurter is said to have been reluctant
about the plan once announced,246 and later in life took pains to es-
242 See 2 CONGRESS AND COURTS, supra note 223, at 2342 (emphasis added).
24 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 23 ("[I]t was Roosevet's view that
the Court, not the Constitution, was the problem."). Of course, many argued that add-
ingjudges may not prove a long-term solution either, ifjudges had so much discretion
to interpret the Constitution. See FEINMAN, supra note 136, at 124 (describing those
who advanced this argument).
244 Letter from Homer Cummings to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 26, 1936), quoted
in LASSER, supra note 87, at 150; see alsoJACKSON, supra note 118, at 180 ("[I]t was men,
not the institution, that needed correction.").
245 Frankfurter warned the Court's critics to avoid "mechanical contrivances" when
crafting court reform. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Publi4 83 FORUM
334 (1930). "The ultimate determinant," he wrote, "is the quality of theJustices." Id
246 Dean Acheson believed that Frankfurter was "dead against" Roosevet's plan.
DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 202 (1965). Indeed, Frankfurter wrote an arti-
cle in 1934 arguing that "to enlarge the size of the Supreme Court would be self-
defeating." Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court of the United State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL ScIENCES 45 (1934), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS 28 (Archibald MacLeish &
E.F. PrichardJr., eds., 1938).
However, Frankfurter supported the plan, albeit with a measure of unease. Upon
hearing of the plan, Frankfurter wrote Roosevelt and praised him for "the deftness of
the general scheme," criticized the Court for a "long series of decisions not defensible
in the realm of reason," and expressed his belief that "some major operation was nec-
essary" in order "to save the Constitution from the Court, and the Court from itself."
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Feb. 7, 1937), in ROOSEVELT
AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 380-81 (1967) [hereinafter
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER]. Roosevelt incorporated that phrase into his fireside
chat of March 9. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE
REFORMYEARS 268 (1982) (detailing Roosevelt's use of Frankfurter's phrase). Both in
letters and in person he gave Roosevelt encouragement and advice on how to success-
fully pursue his Court-packing plan. See id. (describing such encouragement). In a
letter to Roosevelt, Frankfurter criticized New York Governor Herbert Lehman for op-
posing the proposal. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (July
20, 1937), in ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at 403 (quoting Frankfurter as say-
ing he was "hot all over regarding Herbert Lehman's letter"). At Frankfurter's sugges-
tion, Henry M. HartJr., a recent Frankfurter proteg6, wrote an article favorable to the
plan in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. See PARRISH, supra at 268. Privately, Frankfurter
did express shock at the "longevity point" of Roosevelt's plan, explaining, "You may
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tablish that the Court never bowed under the pressure of it).247 In his
Storrs Lectures, Frankfurter wrote: "In simple truth, the difficulties
that government encounters from law do not inhere in the Constitu-
think it sentimental of me, but I have a real feeling of reverence for old age." Letter
from Thomas Reed Powell to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 20, 1937), quoted in PARRISH, su-
pra, at 269. However, at no time during the five month Court-packing struggle did
Frankfurter "suggest[] that Roosevelt retreat." MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FEIX
FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 42 (1991).
Frankfurter's behind-the-scenes encouragement was coupled with a public silence
about the plan. He never openly endorsed the President's plan. He took pains to
avoid being drawn into the public debate about the plan and wrote Roosevelt that
"foolish folks (enemies of yours) are doing their damndest to make me attack the
court so as to start a new line of attack against your proposal. They miss their guess. I
shan't help them to divert the issue.... There are various ways of fighting a fighti"
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937), in ROOSEVELT
AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at 392. This silence has been explained as a function alter-
natively of Frankfurter's blind loyalty, self-interest, hypocrisy, cowardice, or doubt. See
PARRISH, supra, at 268-69 (describing Frankfurter's states of mind). However, Frank-
furter's course of action defies such simple explanation. A letter Frankfurter wrote but
never mailed to Brandeis is the fullest exposition of his complex view of the plan:
Tampering with the Court is a very serious business. Like any major operation
it is justified only by the most compelling considerations. But no student of
the Court can be blind to its long course of misbehavior. I do not relish some
of the implications of the President's proposal, but neither do I relish victory
for the subtler but ultimately deeper evils inevitable in the victory for [Evans]
Hughes and the [Pierce] Butlers and their successors .... It is a complicated
situation and an unhappy one that F.D.R. has precipitated, but the need, it
seems to me, more important than any is that in a handful of men.., the fear
of God should be instilled so that they may walk humbly before their Lord.
PARRISH, supra, at 270 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis Brandeis (Mar.
26, 1937)).
247 Frankfurter's first reaction to the switch in time was that Roberts's 'somersault"
was
incapable of being attributed to a single factor relevant to the professed judi-
cial process. Everything that he now subscribes to he rejected not only on
June first last, but as late as October twelfth.... I wish either Roberts or the
Chief had the responsibility of conducting the class when we shall reach this
case shortly. It is very, very sad business.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Stone (Mar. 30, 1937), reprinted in PARRISH,
supra note 246, at 271. Later, however, Frankfurter wrote an article in the Univesity of
Pennsylvania Law Review, explaining that Roberts's vote was not the result of the pres-
sure of the Court-packing plan. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 313-14 (1955) (arguing that Roberts was prepared to overrule the Adkins de-
cision in the spring of 1936). For an account of Frankfurter's desire for his revision to
become accepted history in order to protect the reputation of the Court, see Ariens,
supra note 14, at 667-69. Ariens goes so far as to imply that Frankfurter manufactured
a memorandum from Roberts on the subject, see id. at 645-49, a point disputed by
Richard Friedman, see generally Richard D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of
the Roberts Memorandum, orFelix the Non-Forger, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 1985-86 (1994)
(arguing that the idea that Frankfurter forged the memorandum is "demonstrably
false" and "should be put aside and forgotten").
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tion. They are due to the judges who interpret it."
48
F. The Values That Spelled the Plan's Demise
Despite strong public frustration with the courts, something went
wrong. By the commencement of Senate hearings, the plan had run
249into a gale of public resistance. Then, according to the traditional
story, the proposal was devastated by the "switch in time."m In several
decisions in 1937, notably includingJones & Laughlin Steel2s ' and West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Panish, 2 the Court narrowly upheld social welfare
legislation, seemingly changing direction on the meaning of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses.23 These decisions took pressure off
the Court and diminished the sentiment that Court reform was neces-
sary. 2 Next, Justice Van Devanter resigned, s5 suggesting to many that
... FRANKuRTER, supra note 133, at 79.
249 SeeAIsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 70-73 (describing imme-
diate negative reaction); CUSHMAN, RETkINKING, supra note 8, at 13 ("Polls taken be-
tween February and May of 1937 indicate that the first major domestic initiative of
Roosevelt's second term was consistently opposed by a majority of the same American
people who had so overwhelmingly returned him to office the preceding November.");
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 145 (noting that mail ran heavily against the plan and
polls showed a majority against the Court-packing bill).
0 See LEucHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 143 ("The switch by Roberts had ironic
consequences. On the one hand, it gave Roosevelt the victory he wanted, for the
Court was now approving New Deal legislation .... But, on the other hand, Roberts's
'somersault' gravely damaged the chances for the Court plan."). The debate on this
point is discussed infra, notes 390-94 and accompanying text (discussing the prospects
for the plan's success).
251 NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
212 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2' Many commentators agree that the earlier decision in Nebbia might have sig-
naled a significant switch with regard to the Due Process Clause, which is why the
Tipaldo decision caused such a stir. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14. Barry Cush-
man stands almost alone, however, in arguing thatJones & Laughlin was not a tremen-
dous doctrinal shift. See CUSHMAN, RETHNKING, supra note 8, at 168 ("No departure
from existing commerce doctrine was necessary in order to sustain the [Wagner] Act.
Indeed, the current of commerce doctrine would have appeared to require that the
Act be upheld.... Had [the Justices relied on this doctrine], a great deal of historical
confusion... might have been averted."). For further discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 361-94 and accompanying text.
2" See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 21 ("The retirement for which both
Roosevelt and Van Devanter had thirsted for so long had sealed the fate of the Court-
packing plan."); see also Turner Catledge, Split on Court Bil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937,
at 1 (reporting that opponents to the Court plan called the decision a "death-blow"
and that even Roosevelt conceded that the decision "tended to relieve the urgency for
court reorganization"); The Federal Power Broadens, WALL ST.J., Apr. 13, 1937, at 4 ("[I]t
can no longer be asserted with even a color of plausibility that the high bench inter-
prets the basic law without reference to changing economic or social conditions. The
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the problem would be solved by natural attrition from the Court.2s At
this point, talk of compromise began. 7 As of July 2, a compromise
was being considered that would allow a maximum of one Justice to
be added a year." This plan might have passed, giving Roosevelt
immoral judicial bill is now bereft of its only pretense ofjustification."); Arthur Krock,
WagnerAct Decisions Vewedfrom PoliticalAngle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 24 (explain-
ing that "some members of Congress who will vote for the bill as a last resort found
renewed hope they may not be obliged to do so"); Press Views on the LaborDecision, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 21 (summarizing headlines from across the country which in-
cluded "Blow to Court Packing" in the Kansas City Star, "Should Remove Plan's 'Last
Prop'" in the Hartford Courant, and "Roosevelt View Held Disproved" in the Los Angeles
Times). Even this was not enough for some, however. See Louis Stark, Labor Predicts
Sweeping Gains, N.Y. TIMWEs, Apr. 13, 1937, at 19 (quoting John L. Lewis, President of
the United Mine Workers of America and head of the CIO as saying, "[t] he Court is as
variable as the winds, and the people wonder how long they are to be the victims of its
instability. Obviously the situation needs change. The President's court plan is the
immediate answer.").
2- Van Devanter's timely retirement may not have been coincidental. Some sug-
gest that it was gently engineered by Senator William Borah, a prominent member of
the Court-packing opposition. SeeALSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at
206-07 (discussing Borah's influence on Justice Van Devanter); LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 8, at 143-44 ("Van Devanter's action was believed to have been the result of coun-
sel from Senators Borah and Wheeler."). Nonetheless, Van Devanter had wanted to
retire and had been dissuaded from doing so earlier by a concern that Congress might
act to reduce his retirement compensation. Van Devanter feared that he would receive
the same treatment given to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes after his retirement in
1932. See 2 MERLOJ. PuSEy, CF E EvANs HUGHES 760 (1951) (noting thatJustice
Van Devanter "clung to [his seat] chiefly because of the unfairness of Congress to Jus-
tice Holmes"). Shortly after Holmes resigned, Congress enacted the Economy Bill of
1933, reducing the retirement compensation of all retired Supreme CourtJustices. See
id. (noting that Congress had reduced compensation for retired judges); THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 302-03 (DavidJ. Danelski et al.
eds., 1973) (discussing compensation and privileges of retirement for Supreme Court
Justices). This economy measure had the ironic effect of keepingjudicial opponents
of New Deal legislation on the Supreme Court longer than they otherwise would have
chosen to remain. See BAKER, supra note 9, at 87-88, 202-03.
2'6 See Court: Champions of the Senate Wage Wordy War overPresident's Plan, NEWSWEEK,
July 17, 1937, at 8 ("The resignation of Mr. Justice Van Devanter, coming as it did on
the morning when the Senate Judiciary Committee was voting on the Reorganization
Bill, was especially well timed." (quoting Sen.Joseph R. Guffey)).
25 See Court Program Status Unsettled, WALL ST.J., Apr. 14, 1937, at 2 (divulging that
the administration "has quietly begun to explore new routes to economic control over
big business" which theJones & Laughlin decision would permit, and predicting that "it
is entirely possible that the judicial plan will be modified, toned down or allowed to
simmer along until it can be quietly ditched"); see also Turner Catedge, Roosevelt Still
Presses His Bill to Change Court; May Take a Compromise, N.Y. TiME, Apr. 14, 1937, at 1
(reporting that several of Roosevelt's supporters in Congress were suggesting com-
promise plans); Arthur Krock, Three Apply Commerce Clause to Manufactures First Time,
N.Y. T i S, Apr. 13, 1937, at 1 ("The political community fell to instant argument over
the question whether now the President's judiciary bill should be withdrawn.").
2m See Court Bill Shelved by Senate Chiefs; Substitute Ready, N.Y. TMES, July 2, 1937, at 1
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much of what he asked,2- but any wind fell out of the sails of com-
promise when the Majority Leader in the Senate, and Roosevelt's
staunchest legislative lieutenantJoe Robinson, died of a sudden heart
attack 2 ° On July 22, the legislation was recommitted to committee
261never to emerge again.
Given the outrage at the Court, leadership on the issue by a Presi-
262dent who had just won an impressive mandate, ample patronage to
bestow and the will to do it,26 and a large Democratic majority in both
264
Houses, one might have expected the legislation to have easily
passed through Congress. To the contrary, however, the plan aroused
vociferous opposition. Many members of his own party deserted Roo-
(stating that the age limit would be lifted "from 70 1/2 years to 75" and the plan would
be modified to "limit the President to the appointment of one additional Justice to the
Supreme Court each year to supplement the activities of any Justice more than 75 years
old who did not elect to retire").
29 On this point the most noteworthy commentators diverge sharply. For recent
commentary on this question, see infra notes 881-83 and accompanying text.
m See ALsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 268-271 (quoting Burton
Wheeler's demand that the President withdraw his bill "lest he appear to be fighting
against God," and describing how despite Roosevelt's vow that "they can't use Joe
Robinson's death to beat me," the compromise failed because of disruption from find-
ing a successor to Robinson's post); LEUcHTNBURG, supra note 8, at 152 (noting that
many interpreted Senator Robinson's death as a warning against proceeding with the
plan); Congress: Mr. Roosevelt's Court Plan Dies; Garner Arranges for Burial and for Party
Truce, NEwSWEEK, July 31, 1937, at 5 (suggesting that Robinson's death signaled the
effective end of Roosevelt's plan). Alsop and Catledge emphasized the drama of the
senator's death in their description:
Joe Robinson was found sprawled on the floor of his ovenlike apartment bed-
room, still clutching a copy of the Congressional Record. He had arranged
his compromise; he had made his lists of votes; he had obtained his personal
commitments from the senators-and then his death released the senators
from their commitments.
Joseph Alsop & Turner Cadedge, The 168 Days: The Ghost ofJustice Robinson, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Sept. 25, 1937, at 50 [hereinafter Alsop & Catledge, The Ghost].
2 See LEUC-TENBURG, supra note 8, at 153 ("[T]he Senate unceremoniously re-
turned the legislation to committee, from which it never emerged."). The utter defeat
of the Court-packing plan did not occur until July 22, 1937, when it was permanently
buried in the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. See Congress: Mr. Roosevelt's Court Plan
Dies, supra note 260, at 5 (discussing the path the bill took to its demise). Senator
Logan of Kentucky announced in the Senate chamber, "The Supreme Court is out of
the way." The response in the Senate chamber was by SenatorJohnson of California:
"Glory be to God!" The silence in the chamber galleries was broken by exuberant
clapping. Id
262 See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing Roosevelt's overwhelming
election victory).
SeeALSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 190-92 (discussing use of
patronage as a "weapon" in the Court fight).
See PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 81 (describing the magnitude of Democratic
victory).
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sevelt. 2  Indeed, a large part of the Republican strategy was to lie
back and allow the Democrats to lead the charge against the plan.266 It
thus becomes impossible to attribute the opposition to mere politics.
Deeper reasons explain why opposition was so fierce.
The same sorts of broad social forces that determined the con-
tours of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan also can explain its demise.
Roosevelt made two critical miscalculations about public opinion in
believing that his plan could succeed, surprising ones for such an oth-
267erwise astute politician. The first mistake was in missing critical
changes in popular views of judicial supremacy since the time of Re-
construction. The second was in failing to give sufficient credence to
developing public understanding about the role of an independent
judiciary. The two were interrelated.
1. Shifting Views ofJudicial Supremacy
Roosevelt failed to recognize or account for substantial changes in
public sentiment about the idea of judicial supremacy that had oc-
curred between Reconstruction and the 1930s.2 68  Reconstruction is
2 See BURNS, supra note 62, at 297-98 ("Two noted progressives, Burt Wheeler and
Hiram Johnson, were opposed. So were Democrats Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming,
Tom Connally of Texas, Bennett Clark of Missouri, Ed Burke of Nebraska, and a dozen
others of the kind of men on whose loyalty the President had counted."); Crisis in the
Court Fight, Bus. WIL, May 15, 1937, at 72 ("The fight must be pressed both at Washing-
ton and back home. It is because of the immediate sturdy protest back home that so
many senators of the President's own party have found the courage to oppose him on
this issue.").
2 See BURNS, supra note 62, at 298 (noting that something had changed in the coa-
lition that carried Roosevelt through the election, and that "something was happening
to the Republicans too. Knowing that their little band in Congress could not over-
come the President in a straight party fight, they resolved to stay silent and let the
Democrats fight one another."); Alsop & Catledge, Behind the Stoy, supra note 149, at
96 ("The Republicans agreed that if [they] lay low, if they avoided partisan expression
like the plague, the Democrats would be greatly encouraged to fight among them-
selves."); Court: Champions of the Senate Wage Wordy War over President's Plan, supra note
256, at 8 ("Sly Republicans slouched in their seats and let their political opponents
bicker and snarl .... ").
2 See LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 131 ("In retrospect, it appears that the
President misjudged the state of opinion and underestimated the resiliency of the
Court....").
20 Judicial supremacy may refer to a variety of different concepts, but by the time
of the New Deal, the term referred not only to the notion that courts could interpret
the Constitution in the context of a case, but also to the idea that compliance with
such a decision was expected of government officials party to that case. Little more
need be said in the context of the New Deal. For a broader discussion of the varied
meanings ofjudicial supremacy, however, see generally Friedman, supra note 43, espe-
cially at 351-56.
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the right point on which to fix attention, for Roosevelt's view of the
Court as partisan and political-and thus subject to political control-
269bore a remarkable similarity to Reconstruction era understandings.
But times had changed, as is evident in the disparity between public
understandings of judicial supremacy and those of Roosevelt and
RobertJackson.27
Roosevelt was ambivalent at best about judicial supremacy. In a
1932 speech Roosevelt lumped the Court together with the other
"Republican" branches of governmenL In a conversation with one
Senator he expressed frustration that the ChiefJustice would not sim-
ply come over and discuss with him what was needed, in order to get
the Court's opinion before Roosevelt acted.2 Harold Ickes reports
that the President suggested he might go to Congress following judi-
cial invalidation of a law and ask Congress whether he was to follow
their mandate or the Court's. "If the Congress should declare that its
own mandate was to be followed, the President would carry out the
will of Congress through the offices of the United States Marshals and
ignore the Court."27 As Alsop and Catledge point out, Roosevelt's
"reverence for the Supreme Court as an institution was of a distinctly
limited sort."
2 74
Indeed, Roosevelt's planned reaction to a negative decision in the
Gold Standard cases would have been one of the greatest challenges
to Supreme Court-and judicial-supremacy by any American presi-
dent.27 As the Court deliberated, the Administration anticipated the
29 See generally Friedman, Reconstruction's Political Court, supra note 59.
270 See NEIL DUxBURY, PATrERNs OF AMERICANJURISPRUDENCE 116-19 (1995) ("Le-
gal realists-some of whom were, by this stage, active New Dealers-tended to be sur-
prised less by the heavy-handed authoritarianism of the Supreme Court than they were
by the willingness of the American public to accept the Court's decisions.").
2'' SeeALSoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAyS, supra note 9, at 15 (noting that Roosevelt
stated "that the Court was a mere annex of the Republican administration");
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 83 (noting that Roosevelt's partisan characterization
of the Court was not part of the original speech, and when given the opportunity to
modify his position the day after the Baltimore address, FDR said: "What I said last
night about the judiciary is true, and whatever is in a man's heart is apt to come to his
tongue-I shall not make any explanations or apology for it").
27 SeeALSoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 16 (discussing Roosevelt's
failed attempt to discuss "important plans concerning the general welfare" with the
Chief'Justice).
273 LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 101.
27 ArsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYs, supra note 9, at 15.
Lincoln's instructions to ignore the order in Ex Parle Menyman, 17 F. Gas. 144
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), may be the most defiant:
[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
(Vol. 148:971
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financial burden that might be placed upon the government in one
fell swoop.27 6 Arthur Krock reported that he had confirmed the exis-
tence of a draft speech prepared for FDR, in which FDR would "ask[]
the public specifically to choose between the 'legalism' of the courts
and the 'facts,'" which required legislative and executive action,"
Krock said that
[h]ad the President delivered it, the clearest issue yet presented by the
New Deal would have been made between those who believe that, under
all circumstances and regardless of consequences, the word of the Su-
preme Court must be final, and those who believe that a situation could
exist which would require a President and Congressional majority,
elected by the people, to circumvent the ruling.2
In the draft speech, FDR detailed the financial catastrophe in-
volved in obeying the Court. 2  Then, disclaiming any desire to "enter
into any controversy with the distinguished members of the Supreme
Court of the United States who have participated in this (majority)
decision," who have "decided these cases in accordance with the letter
of the law as they saw it," Roosevelt concluded,
It is nevertheless my duty to protect the people of the United States to
the best of my ability. To carry through the decision of the Court to its
logical and inescapable end will so endanger the people of this Nation
that I am compelled to look beyond the letter of the law to the spirit of
the original contracts.20
To fulfill that end, Roosevelt intended to "immediately take such
steps as may be necessary, by proclamation and by message, to the
Congress of the United States."s 1 Krock compared the possible
pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official
oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was be-
lieved that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it? But it was
not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law
was violated.
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted in 4
CoLLEcrED WORKS oFABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2 See LEUcHENBURG, supra note 8, at 87 (noting that Roosevelt's contingency
speech declared that such an adverse decision would result in default by state and local
governments and catapult the nation into its worst economic plight).
2n Arthur Krock, Roosevelt Speech Was Ready on Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1935, at 1.
Id. at 1.
See id. (noting that the speech included forewarnings of bankruptcy for rail-
roads and corporations, and wholesale mortgage foreclosures).
= President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proposed Statement on the Gold Clause, at 8
(Feb. 18, 1935) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
2' Id. at 9. At the top of the statement, in FDR's handwriting, is a note: "File-Pri-
vate: This is the rough draft of radio address I would have made if the Supreme Court
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speech to Andrew Jackson's alleged reaction to Worcester v. Georgia,2
but the fact is that if the speech had been given as reported, the con-
flict likely would have been far more dramatic.
FDR's aggressive defense of the Court-packing plan drew heavily
from Reconstruction era precedents.2 When Roosevelt was attacked
for being disingenuous,2 he took to the airwaves with addresses that
were more candid about his purposes. Roosevelt said he wanted "as
all Americans want-an independent judiciary as proposed by the
framers of the Constitution." But this did "not mean ajudiciary so in-
dependent that it can deny the existence of facts universally recog-
nized. 28 ' Roosevelt went on to reassure his listeners: "[t] here is noth-
ing novel or radical about this idea." He alluded to a prior proposal
that had passed the House of Representatives in 1869, denied that by
packing the Court he meant to put "spineless" individuals on it, and
denied that it would be "a dangerous precedent for the Congress to
change the number ofJustices. " 7 "The Congress has always had, and
will have, that power," he said, citing the number of times in the past,
including Reconstruction, that the number of Justices had been
288changed.
Moreover, Attorney General Robert Jackson's testimony in favor
of the plan before the Senate Judiciary Committee also drew strongly
from past Court-packing precedents.m Jackson is recognized as one
of the plan's most effective advocates. Unlike Cummings, who stuck
decision in the Gold Cases had gone against the Gov." I& at 1.
212 See Krock, supra note 277, at 4.
2s See CURTIS, supra note 192, at 35-37 (drawing the connection).
SeeLAssFR, supra note 87, at 155 (noting that Roosevelt's disingenuous presenta-
tion of the plan received a great deal of immediate criticism from the print media);
CUSHMAN, RETHiNKING, supra note 8, at 11 (recording the opposition of the American
Bar Association and various other professional associations); HOFSrADTER, supra note
129, at 311 (asserting that the Court plan, and Roosevelt's artful justifications for the
proposal, alienated many liberals otherwise supportive of the New Deal agenda). In a
chapter entitled, "A Case Built on Sand," Merlo Pusey attacked Roosevelt's "false prem-
ises" for the Court-packing plan. PUSEY, supra note 115, at 10-21 (1937) (noting that
Roosevelt's fears of the "lowered mental or physical vigor" of older judges was usually
accompanied by talk of "new blood" who would reconsider his economic and social
legislation).
2'5 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), in 1937 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 62, at 126.
2' Idat 128.
287 Id. at 129.
SId. at 128-29.
2'9 Senator Sherman Minton did the same. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 325
(noting that Minton testified "on Reconstruction precedents involving Court contrac-
tion and expansion").
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to the disingenuous argument before the Senate, Jackson took a
straightforward and hard-line approach, and in doing so kept himself
out of much of the trouble other witnesses faced 2 0 Jackson pointed
to all the constitutional controls Congress theoretically had over the
Court, in order to deny it complete supremacy. Congress might exer-
cise its power "to see that the personnel of the judicial system is ade-
quate, both with respect to number and to neutrality of attitude." As
he elaborated at great length, "[s] ix times we have effected changes in
the size of the Court, with resulting changes in the Court's attitude."
91
But times had changed since Reconstruction: by the 1930s, the
notion of judicial supremacy was fairly well established, and even re-
vered.2 Two astute legal commentators, Charles Fairman and Max
Lerner, both recognized the fixed place judicial review had taken in
American government. Lerner took "judicial supremacy" as a given,
stating that "the rule of judges through their veto power over legisla-
tion is the unique American contribution to the science of govern-
ment has become a truism of political thought."25 Discussing the re-
tirement of federal judges in 1938, Fairman said:
Certain initial assumptions will narrow the range of discussion. We may
take it that the system of judicial review is to be preserved. Whatever
speculative interest may be found in imagining the situation had a dif-
2n
"A majority of the justices have made it apparent that the great objectives of
this Administration and this Congress offend their deep convic-
tions.... Prediction of 'impending moral chaos' [and] grief over the fear that
'the Constitution is gone'... indicate an implacable, although unquestiona-
bly sincere, opposition to the use of national power to accomplish the policies
so overwhelmingly endorsed by the voters."
Quiet Crsis, supra note 119, at 16.
2" Hearings, supra note 223, at 2340.
2"2 Thurman Arnold, writing before the Court fight, would conclude, "Thus, in
spite of their cumbersome way of approaching problems, courts appear to have found
a way of acting which has brought them overwhelming prestige and respect." ARNOLD,
SYMBOLS, supra note 7, at 203. In its immediate aftermath he would say: "It was this
faith in a higher law which made the Supreme Court the greatest unifyring symbol in
American government... On this Court the whole idea of a government of laws and
not of the competing opinions of men appeared to depend." ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, su-
pra note 116, at 63-64; see also CURTIS, supra note 192, at 12 ("A hole was left where the
Court might drive in the peg ofjudicial supremacy, if it could. And that is whatJohn
Marshall did. He drove it in, so firmly that no one yet has been able to pull it out.");
PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 87 ("To [those suspicious of tampering with the Court,]
court and Constitution were almost synonymous.").
2s Lerner, supra note 63, at 688 n.2; see also Edward S. Corwin, President and Court.
A CrudalIssue, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1937, § 13 (Magazine), at 30 ("IThe general trend
of professional opinion has come to endow the court's interpretations of the Constitu-
tion with the authority of the latter....").
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ferent doctrine irevailed, judicial supremacy has become firmly embed-
ded in the mores.
No less certain were the Court's fiercest critics. For example,
Ralph Fuchs stated that "a habit of deference to judicial opinion in
these matters has fastened itself upon the entire body-politic."9 5 Simi-
larly, in a book critical of the New Deal decisions, Robert Carr calls
judicial review "the very keystone of our constitutional arch.06
Even those who disliked the idea of judicial supremacy seemed
ready to acknowledge its fixed status. Isidor Feinstein, in a scathing
attack on the Court, called judicial supremacy "the most important
problem of our time," but acknowledged that the tide had turned to-
ward supremacy in 1883. 9 7 Leonard Boudin, a critic since the Popu-
list/Progressive era, published a famous two-volume critique of the
Court, entitled Government by judiciay, laden with countermajoritarian
criticism challenging the idea of judicial supremacy.! s Nonetheless,Boudin also recognized that supremacy had become embedded since
2 Fairman, supra note 194, at 399.
25 Fuchs, supra note 63, at 3.
2 CARR, supra note 140, at 14; see also LEWIS, supra note 179, at 29 ("It is the ex-
pression of respect for judicial tribunals that is one of our most valuable characteris-
tics."). Lewis explains further that "[t]he principle that the Supreme Court is the
authoritative interpreter of our written Constitution is an outstanding characteristic of
our system of government. Although not found in any provision of our written Consti-
tution, the people have made it part of the unwritten Constitution of the United
States." Id at 38. The New York Times agreed:
Many extreme things have been said about the NRA decision by the Supreme
Court, but no one has proposed to disregard or defy it. Until it is modified or
reversed, it is the law of the land and must be observed. This is conceded
even by those whom it most deeply offended. The judges may have been
wrong, but at least they were acting within their rights and doing their desig-
nated duty.
Authority, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1935, at 22; One Point Not Doubtfu N.Y. TIMRS, Feb. 13,
1935, at 18 ("While the decision of the Supreme Court in the gold-clause cases is still
shrouded in uncertainty, there is no difference of opinion on one point. It is that
whatever the judges decide the country will accept. Many may be aggrieved, but no
one will counsel resistance.").
FEINsTEmN, supra note 97, at 53-55.
20 See 1 BoUDIN, supra note 109.
What is more, I believe that the people of the United States are not ready to
abdicate their right to self-government. And if they have actually done so-
and this book proves that they have-it is because they did not know what they
were doing, and still do not know what has actually happened to them. The
Judicial Power is based not so much on an initial act of usurpation as on con-
tinued ignorance as to the actual workings of our governmental system, which
leaves the illusion ofself-governmentwhile destroying its substance.
I& atx.
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Jefferson's time.2
In his subsequent analysis, Robert Jackson recognized that the
fierceness of the battle followed directly from public commitment to
the supremacy of Supreme Court rulings."' It thus is easy to under-
stand why Jackson's countermajoritarian criticism of the Supreme
Court came only after failure of the Court-packing plan. Prior to de-
feat of the plan, both Roosevelt and Jackson saw the Court as subject
to a certain amount of political control. Once it became clear that the
ability to exercise control no longer existed, the countermajoritarian
difficulty became a problem, and thus a common theme of Jack-
son's.'
2. Public Support for an IndependentJudiciary
Roosevelt also failed to see how troubled the public would be by
the plan's implicit consolidation of authority in the Executive
Branch. °9 These concerns played out in the debate over the plan,"°3
reinforcing public approval of the idea ofjudicial supremacy.
3 04
299 See i& atv.
'00 SeeJACKSoN, supra note 118, at 70 ("[A]t the threshold of the New Deal the
Court had established itself as a Supreme Censor of legislation.").
301 It is unclear whether it occurred to Jackson that the people themselves had re-
jected such control, making countermajoritarian claims more difficult to assert.
m Criticism of the consolidation of power in the executive came immediately after
announcement of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. Editorial comments gathered from
around the United States that week include: "[Roosevelt] would strike at the roots of
[the] equality of the three branches of government upon which the nation is founded,
and centralize in himself the control ofjudicial, as well as executive functions."; "This
is too much power for any man to hold in a country that still calls itself a democracy.";
and "He might more plainly put it by frankly saying: 'Let me appoint sixjudges to the
Supreme Court and they will see to it that the Constitution does not stand in the way of
what I want to do.'" Opinions ofthe Nations Press on Court Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1937,
at 10. The former president of the American Bar Association, Silas H. Strawn, attacked
the plan "as a short cut to a dictatorship." Strawn Scores Proposal; N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1937, at 10. State governments lashed out as well. Texas State Senator T.J. Holbrook
declared that the plan would "establish a dictatorship equal to that of Hitler or Musso-
lini." Texas Legislature Fights Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1937, at 1.
'3 See Quiet Crisis, supra note 119, at 15. The article quotes The New Yorker colum-
nist E.B. White as saying,
[We decline to follow a leader, however high-minded, who proposes to take
charge of affhirs because he thinks he knows all the answers. Mr. Roosevelt is
not ambitious personally, but he has turned into an Eagle Scout whose pas-
sion for doing the country a good turn every day has at last got out of hand.
Id
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 138 ("Above all, they protested that Roose-
velt was not showing proper regard for thejudiciary... A prominent Catholic layman
compared the Court's authority to that of the Pope and added: 'To all intents and
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Three interconnected, yet distinct, arguments were at the fore of
challenges to the Court-packing plan: (1) the Supreme Court's ability
to defend civil rights and civil liberties would be jeopardized by mak-
ing it too accountable to political appointments;305 (2) the plan would
undermine judicial independence;,0 5 and (3) the plan would give the
President, and particularly President Roosevelt, dictatorial powers.
Worry about rising totalitarianism elsewhere in the world further
fueled these concerns. Both sides to the debate over the Supreme
Court and the New Deal played the fascism card, with Roosevelt forces
arguing that fascism was overtaking government in some places pre-
cisely because government was proving unable to deal with economic
crises.0 7 Lest that happen here (the thinly veiled threat went) it was
necessary to move the Court out of the way of progress.! Others,
purposes our Supreme Court is infallible. It can not err.'" (citations omitted)).
A court which is not independent in one sphere will not be independent in
any sphere. You cannot have a court that will blindly say, "O.K., Chief," to the
economic purposes of the President-any President-and not have at least a
tendency to do the same thing with regard to personal civil liberties.
Ira Jewell Williams & Ira Jewell Williams Jr., What Are a Man's Rights?, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, May 29, 1937, at 17.
'"" Robert Post describes convincingly the way in which the Supreme Court's own
decisions paved the way for its role in protecting individuals. See Post, supra note 132,
at 1529-45. Post explains that, ironically perhaps, the substantive due process decisions
of the Lochnerera that were so reviled nonetheless reflected the same concern for indi-
vidual liberty that ultimately flowered in decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and provided ground for later individual liberty decisions. See id. at 1530-40
(citing Taft court decisions that safeguarded individual liberty from "unjustifiable in-
terference").
'0 See Williams & Williams, supra note 304, at 16 ("Our Constitution guarantees
these rights. The Supreme Court guards the Constitution. Such a guardian must be
independent of all things save one-namely, his oath of office. To pack the court
would endanger this independence and, ultimately, the personal human liberties that
we most deeply cleave to.").
'07 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (describing the crisis of faith in
democratic governance).
For example, Senator Logan proclaimed:
There is a great cry going up against dictators and dictatorships. We who
support this legislation are fighting for the maintenance of the freedom of the
people of the Nation and against dictatorship. The Supreme Court now ad-
mittedly is a dictator, so far as economical and political principles are con-
cerned, as they relate to the most vital questions in the Nation.
81 CONG. REc. S.7380 (1937); see also Held Gain for Democracy, supra note 219, at 10
("Never before has it been so necessary to take changed economic and social condi-
tions into account. They threaten the very continuance of democracy as a form of
government, and means must be found to make democracy effective in dealing with
them." (statement of Sen. Green)); New Dealer Warns the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1937, at 6 (reporting speech of Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of
the United States, where he warned the New York State Bar Association that democ-
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however, supported the Court as a protection against fascism. In par-
ticular, there were frequent expressions of concern about the accumu-
lation of power in the national government, especially in Roosevelt's
hands. In this environment, the Court's checking function was an
important one.- To identify just one interesting example, the front
page of the New York Times on November 28, 1936, reported on the
AFL convention. 30 Among other action, the convention rejected con-
stitutional amendments to increase government power and curb the
Court.3 1 ' Adjacent to the story is another labeled "Reich Decree Bans
All Art Criticism" and "State To Be Sole Judge."
3 12
racy was being "'frustrated' by the monopoly of the Supreme Court by lawyers"). Jack-
son closed his speech with: "[W]hen free government becomes too perplexing and
futile, the people turn to dictatorship. Out of the break-down of an attempt at free
government which failed to function arose Hitler, Lenin and Stalin, Napoleon and
Cromwell." Id. As a 1937 New Yor* Times article noted, cooperation between Congress
and thejudiciary was necessary
because in a very literal sense democracy is now on trial. In all parts of the
world many men have lost patience with the ways of popular government.
They say it cannot function effectively in a crisis. They ridicule its some times
blundering efforts to translate the will of the electorate into a policy of na-
tional action. They scorn the elaborate system of checks and balances by
which it attempts to conserve personal liberty and individual initiative. There
is a challenge in such skepticism which only a great democracy can meet, and
a challenge which a great democracy can meet only by giving "the confident
answer of performance" to those whose instinctive faith makes them wish to
believe that the complex problems of the twentieth century can be solved
within the framework of free government under a written Constitution.
The Ways of Democracy, supra note 175, at 18.
309 See Louis Stark, A.F. of L. Demands 30-Hour Week Law; Green Re-Elected, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1936, at 1 (describing the proposals for a constitutional amendment at an
AFL meeting). One delegate, for example, was quoted as saying.
"American constitutional government is the hope of the world."... "If it is
abandoned where will we go? Who hears of the Supreme Court of Russia,
where Stalin sulks and issues his mandates? Who hears of the Supreme Court
of Italy, where Mussolini smites himself upon the breast and imposes his man-
date upon the people? Who hears of the Supreme Court of Germany?"
Id. An earlier New York Times article had summarized the argument of William Ran-
som, President of the American Bar Association, as:
[I]f the present movement to abridge the jurisdiction of the courts succeeds,
Congress could then pass laws "that no red-headed man could have ajob, that
no Catholic could go to Mass, that no Jew could adhere to his religion or
marry, that no employer of labor could vote in a Federal election, that no
worker could belong to a trade union or that every worker must belong to a
trade union or that no woman could be employed except as a housewife."
BarHead Warns of a Dictatorship, 'N.Y. TIMWEs, May 1, 1936, at 15.
s10 See Stark, supra note 309, at 1 (reporting on the AFL convention).
3" See id. (declining to adopt resolutions calling for constitutional amendments to
permit labor and social welfare legislation and to curb the Supreme Court).
s'2 N.Y. TES, Nov. 28, 1936, at 1.
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In light of concerns about totalitarian government,31 s the Supreme
Court's role as defender of constitutional rights and liberty moved to
the fore.1 4 Conservatives, of course, long had treasured that role with
regard to property rights. At the time of the plan, however, a new role
for the courts was emerging.1 5 Concerns about police practices in
criminal investigations were attracting the interest of some.316 Issues
313 See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 121, at 137 ("By 1937, talk of the 'totalitarian men-
ace' and the equation of communism, fascism, and Nazism were common.").
314 The Court had been making some progress on this front, including the well-
publicized Scottsboro decision, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that
due process was denied to defendants because they did not have the effective assis-
tance of counsel). See Friedman, supra note 20, at 1907-09, 1913-14 (describing some
early civil liberties decisions of the Hughes Court); see also Scottsboro Case Called Land-
mark, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1932, at 40 (noting that the secretary of the National Com-
mittee for the Defense of Political Prisoners said: "[W e believe [the Scottsboro case
will] become a great historic landmark.'"). Courts were seen as the only guardian
against abuse of citizens' rights. One person commented that "it was well understood
[by the Framers] that the integrity of the Constitution and the liberty of the individual
depended upon maintaining the independence of the courts whose duty it would be to
hold void laws or executive acts in violation of the Constitution." Thomas Raeburn
White, Letter to the Editor, Danger Seen in Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1937, at 20.
Fred Clark, the National Commander of the Crusaders, stated that the "Supreme
Court is the only guarantee the people have of sustained liberty." Bar Urged To Give
Opinion on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1937, at 2. See Williams & Williams, supra note
304, at 40 ("Personal civil liberty is a precious and a continuing achievement....
[E] ternal vigilance is still its price. Again I say that an independent Supreme Court is
our best and our last defense against the destruction of these fundamental liberties.").
s An example is an article in the Saturday Evening Post, see Williams & Williams,
supra note 304. The authors argue that "[t]o pack the court would endanger this in-
dependence [of the Court] and, ultimately, the personal human liberties that we most
deeply cleave to." Id. at 16. In the course of making this argument, the authors stress
that in discussing "rights," "[y]ou will find here no defense of property rights as such,
nor will there be any attack on the New Deal so-called, or on its professed objectives."
Id. Rather, the authors expressed the belief that "[t]he fundamental personal rights
are the only ones that in the long run have any real importance." Id.; see also The Con-
stitutional Crisis, 25 COMMONwEAL 481 (1937). This article states that
[w]hat the great majority of Americans, we believe, do firmly hold to be true,
and justifiably so, is that the Supreme Court has been the instrument through
which the civil liberties and rights of the people have been preserved and de-
fended and perpetuated, and for that reason the Supreme Court is justly re-
spected, and venerated, and now will be stoutly, even passionately, defended.
Id. at 482.
316 See FRANiFURTFR, supra note 133, at 59 (comparing unfavorably police methods
in the United States to those in England). One columnist urged Congress to adopt the
principle, obsta principiis ("withstand beginnings"). See Burke, supra note 178, at 7-8
(urging Congress to adopt this principle as the basis for its opposition to the Presi-
dent's Court-packing proposal). The principle was adopted by the Court in a decision,
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which upheld a citizen's right against unlaw-
ful search and seizure of private papers under the Fourth Amendment.
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of race and minority rights were of concern to others.!17  The First
Amendment in particular was receiving the attention of the Court and
the public.'81 Opinion was split on the subject of whether the Court
was protecting rights adequately, with some quite critical.3 19 Others,
including the New York Times, were more willing to praise the Court.
s32
317 See Bar Urged to Give Opinion on C4our supra note 314 ("We [the Voluntary Com-
mittee of Lawyers] believe that [the proposal] is unmistakably an attempt to pack the
court... [and] that it would destroy the sole defense of minorities against the unre-
stricted tyranny of majorities."). Senator William H. King remarked that,
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has proved to be a bulwark for the
safety and protection of the States and the people. It has truthfully been said
that it is our "Ark of the Covenant," and to weaken or impair the power and
the authority of the Supreme Court or to tamper with our judicial system can-
not help but arouse grave apprehensions in the minds of all thoughtful
Americans.
Court Change Foes Hold Senate Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1937, at 15.
SI8 For example, Williams and Williams argued:
What cannot be left to take care of itself is civil liberty not having to do with
property. Does no one care any longer for freedom of speech, of assembly or
of worship? In all the millions of words written about the President's pro-
posal, how many have concerned themselves with the disperil to civil liberties
that the proposal involves?
I say. A plague on both your houses. You, Mr. Roosevelt, are wrong in
seeking to weaken the Supreme Court as a court, and even more wrong in not
seeing, or not caring, that you will have successors; that some of them may as-
sail these fundamental freedoms of ours; and that then we shall be in bitter
need of a strong court which can say "No"....
Williams & Williams, supra note 304, at 38, 40.
Big For example, Isidor Feinstein charged that:
[T]he Supreme Court has been as unwilling to apply the clear letter of the
Constitution and its spirit in defense of civil liberties as it has been willing to
twist, stretch, pervert, or ignore the letter and spirit of the Constitution to up-
hold property rights, no matter how spurious in their origin or harmful in
their exercise.
FEINSTI!N, supra note 97, at 100; see also LOUIS P. GOLDBERG & ELEANORE LEVENSON,
LAWJLEssJuDGEs 231 (1935) ("Not only have judges failed to apply the constitutional
provisions for the protection of civil rights of individuals and minority groups but they
have construed such provisions so as to deprive large masses of workers and non-
conforming minorities of their constitutional privileges.").
820 See The Real "Super-Government" N.Y. TIMys, Feb. 12, 1936, at 20 (asserting that
the complaints against the Supreme Court are really against the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, and thatjudges are merely applying the restrictions imposed on legisla-
tures by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution); Wat the Court "Obstructs," N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1936, at 16 ("[I]n the aspect usually overlooked by those excited radicals who
see it only as a set of 'nine old obstructionists[,]' ... [T]he court stands as the protec-
tor of free speech, a fair trial, and other individual liberties. It 'obstructs' indeed, but
what it obstructs is injustice, brutality and tyranny.").
Felix Frankfurter's nomination was praised for his concern for civil liberties with
much the same language used several weeks later to laud the retiringJustice Brandeis.
Comparejustice Frankfunter, supra note 186, at 18 ("No real doubt was expressed that the
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But this emergent role for the Court gave pause about stripping it of
the power to stand up against majoritarian government. Indeed, the
ability of the Supreme Court to protect civil liberties had even influ-
enced Roosevelt's decision against a supermajority voting requirement
for the Court.3 The essential role of the Supreme Court in protect-
ing individual liberty was mentioned frequently in the Court fight.
s2
Religious groups were early opponents of the plan.s2 The Senate Ju-
living Constitution, and the liberties of the citizen under the Constitution, will be safe
in [Justice Frankfurter's] hands."), with A Great Judge Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1939,
at 18 (praising the career ofJustice Brandeis by saying "[n]o man has shown a keener
appreciation of the personal liberties and the civil rights which are the rich heritage of
the American people, or done more to help preserve those liberties and rights").
Some writers responded to the "horse and buggy" criticism of the Supreme Court
by pointing out that many traditional civil rights came from that era:
Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, of assembly, of domicile, of con-
science, together with free elections and due process of the law, are some of
the rights embodied in a Constitution which goes back to the horse-and-buggy
age.... [A]re the human rights embodied in this obsolete charter also to be
regarded as obsolete?
Other Obsolete Traditions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1936, § 4, at 8; see also Vehicle Carries Rights,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1936, § 4, at 8 ("[A] man's right to a fair trial for his life in Ala-
bama is a horse-and-buggy right. A man's right to get up on a soap-box in Florida or in
Union Square is a horse-and-buggy right. That is to say, they are rights which grew up
with our horse and buggy civilization.").
321 See LEucHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 111-12 ("An act requiring more than a ma-
jority ofJustices to invalidate a law, a solution a number of legislators favored, did not
bear scrutiny.... [S]uch a law would limit the Court's role as a protector of civil liber-
ties."); see also 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 338 (explaining how amendment solu-
tions to the Court problem also had run into trouble because the "Old Court had used
these provisions [the due process clauses] primarily to protect private property and
freedom of contract, but it had also safeguarded other rights-most notably, freedom
of expression and religion. How were the New Dealers to separate the wheat from the
chaff?").
s32 See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 139 (quoting the historian James
Truslow Adams as stating that the judiciary is "the sole bulwark of our personal liber-
ties"); John A. Ryan, The Supreme Court Debate: Court Reform and Minorities, 25
COMMONwEAL 683, 683 (Apr. 16, 1937) ("All... minority groups and some majority
groups would be in danger of injury if the independence of the courts were de-
stroyed.").
33 SeeALSOP & CATLEDGE, TIM 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 73 ("The churches, and
especially the Roman Catholic Church, always nervous over religious liberties and
grateful to the Court for strong decisions protecting them, showed signs of acute un-
easiness."); Leo P. McNally, The Supreme Court Debate, 26 COMMONVWEAL 133, 133 (1937)
("[S]uch [Supreme Court] appointees may not consciously destroy the rights of relig-
ious minorities, but will do so only on the theory of protecting the rights of the major-
ity for the general welfare of the country."). M.B. Carrott, The Supreme Court and Minor-
ity Rights in the Nineteen-Twenties, 41 Nw. Olno Q. 144 (1969), describes the Court's
decisions "to support the personal liberties of ethnic, religious, and racial groups, a
policy which was borne out in a series of cases between 1923 and 1927 involving paro-
chial schools, foreign-language instruction, and the right of Negroes to vote." Id at
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diciary Committee report lambasting the plan played heavily on the
concerns for civil liberties 24
Tied to the concern for civil liberties was the insistence on "judi-
cial independence."m One editorial declared the battle between the
independence of the Supreme Court and the progressiveness ofjudi-
cial decisions as a "constitutional crisis."3 26 "[T]here are millions of
farmers who reckon the Constitution and the independence of the
Supreme Court as of higher value than any temporary legislative nos-
trum."32 7 The Court-packing plan would "mark the beginning of the
end of the independence of the Supreme Court, and with it the be-
ginning of the end of constitutional democracy in this nation. '3 28 This
144. Carrott argues that some of theJustices supported these decisions in part to gain
the support of these groups in restoring order in society. See id. at 149 ("[I]t was natu-
ral that some members of the Court would mention religion as a hopeful stabilizing
factor."). But Carrott also argues that ChiefJustice Taft was hopeful the groups would
support the Court in the face of increasing attacks on it. See id at 150, 151 (stating that
Taft "desired to carry the support of increasingly powerful ethnic, religious and racial
groups" against those attacking the authority of the Court).
324 See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, TE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 230-32 (noting the com-
mittee's concern with "safeguarding the rights of the citizen"); id. at 230 ("For the pro-
tection of the people, for the preservation of the rights of the individual, for the main-
tenance of the liberties of minorities .... the three branches of government were so
constituted that.., no one branch could overawe or subjugate the others." (quoting
Senate report)); see also PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 89 ("[S]ome congressmen ob-
jected to the proposal because they believed that it threatened civil liberties.").
"2 See PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 87 ("Perhaps a more widespread popular view
reflected a reverence for the Supreme Court as an institution."); id. ("'Only a Supreme
Court, independent and unawed ... stands guard to protect the rights and liberties of
the people.'"(quoting Sen. Burke)).
$2 The Constitutional Criis, supra note 315, at 482.
52 It Must Not Pass, BUS. WY., Feb. 20, 1937, at 64; see also Speak Frankly, Mr. Prei-
dent, Bus. WI., Mar. 6, 1937, at 68 ("Come, golden voice, tell this to the people, in-
form them frankly that all you want from the Supreme Court is complete subservience
to the White House!"); Williams & Williams, supra note 304, at 40 ("But at the very least
let us make sure that the Supreme Court remains independent of everyone, and espe-
cially of the President and of all Presidents to come the chief pillar of the temple of
our civil liberties, forever.").
M Burke, supra note 178, at 8. Burke also claimed:
The principle that the powers of the national government should be sepa-
rated from one another and that the national judiciary should be completely
independent of the executive or the legislative department of the nation, was
born of the conviction, resulting from the experience of the ages, that the
vindication of the provision of the Constitution which the people and the
states believed necessary for the preservation of their liberty and well-being,
could not be safely committed to a national judiciary subservient to either of
the other branches of the government.
Id at 5; see also 'Williams & Williams, supra note 304, at 40 ("It is clear to me that the
President's proposal to pack the court and to cripple the court's independence will
pass unless some other way can be found to grant the desire of politicians for more
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theme reappeared in the Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Report
against the plan,32 and one of the key speeches in the debate against
the compromise bill was to the same effect!33
Accompanying these concerns were the persistent claims about
"dictatorial" powers-an accusation that would continue to haunt
Roosevelt through the deliberation on his executive reorganization
program. As Alan Brinkley observes, despite popular approval of Roo-
sevelt and the New Deal, there remained a latent distrust of state
power. 3  Courts were seen as the final bulwark against dictatorial uses
of such power, 2 and Roosevelt's plan threatened to increase his own
power at the expense of those very courts.
The result was a veritable flood of articles and speeches about dic-
tatorship, some subtle and others quite explicit in attacking Roose-
velt's motives. This same concern would also spell a temporary end to
his plans to reorganize the Executive Branch. "Without ever directly
power and the wish of the people that they should have it.").
3' SeeAiSoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYs, supra note 9, at 232 ("'This bill is an in-
vasion of the judicial power such as has never been attempted in this country.'" (quot-
ing the SenateJudiciary Majority Report)).
3" See id. at 262. Alsop and Cadedge describe the scene of Senator Bailey's emo-
tional speech:
He ... shouted his warnings of what would come if the independence of the
judiciary were impaired, and hammered his desk at each of the points in-
tended to show that an impairment of thejudiciary's independence was the
inevitable result of the court bill.... [T]he senators listened with complete at-
tention.... That rare thing, a successful and convincing argument, was being
made on the Senate floor....
Id.
33 See BRINKLEY, supra note 149, at 17 (discussing how new Democratic initiatives
launched in 1937 encountered unexpected opposition despite the party's popularity).
3"2 See i& at 20 ("If a President tries to take away our freedom of speech ... who is
to save us except the Courts?" (quoting the historianJames Truslow Adams)).
As Barry Dean Karl later explained:
The opposition [to executive reorganization] seemed not to see the potential-
ity of public furor until the President pointed it out to them when he attacked
the Supreme Court. The two arguments seemed to have no necessary relation
to one another, yet in tandem they revealed inherent fears which, like images
in a hall of mirrors, reflected endlessly the historic shape of the fear itself.
BARRY DEAN KARL, ExEcUTivE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEw DEAL 256
(1963). Stories of the reorganization effort are chock full of references to concern
about Roosevelt having dictatorial power. See, e.g., id. at 248 ("The introduction of the
bill in the Senate the following winter met with heated and organized furor, with cries
of 'Dictator' and the fantastic charge that Roosevelt was seeking the power to abolish
the Congress.... ."); RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNmvENT
vii (1966) ("Congressmen who opposed reorganization contended that it would create
a presidential dictatorship, and scores of newspapers echoed this sentiment."). The
clamor was so intense Roosevelt actually issued a statement denying dictatorial designs.
See id at 159 (describing a letter to an anonymous friend which stated, "I have no in-
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saying that Roosevelt was another Hitler, the authors [of the Senate
report on the plan] called attention to 'the condition of the world
abroad"' and warned of "autocratic dominance."4 More overtly, the
Los Angeles Times headlined the plan, "ROOSEVELT OUT FOR
UNLIMITED POWER,"ssS and the Boston Herald chose, "HOLDS
.336GREATER POWER AIM"; others noted generally that "prophecies
of ruin and warnings of dictatorship to come were editorial writers'
small change that day." 7 It became something of a sport to invoke
Roosevelt's name-explicitly or by innuendo-with those of Hitler,
Mussolini, and Stalin.m Columnist Dorothy Thompson followed this
theme:
No people ever recognize their Dictator in advance. He never stands
for election on the platform of dictatorship .... Since the great Ameri-
can tradition is freedom and democracy you can bet that our dictator,
God help usl will be a great democrat, through whose leadership alone
democracy can be realized. And nobody will ever say 'Heil' to him or
'Ave Caesar'nor will they call him 'Fuhrer' or 'Duce.' But they will greet
him with one great big, universal, democratic, sheeplike blat of 'O.K.,
Chiefi Fix it like you wanna Chief! Oh Kaaayl'SS9
clination to be a dictator"). The letter only served to make matters worse for taking
seriously such an absurd charge. See id. at 159 ("Strangely, the fact that Roosevelt
thought it necessary to disavow dictatorial ambitions only lent credence to the accusa-
tion. 'Think of it,' sputtered one congressman, 'needing to assure the country about
it-that he did notwant to be a dictator. In Heaven's name, why did he mention it?'").
m4 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 146 (quoting from an adverse report of the
SenateJudiciary Committee).
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 299.
Opinions of the Press on Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1987, at 10 (quoting press
reaction from around country).
M ALSOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 71.
m' This was true even before the plan was announced. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 8, at 90 (quoting Senator Vandeberg, who responded to Roosevelt's 'horse and
buggy' remark: "I don't think the President has any thought of emulating Mussolini,
Hitler or Stalin, but his utterance as I have heard it is exactly what these men would
say"); PATrERsON, supra note 39, at 87 (describing a citizen who wrote that President
and Congress "seem to have become intoxicated with the DEMOCRATIC FEVER
which brought them into power and there is no influence which can stop their head-
long rush into the CHASM where STALIN, MUSSOLINI, and HITLER have led their
countries"); Lionel V. Patenaude, Gamer, Sumnem, and Connally: The Defeat of the Roose-
vet Court Bill in 1937, 74 Sw. HIST. Q. 36, 44 (1970) ("Connally, posing as a friend of
the President, by innuendo linked Roosevelt's motives with those of a Hitler, a Stalin, a
Mussolini not by direct words, but by innuendo." (quoting the Austin American, com-
menting on a speech by Senator Tom Connally)).
'-" The BigDebate, TIME, Mar. 1, 1937, at 10.
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Even Roosevelt's own metaphor of government was turned against
him:
Trust me, he said, for I seek harmony, not domination, I am only one
horse in a three-horse team, I am not the driver. Not the driver? He is
the boss of Congress, the boss of the party that rules Congress. He drives
the second horse and now seeks authority to drive the third horse, which
prefers to go about its business, doing the routinejob of plowing, instead
ofjumping over the fence into a lot outside the Constitution.m
Thus, from the debate over FDR's plan came a new vision of the
role of courts. Tremendous power having been ceded to the national
government, the plan was the point at which the country balked. The
accretion of government power threatened judicial independence,
which at that time referred to the emergent role of the Court as a de-
fender of individual liberty.
II. THE LESSONS OF 1937
After 1937, everything was different. The man whose policies
were frustrated by a Supreme Court to which he made no appoint-
ments during his first term, ultimately would appoint more Justices
than any other president. By the time he passed away, Roosevelt had
selected eight of the Court's nine members.s The new Justices had
little prior judicial experience,'s4 but significant exposure to politics
and government.m And, as Supreme Court Justices go, they were
young. Indeed, Life Magazine's 1945 article on the Court, no doubt
emphasizing the change from the early New Deal days, was titled,
"The Nine Young Men."34 Most important, for the first time in his-
340 Trust Me, He Said, Bus. W., Mar. 13, 1937, at 60.
-' See Thomas Reed Powell, Our High Court Analyzed, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1944,
(Magazine), at 17.
Justice Rutledge had served for two years on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The only other Justice appointed by Roosevelt
with judicial "experience" wasJustice Black, who, "as his detractors were fond of point-
ing out" had served "18 months as a police judge in Birmingham." C. HERMAN
PRITcHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY INJUDICIAL POLrrIcs AND VALUES 1937-
1947, at 13 (1963).
m See id. at 12-13; see alsoJohn Chamberlain, The Nine Young Men, 19 LIFE 76, 78-79
(giving a brief biographical sketch of each Justice); Jonathan Daniels, The Battle of the
Bend COLLrER'S, Aug. 17, 1946, at 12 (observing that five of the Justices had been
elected to public office); Arthur M. SchlesingerJr., The Supreme Court. 1947, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1947, at 73-78 (discussing the backgrounds andjudicial attitudes of the Roosevelt
Justices). ThreeJustices also had academic experience: Douglas, Frankfurter and Rut-
lege. SeePRrTcHETr, supra note 342, at 13.
34 Chamberlain, supra note 343, at 76; see also PR1TcHETr, supra note 342, at 13
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tory, "the Court found itself in the unprecedented situation of being
the most liberal branch of the government."m
As the membership on the Court changed, so too did constitu-
tional law. Ironically, scholars focus on 1937 to ascertain whether
there was a "switch" engendered by "politics,"M 6 when no one seems to
disagree that in a broader perspective this is precisely what happened.
ABI. agree that by the 1940s constitutional law was dramatically differ-
ent, and that decisions such as United States v. Darbyt 7 and Wickard v.
Filbum 3 s8 were revolutionary 9 No one denies that the 1940s switch
was the result of Roosevelt's transformation of the bench.' By the
("The previous Court with its nine old men had reached the average age of 72 by 1937.
In 1943, when Roosevelt's last appointment had been made, the average age of the
Court was 56 years."); Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1939-40, 35 AM. POI
ScI. REV. 250 (1941) ("By his policy of appointing younger men,.... [lt seems prob-
able that we shall have a 'Roosevelt Court' for many years to come."); Schlesinger, su-
pra note 343, at 73 ("These are young men by Supreme Court standards: The oldest
cannot qualify for a pension till 1952.").
ParrcHErT, supra note 342, at 14; see also Alexander H. Pekelis, The Supreme Court
Today, NEW REPUBUC, Apr. 17, 1944, at 522 ("The Federal judiciary, led by its Supreme
Court, may well prove to be... the most liberal of the three branches of the national
government."); Chamberlain, supra note 343, at 76 ("Even members of the Roosevelt
Court admitted officially that the lower courts and the bar can no longer even guess
with any degree of accuracy at what the law will be tomorrow.").
46 See infra notes 361-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
34 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
49 See PAUL R. BENSON JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
1937-1970, at 89 (listing Darby as "one of the half-dozen most important cases in the
whole 180-year history of American constitutional law."); CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra
note 8, at 224 (contending that the "revolution" is to be found in the aftermath of
Roosevelt's appointments, not in the Court's Commerce Clause decisions between 1937
and 1940); LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 221-22 (noting that the Court's ruling in
Wickard "assigned to the dustbin of history not only the criterion of direct and indirect
effects but almost any distinction between commerce and production as a relevant
standard for determining constitutionality").
m See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 224 (contending that the replace-
ment of the Nine Old Men "brought forth a new paradigm for commerce clause juris-
prudence."); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 220 (reporting that by June 1941, the
"Four Horsemen" had left the bench, along with Cardozo and Brandeis, allowing Roo-
sevelt to appoint faithful lieutenants to the Court and elevate Justice Stone to Chief
Justice). As Wendell Wilkie explained,
"Mr. Roosevelt has won. The court is now his.... When a series of reinterpre-
tations overturning well-argued precedents are made in a brief time by a newly
appointed group ofjudges, all tending to indicate that same basic disagree-
ment with the established conception of government, the thoughtful observer
can only conclude that something revolutionary is going on. And that is what
has happened here."
Id, at 155 (quoting Wendell L. Wilkie, The Court Is Now His, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Mar. 9, 1940, at 71, 74.).
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mid-1940s, frequent commentary alluded to, or complained about,
the inability to predict legal outcomes because of the large number of
judicial overrulings35 ' The ABAJournal referred to the practice of law
in this environment as "The New Guesspotism." s5 2 Justice Roberts
complained that precedents were falling "into the same class as a re-
stricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."53 Thomas
Reed Powell quipped that when the Supreme Court was sitting he had
to look at his clock during class in order to know what to tell his stu-
dents the law was."'
This shift in doctrine appears to raise difficult questions about the
separation of law from politics. Thus, since 1937, scholars have de-
bated what happened and why, combing the historical record in order
to ascertain the motives of key players, such as Justice Owen Roberts,
whose possible change of votes in key cases was "the switch in time
that saved Nine."30 The concern of this scholarship is the extent to
which the transformation of 1937 was the result of political pressure.
The problem with this approach, however, is that it is too histori-
cally contingent. The stakes in this debate are high, sufficiently high
that one must hope that the answers do not rest on the actions of in-
dividual Justices. Is law separate from politics? Was the constitutional
change after 1937 legitimate? What is the proper role of the judiciary
in American democracy? Do we really care to believe these questions
are answered primarily by what Owen Roberts was thinking in 1937?
Surely 1937 has something to teach us about these important ques-
tions, but one might hope the lessons can rest on a broader under-
standing than the motives of one man.
This section looks at the problem of the separation of law and
politics through the lens of 1937 but-again-its focus is on public re-
action to the Supreme Court, rather than the actions taken by Su-
preme Court Justices in response to political threats. The suggestion
'5' See Chamberlain, supra note 343, at 77 ("[L] awyers feel like advising their clients
to push cases as men bet on horse races, just for the sake of the gamble."); Powell, su-
pra note 341, at 44 ("Where shall confidence be placed? How far will transactions be-
come a mere gamble as to their legal results? These are questions many lawyers are
now asking.").
32 Frank W. Grinnell, The New Guesspotism, 30 A.B.J. 507 (1944).
3*1 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also
PMITCHETr, supra note 342, at 57 (1948) (noting that there were 32 overrulings during
the period 1937-1946).
See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 234.
See, e.g., CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at ch. 1; Friedman, supra note 20
(arguing that understanding the minds ofJustices Hughes and Roberts is essential to
understanding the decisions of 1936 and 1937).
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here is that the independence of the judiciary rests on public willing-
ness to respect that independence. The analysis that follows pursues
this idea with regard to two specific questions: the range of inde-
pendence possessed by the Court in 1937, and the empirical legiti-
macy of the doctrinal change that followed.
A. The Events of 1937, and the Extent to Which
Law and Politics Are Separate
Public reaction to the Supreme Court is not only the product of
agreement or disagreement with specific decisions. The public will
support the idea of a independent judiciary, even while seriously op-
posing judicial holdings.
As the preceding history makes plain, the public was extremely
angry about Supreme Court decisions and the Court's constant inter-
ference with the New Deal agenda. At the same time, many parts of
that same public-including those who favored the New Deal meas-
ures struck down by the courts-opposed the Court-packing plan. s
This phenomenon was confirmed by Gallup polls that showed both
dissatisfaction with Court decisions and opposition to tinkering with
the Court. s 7 As Thurman Arnold explained, "much of the opposition
to the proposal came not from those who were opposed but from
those in favor of the main outlines of the Roosevelt policies,' includ-
ing the farm movement and organized labor.39 In addition, many
members of Congress were enthusiastic New Dealers who were eager
to solve the Court problem, but insisted on doing so by constitutional
amendment, rather than by Court packing.30
This was not universally true, of course; the defeat of the Plan necessarily took a
coalition of New Deal opponents (who may or may not have disagreed with Court-
packing in principle, but would oppose it because the Court was checking a disfavored
political course), and New Deal proponents.
95 See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 24, at 638 n.4 (noting that most of the public
opposed the Court's anti-New Deal actions, but fewer than half polled approved judi-
cial review limitations).
M ARNOLD, FoiLoRE, supra note 116, at 53; see also ALSOP & CATLDGE, THE 168
DAYs, supra note 9, at 184 ("[In the country you have the millions of middle-class
Americans, whose political thinking is precisely that of the moderate New Dealers, who
voted for the President in droves at the November election, deserting him on the court
issue ...
'9 ALsOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYs, supra note 9, at 119 ("The behavior of the
farm organizations was the first sign that there might be a popular dissent from the
court plan."). The situation was a bit more ambivalent with labor. See id. at 173-74
("[A]fter the first loud pronouncements, no more happened.").
See id. at 184 (describing how members of Congress deserted the President after
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The question that remains, then, is how much room a Court has
to maneuver in the face of public opposition. Stated differently, what
are the boundaries of judicial independence? With regard to 1937,
scholars have approached this question by first assessing the degree of
political pressure, and then trying to ascertain whether a switch in fact
occurred, ostensibly in response to it.3 ' The widespread perception
in 1937, however, was that the Court did in fact switch. Thus, the is-
sue is not whether the Court switched, but what might have happened
had it not done so. Obviously conjecture is required here, but in that
conjecture rests some insight into the separation of law and politics.
1. The Public Believed the Court "Switched"
Press coverage suggests the public clearly received the impression
that the Court had changed direction in the critical decisions in West
Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel. 32 As William Leuchtenburg re-
ports, "[m]any observers, especially supporters of the plan, did not
question that the Court had altered its views, and that it had done so
because it had been baptized 'in the waters of public opinion. 'm Al-
the switch); POLENBERG, supra note 333, at 125-26 (describing the Democrats' aban-
donment of the President after the plan's announcement). The President immedi-
ately lost the support of Texas Democrats, never easy New Deal allies, but critical to
him nonetheless. See Patenaude, supra note 338, at 36 (describing the Texas Demo-
crats' opposition to the plan).
3" Many scholars simply assume a switch occurred. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14,
at 290-91 (noting scholarly assumptions that a "switch" occurred). Legalists argue at
least that no switch occurred in response to politics, and perhaps also that no switch at
all occurred in 1937. See CUSHMAN, RETHINMNG, supra note 8, at 31-32 ("The fact that
the only case that required the Court to eat its words was a response neither to the
Court-packing plan nor to the 1936 election ought to give us pause when considering
whether these political events were the proximate causes of decisions requiring no
such voilefaca"). Quite recent scholarship suggests the Court perhaps was switching
back and forth. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 927 (arguing that the 1935 decisions
were consistent with direction of precedent, but that the Court "panicked" in 1936);
Pepper, supra note 14, at 73-75 (arguing that apparently liberal decisions of the 1935
Term either were seen as not so liberal or were an aberration).
62 David Pepper cites numerous sources for the proposition that "court-watchers
immediately hailed the 1937 decisions as decisive turns in the Court's jurisprudence."
Pepper, supra note 14, at 136. Barry Cushman cites sources that suggest the 1937 deci-
sions were not that dramatic. See CUSHMAN, RETI NKING, supra note 8, at 177-80.
Cushman's sources are law review sources, however, and immediately before the bulk
of them he cites sources going the other way. As David Pepper observes, "I contend
that the overwhelming amount of evidence garnered from a survey of leading law
journals at the time outweighs Cushman's data." Pepper, supra note 14, at 136-37,
n.454. Certainly that is the case for the more popular media.
'0 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 143. The most that can be said for the legalist
view in this regard is that some of the press coverage spoke in terms of "broadening"
rather than overturning precedent, but this subtlety was only attempted by part of the
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sop and Catledge refer to the events of 1937 as "the Court's self-
salvation by self-reversal."
The apparent nature of the switch was clear to Felix Frankfurter,
who later took a vested interest in establishing that it was not a re-
sponse to public or political pressure .35 This concern that the switch
not appear to be one of political pressure was undoubtedly felt by all
those who cared about the distinction between law and politics. Yet,
Frankfurter was initially quite candid in observing the switch, calling
Roberts's and Hughes's support for the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision
"hardly reconcilable with some of the views they sponsored regarding
the invalidity of the labor provisions under the Guffey ACt... [O]ne
thing is patent to every informed reader of the Court's opinions. A
disregard of settled doctrines of constitutional procedure dangerously
borrows trouble."3
Even if the West Coast Hotel decision had little impact on public
press, and the broadening was seen to be substantial.
'- AiSoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAS, supra note 9, at 147.
See Ariens, supra note 14, at 621-23 ("Justice Felix Frankfurter tried to coordi-
nate history to protect the integrity of the Court as he saw it.... Frankfurter's revision-
ist history permitted defenders of the Supreme Court to claim thatJustice Roberts had
not altered his stance in 1937 as a result of FDR's court-packing plan."); Friedman, su-
pra note 247, at 1994 ("[I]n both securing the memorandum and publishing it, one of
Frankfurter's motivations may have been the support that it gave to the Court's legiti-
macy."); Pepper, supra note 14, at 150-51 ("Pusey and Frankfurter, on whom modem
legalists greatly rely, undertook their historical analysis with strong views about legiti-
mate constitutional change: Politics should never inform constitutional deliberation,
they believed. Their arguments aimed to forward these notions.").
2' Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the Octo-
ber Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 637 (1938). Richard Friedman's de-
tailed article on the switch offers justifications for seeing the votes inJones & Laughlin
Steel as other than pressured. He concludes the "evidence strongly supports Hughes's
insistence that Jones & Laughlin Steel represented no change in his concept of the
commerce power." Friedman, supra note 20, at 1967. However, Friedman concedes
that "Hughes's treatment of the Commerce Clause in Carter does not sit easily along-
side his monumental opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel. The two may be logically rec-
oncilable, but I believe that, to the extent they are not, Carter is the aberration." Id. at
1962. Be that as it may, it surely suggests Hughes "switched" to some degree between
Carter and Jones & Laughlin Steel and unquestionably that it could be seen as such. As
for Roberts, Friedman repeatedly acknowledges it is more difficult to explain his vote
inJones & Laughlin Steel than Hughes's vote. See id. at 1967-74. Friedman then offers
an extremely complicated (and somewhat questionable) apologia for Roberts, see id. at
1970-72, one that is a little inexplicable given his recognition of Roberts's "judicial ti-
midity," see infra note 370. Indeed, Roberts himself conceded the pressure, "the tre-
mendous strain and the threat to the existing Court, of which I was fully conscious."
Edward A. Purcell Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L. REV. 277, 279 (1994)
(citing Composition andJurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearings on S.J. Res. 44 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 83rd Cong. 9
(1954) (statement ofJustice OwenJ. Roberts)).
2000] 1051
1052 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
thinking about the Court-packing plan (a conclusion born out by
Gregory Caldeira's careful study of polling results),5 7 that does not
mean the decision failed to attract attention as representing a shift of
direction. Anything else would have been incredible given the out-
rage expressed at the Tipaldo decision. Leuchtenburg's study of pub-
lic opinion reveals "one correspondent ask[ed]: 'Didn't the Welsh-
man on the Supreme Court do a pretty job of amending the
Constitution yesterday?'" while a Democratic leader observed that
Roberts had performed a "marvelous somersault in mid-air".36s Simi-
larly, Attorney General Homer Cummings remarked that because of
"the change of ajudicial mind.., the Constitution on Monday, March
29, 1937, does not mean the same thing that it meant on Monday,
June 1, 1936."36
Alsop and Catledge themselves report that in drafting West Coast
Hotel, there was "Roberts' change of front to be explained," and that
to do so Hughes relied on "the novel argument that judicial interpre-
tation must take cognizance of the changes of the times." 7' The un-
derstanding that a shift had occurred was even greater after Jones &?
Laughlin Steel Alsop and Catledge report the surprise that greeted the
7 See infra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting numerous public reactions).
69 Id at 176. Leuchtenburg's account is chock full of reactions to the "change,"
including one woman's description of Roberts's "politically expedient" change, and
the New Yo*ess quip that "We are told that the Supreme Court's about-face was not
due to outside clamor. It seems that the new building has a soundproof room, to
which justices may retire to change their minds." Id. at 177.
370 ALsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYs, supra note 9, at 142. It is irrelevant that
Roberts voted prior to the announcement of the Court-packing plan (and thus could
not have switched in response to it), see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 177, or that
West Coast Hotel may not have been "novel." Alsop and Catledge were contemporary
observers, and they perceived that a change had occurred. More importantly, most of
the public would have had no idea whether the conference vote deciding West Coast
Hotel had been taken before or after the plan was announced.
The best explanation for Roberts's vote may well have been the harsh reaction the
Court's Tipaldo decision engendered. This is an extremely plausible explanation, es-
pecially given the general agreement that Roberts was not a particularly strong person-
ality. SeeFriedman, supra note 20 at 194446. Richard Friedman politely refers to Rob-
erts's "judicial timidity" and quotes Roberts as saying, "I have no illusions about my
judicial career. But one can only do what one can. Who am I to revile the good God
that he did not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a
Cardozo." Id. at 1945 n.270. In light of Roberts's generally-accepted "timid" personal-
ity, Richard Friedman seems also to accept the Tipaldo explanation for the vote in West
Coast Hotel See id at 1947 (arguing that in light of reactions to Tipaldo, "Roberts may
well have come to regret his vote"); id. at 1952 ("[T]o the extent that a political expla-
nation is needed to account for Roberts's move from Tipaldo to Adkins, it may be found
in the reaction to Tipaldo itself. ").
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Court's "self-reversal."37' The authors refer to Roosevelt's "fit of tem-
per" upon learning that he had a "liberal Court" with the Jones &
Laughlin Steel decision and describe how Senate Majority Leader Joe
Robinson advised Roosevelt that "[w]hat he ought to do is say he's
won, which he has, agree to compromise to make the thing sure, and
wind the whole business up."37 News coverage of the decision was
vast, with much of the commentary raising questions regarding the
fate of the Court-packing plan in light of the President's reversal of
fortune. The headline of Newsweek for the week of April 17th read:
"Judgment Day: Supreme Court Gives Its Blessing to Labor Relations
Act and Hands Roosevelt a Victorious Defeat."37 The Commonweal an-
nounced, "The Court Rules on Itself." 74 Leuchtenburg reports that
one former Hoover Administration official "thought the steel case
would be decided unanimously the other ,ay."375 Thurman Arnold
said, "Roosevelt has already accomplished his objectives and we are
rewriting all our briefs in the Department of Justice in terms of the
new definition of the commerce power.0 76 One Senator felt that the
rulings indicated "the certain defeat of the President's Supreme Court
reorganization plan."377 The Supreme Court "opinions robbed the
President of his best arguments-the driver had lost his whip."378 It
presented a "death blow to [the] court plan."379 President Roosevelt
now had his liberal court and "[h]is first reaction was an instant an-
ger. m
2. What Action Might Have Been Taken Against the Court
Had It Not Shifted Direction?
Given that the public perceived a shift by the Court, the next
question is what would have happened had the Court not changed di-
rection (or been understood by the public as not shifting). The focus
of this question relates to, but differs from, a prominent question ad-
s' Id. at 151-54.
'2 ALsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 153.
7 Judgment Day: Supreme Court Gives Its Blessing to Labor Relations Act and Hands Roo-
sevelt a Victorious Defeat, NEiSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1937, at 7 [hereinafterJudgment Day].
'7 The Court Rules on Itself, 25 COMMONWEAL 707 (1937).
"7 LEUcHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 311 n.22.
37' Id. at 143.
377 SeeJudgment Day, supra note 373, at 7.
378 Id, at 8.
s" Alsop & Catledge, Behind the Story, supra note 149, at 98.
m Alsop & Catledge, The Ghost supra note 260, at 20.
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dressed in much New Deal scholarship. Most scholars examine
whether Roosevelt's plan had any chance of success, in order to de-
termine whether the Justices felt pressured to change direction.
Here, the plan's chance of success is a barometer for whether the pub-
lic might have supported action against the Court had it not changed
direction.
Scholars differ greatly on the question of whether political pres-
sure could account for the Court's switch. Barry Cushman is skeptical
about the Court-packing plan's chance of success; if he is correct
this minimizes the possibility that "politics" could have influenced the
court's doctrinal decisions. 2  William Leuchtenburg insists the
chances were better than that, and that up to the very end the com-
promise measure might have succeeded.3 Alsop and Catledge's con-
temporary account gives the impression that the plan itself could have
succeeded before the switch, but that the compromise was a much
more doubtful proposition.3
With historical scholars in conflict, one might suspect the truth
lies somewhere in the middle, an intuition born out by an empirical
study of the events of 1937. In an attempt to understand why the plan
might have been defeated, an extremely useful study by Gregory Cal-
deira compared polling data taken throughout the Court battle with
critical events in that battle. The study suggests that support for the
plan reached a high after Roosevelt's radio addresses, and lost signifi-
cant headway (some five percent in each instance) after the decision
in Jones & Laughlin Steel and after Justice Van Devanter resigned. At
its height, support for the plan was at about forty-six percent.3 The
'8' See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 12-13 (arguing that from the begin-
ning the plan was countered by a large and organized opposition consisting of the
press, numerous bar associations, including the ABA, myriad civic and political organi-
zations, and a number of eminent liberal reformers, academics, and farmers).
See id. at 25 (contending that the Court-packing prong of any political explana-
tion for the Court's behavior is deficient insofar as the good reasons to doubt the plan
would be enacted gave the Justices "ample reason to be confident that constitutional
capitulation was not necessary to avert the Court-packing threat").
See LEucHTENBURG, supra note 8, at 148 (noting that under the compromise
bill, "FDR lost very little," and that the "prospects for enacting this new bill appeared
very promising").
' SeeALsoP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYs, supra note 9, at 226 (arguing that follow-
ing the Social Security decisions and the retirement of Van Devanter, the "time when
compromise would have been easy was definitely past").
U See Caldeira, supra note 24, at 1146 (discussing the constantly changing levels of
support for the Court-packing plan from February to June of 1937); see also The Fortune
Quarterly Suruey: IX FORTUNE, July 1937, at 96, 97 (showing that the President lost
support, from people generally supportive of his policies, after he proposed the Court-
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Caldeira paper supports the conclusion that the "switch" and the Van
Devanter retirement doomed the plan.s&
The political fortunes of the plan depended on a great deal more
than polling results, however!" Party discipline and loyalty to Roose-
velt's coattails remained significant factors to the end.m Even if less
than a majority of the country supported the plan, it still might have
made its way through CongressY 9
For present purposes, it is significant that at some points in the
debate the plan or a compromise had a reasonable chance of success.
By late spring, and certainly after the decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel
and Van Devanter's retirement, it would have been very difficult to get
the plan through Congress.3" Nonetheless, it would be wrong to con-
packing plan).
In light of the competing accounts, and the Caldeira study, Cushman's conclu-
sion that the Court was unaffected by Roosevelt's proposal is a bit difficult to accept.
Cushman bears an overwhelming burden of proof here, and as strenuously as he
makes his case, one is led to decide his conclusion is "not proven." Given the strength
of the competing accounts, it is hard to believe the Court could have been so certain of
the outcome as to ignore the political events. This alternate conclusion is bolstered by
the ChiefJustice's decision to write a letter to Congress challenging the factual basis
for Roosevelt's plan. See AiSop & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 126-27.
One has to wonder why, if the plan's demise was as certain as Cushman relates, the
Chief Justice ever would have gone to the extraordinary step of providing the bomb-
shell letter that he did refuting Roosevelt's premises. See id. at 125-26 (discussing
Hughes's resistance to the idea of participation).
The Literay Digest's poll famously undercounted FDR support in 1936 and pre-
dicted an Alf Landon victory. See Landon, 1,293,669; Roosevelt, 972,897: Final Returns in
the Digest s Poll of Ten Million Voters, LrERARY DIG., Oct. 31, 1936, at 5-6. On the other
hand, James Patterson identifies a study showing a high correlation between voter sup-
port and the stand of their home state's senators. See PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 99
n.76 (citing a study that showed the stand of Senators on the Court-packing plan
closely tracked public opinion in Senators' states).
m See PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 122-24 (noting that for a time the compromise
plan had a majority of votes in the Senate, but that when Majority LeaderJoe Robinson
suddenly died, party control faltered, and the plan died with him); How Big a Revolt
Against F.D.R.?, Bus. WY.,June 19, 1937, at 26 ("If [the Democratic congressmen] vote
against the President, they are likely to be knocked off in the primaries by some New
Deal candidate who charges that the sitting member fights against Our Leader-
against socialjustice."); see also PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 110-17 (making clear how
hard it was to break ranks with Roosevelt).
u' See PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 92-94 (stating that in the first week following
the announcement of the plan, a number of Democratic Senators announced them-
selves for the bill and Time magazine predicted passage of the bill despite great opposi-
tion from other congressional members).
3'0 See, e.g., AISOP & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 201 (noting that the
steering committee against the bill concluded in early May that they had an absolute
majority of Senate votes); CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 8, at 21 (stating that Van
Devanter's retirement "sealed the fate of the Court-packing plan"). Most studies have
focused on the Senate, but Roosevelt chose to fight the fight there because he calcu-
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clude the plan ever was considered folly. Too many contemporary ob-
servers indicated the plan had some chance for passage! 1 Had Roo-
sevelt not refused to compromise until it was too late, it seems likely
there was a second chance for some action.392
lated that was where the best chance of success rested. Leuchtenburg noted that al-
though the Democrats had a nearly four to one advantage in the House, the President
was eager to avoid confrontation with House Judiciary Committee Chairman Hatton
Sumners and so focused the Administration's efforts on the Senate where "the Presi-
dent had so overwhelming a majority in the upper house that several Democrats could
find seats only across the aisle in the Republican section." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note
8, at 135.
... See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 335 ("Most obviously, the President
could have won the battle for court-packing."). Indeed, when the Court-packing plan
was first presented, its passage seemed to some almost certain.
Even opponents of the plan conceded, however, that the bill would be ap-
proved in the House, where the Democrats had a nearly 4-1 advantage, with
many votes to spare.
The situation in the Senate seemed almost as promising. The President
had so overwhelming a majority in the upper house that several Democrats
could find seats only across the aisle in the Republican section. He figured to
lose a few conservative Democrats, but he might make them up .... Yet Roo-
sevelt was unlikely to need these, for there were enough Democratic Senators
who owed their election to him to provide a comfortable margin. If every one
of the sixteen Republicans rejected the measure, the opponents would still
need to persuade more than twice that many Democrats to desert the Presi-
dentjust to draw even.
LEUcHTENBuRG, supra note 8, at 135.
Even late in the game, the plan had a chance of passing. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra
note 136, at 133 (noting that the plan was viable even as late as May of 1937 when Jus-
tice Van Devanter retired); LEUCfTfENBURG, supra note 8, at 142 (quoting Time maga-
zine at the end of March: "Last week the stanchest foes of the President's Plan were
privately conceding that, if he chose to whip it through, the necessary votes were al-
ready in his pockets."). Even after the Judiciary Committee released a damaging re-
port, and a Gallup survey found support for judicial reform at a new low, Roosevelt
revived Court-packing on June 16 with a large picnic party on an island in Chesapeake
Bay. At the three-day party for all 407 Democratic Congressmen, Roosevelt is said to
have "clinched" votes by reversing a few minds. Id at 147.
Further, the outcome may have differed depending on the public's support of
Roosevelt in general.
Leuchtenburg's study suggests how formidable the President would have been
if his support had been soaring instead of sagging as an intransigent Court
continued to provoke public opinion. If the Congressional leadership got so
far despite the loss of popular support, how hard would it have been to win as-
sent from 49 of 76 Democrats in the Senate and 218 of 331 Democrats in the
House when the public was up in arms?
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 336.
"2 Alsop and Catledge are quite clear that as of April a compromise had a very
good chance of success, had the President been willing to listen. See ALSOP &
CATLEGE, THE 168 DAYS, supra note 9, at 197 (arguing that only a successful filibuster
could have defeated a compromise in April). They conclude the President lost critical
time in the two weeks after the Van Devanter retirement by not awarding the seat to
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Moreover, factors other than the Court's decision might have in-
fluenced the public in the face of perceived continued judicial recalci-
trance. Both Eben Moglen and Bruce Ackerman are right to observe
the significance of the economic downturn of 1937.!" 3 It would have
taken a stout Court indeed to have weathered the storm of public
opinion in the face of further bad economic times.
Although it is impossible to answer this question with anything but
conjecture, there seems a basis for concluding that had the Court not
shifted in the eyes of the public, some retributive action would have
been possible. Public sentiment against the Court was strong, and
Roosevelt's case would have been bolstered by a bad economy and
additional unpopular judicial decisions. The vote count throughout
the battle over the plan was close. 94 It is true the President or Con-
gress might have attempted a solution other than Court-packing, for
example, taking the amendment route, but the obstacles to that route
which existed in early 1937 largely remained in place after the plan
was defeated.
3. The Separation of Law and Politics
Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the Court is neither
necessarily susceptible to immediate retributive politics, nor is it en-
tirely immune. As much as we might like to think of the Court as
completely separate from politics designed to influence judicial deci-
Robinson. Id. at 214, 268. Leuchtenburg feels there was a chance of passing a com-
promise as late as the end ofJune. See William E. Leuchtenburg, MDR's Court Packing
Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death 1985 DUKE LJ. 673, 680-81 (1985). He supports
this claim with several sources that expressed such an opinion at the time. See id. at
681 n.50 (citing letters which indicate that there was a chance of passing a compro-
mise). Leuchtenburg concedes a filibuster was a problem, but says,
many doubted that a filibuster would succeed. Roosevelt's opponents, who
had been charging him with perverting the democratic process, would be in
an embarrassing position if they sought to deny the people's representatives
in Congress an opportunity to vote and thereby contrived the triumph of the
will of a minority.
Id. at 681.
3'3 SeeEben Moglen, Toward a New Deal Legal History, 80VA. L. REV. 263, 268 (1994)
(noting that the recession of 1937 was politically damaging, but that it cannot be "en-
listed as an influence on the Court's behavior during the crucial second half of the
1936 Term" because the recession "could hardly be used to explain events that oc-
curred before the public was aware of the worsening economic situation").
-" See, e.g., AIsOp & CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAys, supra note 9, at 245-46 (describing
how "at any moment" during the Court-packing battle a large number of key senators
could either desert or support Roosevelt and change the outcome); Caldeira, supra
note 24, at 1147 fig.3 (describing Gallup Poll results reporting a close division of opin-
ion on the eve of the Court's "switch").
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sions, there have been times in history-Reconstruction was one of
them, and the New Deal was another-when politics appeared to in-
fluence the Court, and may well have done so. As Edward Purcell has
said, speaking of Barry Cushman's legalist story of New Deal change,
"he does not show that the Justices were impervious to the concentrat-
ing pressures they faced during the Depression and the New Deal." 9 5
On the other hand, the traditional external story of political
change during the New Deal probably overstates matters" As this
history has shown, there clearly are forces that operate below the sur-
face of ordinary politics, even retributive politics, that are primary de-
terminants of whether such politics will succeed in disciplining the
Court. A recent study by Gregory Caldeira andJames Gibson similarly
concludes public opinion supports the Supreme Court, even in the
face of dissatisfaction with individual decisions, and that "public val-
ues" regarding democracy and rights are far stronger determinants of
the Court's public esteem. 97 The same sorts of forces that determined
the extent ofjudicial independence in 1937 also are those that would
be important at other points in history: notions of how democracy
should operate, notions of the role courts play in that democracy, un-
derstandings about judicial supremacy, and understandings about the
determinate meaning of the Constitution itself.
The best way to understand the Court's relationship to popular
politics is "bounded independence." On the one hand, a Court that
deviates far from popular understanding faces some threat of retribu-
tion. On the other hand, deep public support for constitutional de-
mocracy protects the Court, even when it renders unpopular deci-
sions. Differing normative views as to the desirability of this "bounded
independence" of the judiciary may exist, but as a descriptive conclu-
sion it seems a difficult one to avoid. As Larry Lessig has said (albeit
writing from a unique normative framework), "there is a limit on how
'95 Purcell, supra note 366, at 280. Caldeira concurs after his analysis of polling
data:
Perhaps one lesson we can extract from these results is that if the justices wish
to gain public support in battles with the popularly elected branches, they
must first assess whether the public stands with the president and Congress on
the substantive issue; and, if so, the Supreme Court can preserve its institu-
tional integrity by retreating on the issue.
Caldeira, supra note 24, at 1150.
396 Thus, Caldeira is wrong to discount entirely public "reverence" for the Supreme
Court. See Caldeira, supra note 24, at 1150.
217 See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 24, at 635-38 (arguing that a citizen may not
agree with all of the decisions of the Supreme Court, but may nonetheless concede the
legitimacy of the Court).
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much a court can resist what is taken for granted by all." s9 The reason
for that limit is that the political branches appear to retain some con-
trol over the Court. Although among academics the propriety of such
control is debated hotly, when the chips are (or appear to be) down,
politicians will urge exercising control. Whenever that occurs, the
country is forced yet again to confront its commitment to an inde-
pendentjudiciary.
B. The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change
This idea of "bounded independence" provides some insight into
one last question at the heart of much scholarship about the New
Deal, the question of the legitimacy of constitutional change. Some
scholars suggest that because the New Deal transformation occurred
without constitutional amendment, the change of law that followed
1937 was of dubious legitimacy.3' Most, however, recognize that the
legal regime that has held sway for some sixty years cannot seriously
be deemed lacking in legitimacy.4°° Nonetheless, they struggle to ex-
plain precisely how that change was legitimate, given the failure to
401utilize the Article V amendment process.
'3 Lessig, supra note 23, at 441.
3' See id. at 444-46 (discussing views of those who believe the change illegitimate).
40 There are a variety of legitimating stories of New Deal change. The one that
scholars call "traditional" or "conventional" is the story of the fall from grace. The Su-
preme Court deviated from original understandings between the end of the nine-
teenth century and the 1930s, and the New Deal transformation is legitimate in the
sense that it was a return to original ideas. See I ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 42-43
(explaining the golden age theory in which the switch in time serves as a symbol of
Court rebirth); 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 259 (same); Lessig, supra note 23, at 446
(same). As Larry Lessig explains, this story is a "lawyer's trick" for "however much the
plain language of these [Marshall Court] opinions might support the New Deal, there
can be no doubt that ChiefJustice Marshall and the Framers he spoke for would never
have sanctioned the extent of Federal power that the New Deal allowed." Id. at 447.
The remaining approaches are efforts to find the New Deal transformation consis-
tent with acceptable means of legal change. Larry Lessig argues that the New Deal
Court properly translated original understandings. See Lessig, supra note 23, at 453.
Larry Kramer argues the Court's doctrine properly reflected changing circumstances
until the Court "panicked" in 1936, and then went back upon its way in 1937. See
Kramer, supra note 16, at 927. Legalists such as Barry Cushman and Richard Friedman
are less explicitly concerned with the legitimacy of the change, but implicit in their
legalist story is legitimate constitutional doctrinal transition by the Supreme Court. See
CUSHMAN, supra note 8, at 4-7; Friedman, supra note 20, at 1982-83. Bruce Ackerman
constructs an elaborate schema for constitutional change. See generally 1 ACKERMAN,
supra note 44; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 14.
"0 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the common, but shallow,
modern explanation of the switch).
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Whatever one may wish to conclude about the normative desir-
ability of constitutional change outside of Article V, this historiogra-
phy suggests that such legitimacy simply exists as an "empirical" mat-
ter. 2 As this history demonstrates, there was a remarkable congru-
ence between what the public wanted out of the Court, and what the
Court ultimately delivered. The public supported the New Deal, and
believed the Constitution was elastic enough to tolerate new solutions
to economic problems, even if those solutions meant sweeping away
the firmaments of substantive due process and narrow commerce
power. At the same time, the public was jealous ofjudicial independ-
ence. Why? Because it saw a role for courts in protecting individual
liberty, in matters of race, of religion and speech, and of criminaljus-
tice. After 1937, the Court abdicated its role superintending eco-
nomic legislation and turned to protecting individual liberty.
The notion of public opinion legitimating constitutional doctrinal
change is likely to cause some normative discomfort. Any notion that
law is legitimate when it meets with public approval, and illegitimate
otherwise, seems to threaten the notion of the rule of law, and the
separation of law and politics. Espedally in a democracy, equating
popular approval with "law" appears to threaten the very values the
rule of law holds most dear: protection of individuals against the
power of the state. Would Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu
be considered legitimate simply because the public approved? Are
constitutional decisions regarding the rights of criminal defendants
legitimated simply by public approval?
Reassurance rests in recalling that the relationship between law
and politics still exists at a remove. The public's view ofjudicial inde-
pendence is not-happily-entirely congruent with its views on the
merits of individual decisions. 3 Indeed, the public may have views
about the judicial role that run contrary to the actions of government
officials. At least during the New Deal, it seems apparent the public
40 See Orts, supra note 30, at 267 (suggesting this notion of empirical legitimacy,
reflected in Max Weber's social theory).
403 This conclusion seems similar to where Don Herzog ends up on the argument
that the legitimacy of law rests on the separation of law and politics. He seems to con-
clude that, given the inherently contestable nature of political debate about legal reso-
lutions, such a strict separation is impossible. See HERZOG, supra note 1, at 124. As his
history of the trial of Charles I indicates (as do other examples in chapter four of his
book), in cases of political trials the separation is going to be difficult to maintain.
Nonetheless, Herzog establishes a number of conditions in the ordinary run of legal
cases, such as judges being free from political influence and deciding cases without
regard to the social and political station of parties. See id. at 129.
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was not looking for a rubber-stamp Court.
Moreover, the Court itself is not exogenous to this process. Public
opinion may determine the degree of the Court's independence, but
the judiciary may also sway public opinion. As other scholarship has
shown, the effects of this Court interaction are unpredictable and
sometimes perverse. °4 The Court, however, plays a role in the forma-
tion of public ideas not only about individual decisions, but about
broader questions of equality and democracy.
In fact, the real danger is that the Court itself could learn the
wrong lesson from the New Deal. What this history of the New Deal
seems to suggest is that the Court has more "political capital" than it
might imagine, that it is free to deviate from popular will. That room
to maneuver is not unbounded, surely, but-with one possible excep-
tion, in 1957-nothing the Court has done since 1937 has come close
to engendering a retributive threat to its independence.
Ironically, 1937 may have provided greater separation of law from
politics, not less. The events of 1937 ended any easy claim to the le-
gitimacy of Court-packing as a retributive measure. The Senate report
on Roosevelt's plan concluded: "It is a measure which should be so
emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to
the free representatives of the free people of America."" 5 That was
then; we have the insights of sixty years of history since. No serious
argument has since been made in favor of Court-packing, although
other remedies to control the Court have been urged. Court-packing
may have died its death in 1937.
Often unnoticed in academic literature is a similar rejection of po-
litical controls in the late 1950s. During the 1957 Term, the Supreme
Court decided ten cases in favor of Communists and Communist-
sympathizers, and against the government's war on those with un-
popular views.40 ' Forces opposed to those decisions joined hands with
414 See Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, supra note 116, at 580-81 (positing
that "all segments of society" participate in thejudiciary's interpretation of the Consti-
tution through the "elaborate dialogue of meaning"); MichaelJ. Klarman, How Brown
Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81J. AM. HIST. 81, 81 (1994) (describing
how the primary impact of a Supreme Court decision may be a backlash in public
opinion and action).
405 SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERALJUDICIARY,
S. REP. No. 711, at 23 (1937).
46 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reversing convictions of de-
fendants charged with conspiring to advocate and teach the forcible overthrow of the
U.S. government and to organize the Communist Party in violation of the Smith Act,
and concluding that "organize" referred only to creation of new organizations and not
already existing organization); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (revers-
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segregationists still angry with the desegregation decisions to launch
yet another political attack on the Court.417 This attack, embodied in
the Jenner-Buffer bill, took the form of jurisdicon-curbing."' The
measure sought to restrict the Court's jurisdiction on many fronts4 °
In a highly public and heavily-fought battle, the measure was de-
feated.410
ing the conviction of a witness in an investigation of subversive activities who refused to
answer questions regarding the Progressive Party and the contents of a lecture);Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (reversing the conviction of a labor union officer
for filing a false non-Communist affidavit with the NLRB and holding that the labor
union officer was entitled to examine FBI reports made by governmentwitnesses).
107 See C. HERMAN PRITcHETr, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960,
at 120 (1961) ("To a very considerable degree the legislative opposition to the Court's
security decisions was recruited from among southern members of Congress whose
main concern was retaliation for the Court's segregation ruling."); AlfredJ. Schweppe,
Court Reuwites Constitution in Its Own Image, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1958, at
114 ("The preponderant backing of the attack on the decision in the Nelson case is
made up of those who would undo the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. . . ."); J.
Patrick White, The Warren Court UnderAttack. The Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Soci-
ety, 19 MD. L. REv. 181, 189 (1959) ("Southern Congressmen, having failed in their
initial effort to mobilize anti-court sentiment.., were quick to perceive that their basic
purpose of discrediting the Supreme Court would be served whether the issue was un-
due concern for civil liberties or softness to communism or states' rights."). J. Lee
Rankin explained that
[The Court] is the target of a rare combination of dissident groups who have
found common ground in their displeasure with decisions in their fields of
special interest Segregation is the particular rallying point at the moment but
the complaints cover limitations on... power in congressional hearings, re-
strictions on dismissal of government employees in security programs, prohi-
bition against punishment by States for sedition directed against the United
States, denial of power to discharge an employee for claiming privilege against
self-incrimination before congressional committees, and determination that a
state cannot draw unfavorable inferences from a mistaken but honest refusal
to answer relevant questions in a proceeding for admission to the bar.
J. Lee Rankin, An Independent Supreme Court, in 25 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 389
(1959) (footnotes omitted).
40s See A Bill to Limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, S. 2646,
85th Cong. (1958). For one of the best sources on the history of this legislation, see
generally PRrrc-ETr, supra note 407. See also White, supra note 407, at 193 (discussing
the attack on the Court following its desegregation rulings, including thejenner-Buter
bill).
'09 Senator Jenner proposed a bill that, in its original form, would have deprived
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law in
state courts; over any function or practice of a congressional committee, including any
proceeding against a witness charged with contempt of Congress; over executive
branch employee loyalty-security programs; over state attempts to control subversive
activities within the state; and over regulations of school boards with respect to subver-
sive activities of teachers. SeePRITcHETr, supra note 407, at 31.
4,0 See PR-TCHETr, supra note 407, at 11, 119-21 (speculating as to several possibili-
ties why the Supreme Court emerged largely unscathed).
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Since the fight over Jenner-Butler, there has not been any serious
attempt to control the Court politically, save in the one way approved
during the New Deal: the regular process of attrition and presidential
appointment coupled with Senate approval. It was here, during the
nomination of Robert Bork, that the battle over the Court was fought
in the political arena. And it is here that the battle has remained. For
the time being, the public has rejected political control over the
courts, save for the confirmation process.
IV. CONCLUSION: LAW'S POLITICS
What happened in 1937 and thereafter teaches us important les-
sons about the legitimacy of constitutional change, ofjudicial review,
and of the separation of law and politics. What did not happen
teaches us some lessons aboutjudicial independence.
It is difficult after 1937 to insist that there is a strict separation of
law and politics; it is not clear anyone really does. In the 1930s, the
public was influenced greatly by the economic catastrophe facing the
nation and by growing world totalitarianism. In the face of those con-
cerns, fundamental shifts occurred in notions of democracy, the in-
terpretation of the Constitution, and the role of courts in protecting
civil liberty and guarding against government oppression. All of these
factors are in some sense "political," and all affected public accep-
tance of the role of courts and influenced reactions to the Court-
packing plan.
Most importantly, these forces led the public to important deter-
minations regarding the role of courts and the legitimacy of constitu-
tional change, determinations that have endured even as they have
perplexed scholars in the legal academy. The public in 1937 was
ready for a change in constitutional meaning. Although it might not
have amended the Constitution formally-by way of the Article V pro-
cedure-there is very little sign of resistance to the same change by
means ofjudicial interpretation. If anything, the public seems to have
demanded this change and to have accepted it happily when it came.
Academics, seeing no vehicle for such change in the Constitution, are
troubled. The public, by contrast, was reconciled.
Indeed, for this very reason, recent Supreme Court decisions in
the area of federalism and economic liberty may not be as surprising
as some observers believe. Although it is far too early to tell, the deci-
sions in cases such as Lopez and Eastern Enterprises may do nothing
more than reflect social forces today that are comparable to those that
existed during the New Deal. The public does seem dissatisfied both
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with national interest-group politics and with the increase in the size
of government accompanied by political stasis. The popularity of
"devolution" reflects this trend. The public may be comfortable with
the direction of constitutional doctrine, even as academics express
unease.
As this story suggests public comfort or discomfort will, ultimately,
have some impact on Supreme Court review and constitutional
change. That was true in 1937 and it will prove true today. This his-
tory suggests law and politics are inextricably intertwined, but at a dis-
tance, not in a close fashion of political retribution for unpopular de-
cisions.
